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FOREWORD
It is difficult to recall a debate in the civil law which has created the
divisiveness and the intensity of purpose that tort reform is causing.
From newspaper editorials in virtually every jurisdiction, to the statements of experts in a variety of fields, opinions on the subject abound.
For many reasons this national colloquy is confusing. The legal principles are challenging and the unavailability of reliable information makes
precise analysis problematical. The debate is further complicated by
competing interest groups - the plaintiffs' and defense bars, insurers
and insureds, tortfeasors and tort victims, manufacturers, health care
providers, business coalitions, and other interested organizations each of which has a different perspective and a specific agenda. Armed
with their own statistics and surveys, these groups lobby the legislatures
and voice their particular concerns and demands. Frequently their proposals are perplexing to lawmakers, many of whom have their own differences of opinion where these technical issues are concerned. In
jurisdictions where a legislative consensus is eventually reached, and
tort reform proposals are enacted, the consequences affect uncounted
activities, institutions, and people. Such pervasive results, whether foreseen or unexpected, substantially alter various aspects of American law
and life.
In some respects, tort reform can be viewed as a grand social science experiment. Proponents of tort reform, the "theoreticians," formulate their various hypotheses about what is wrong, and about what
kinds of reform are necessary to correct it. When their proposals become law, the experiment begins. Those jurisdictions which forego tort
reform may serve, in the clinical sense, as "control" groups. Well into
the next decade, these control jurisdictions will no doubt be analyzed
and measured against those jurisdictions where tort reform has been enacted. Future legislators may choose to alter the experiment in order to
fine-tune the reformation process. Others may advocate abandoning
the experiment altogether. In the final analysis, however, the efficacy of
tort reform will probably be determined by the alleged barometers of
litigiousness - court filings, docket congestion, and median verdict
amounts, by the insurance industry's improved ability to provide liability
coverage at a reasonable cost, and finally, by whether legitimate tort
claimants can obtain just compensation.
Until then, the debate will continue.
This Symposium represents our attempt to contribute to this vital
public policy discussion. While presenting commentary which reflects
differing tort reform perspectives, we have strived to avoid the pitfalls of
the national debate. No absolute answers are presented; no quick fixes
are proposed. Instead, the important issues are addressed and illuminated, opposing views are vigorously represented, and innovative ap-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4

proaches are put forward. It is our hope that this approach will assist
the scholar, the professor, the practitioner, the legislator, and the jurist,
in their efforts to achieve an understanding, if not a resolution, of the
tort reform debate.
Robert ]. Bricmont, Jr.
Symposium Editor

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM:
SOME CAUTIONING IMPLICATIONS OF
LEGISLATIVE TORT REFORM
EDWARD A. DAUER*

A few years before his untimely death my friend and colleague
Grant Gilmore wrote a book entitled The Ages of American Law. ' It was, in
my opinion, the high point of his extraordinary career - an encompassing sweep of American legal history, cannily retold by a scholar who got
away with deriding it only because he so obviously loved it. Gilmore
himself was an altogether interesting fellow, outspoken and dubious
about nearly everything (except about the uselessness of the empirical
social sciences; of that, he was never in doubt). 2 In the classroom he
lectured with a gravelly, almost shy woof that became trapped in his
moustache as often as not, affording a virtuoso education to generations
of law students who happened, as Time Magazine once described it, to sit
in the first two rows.
The book is like the man - elegant, literate, unencumbered by facts
contrary to its theme, and profoundly insightful. It describes the whole
history of American law, from the Founding to the present, in three
ages: the Age of Discovery, the Age of Faith, and the Age of Anxiety.
During the Age of Faith (roughly, the middle of the nineteenth to the
middle of the twentieth century) we of the legal profession believed almost monotheistically in the intrinsic compass of the common law, in its
ability to govern with a principled consistency elaborated through the
art of judicial opinions. As Gilmore's friend Guido Calabresi would
later put it, we trusted the topography 3 of the law mostly to the judges,
no one of whom could depart very far from the gently moving center of4
gravity itself created by the tomes of opinions which had come before.
While some, like Calabresi perhaps, might have preferred that we
remain forever in judicial empyrean, 5 Gilmore's history puts us, like it or
not, squarely in statutory perdition. Our age, the Age of Anxiety, is a
*
Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Denver. Dean Dauer served during
1985 and 1986 as Chair of the Colorado Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance, a group appointed by the governor and legislature of Colorado to investigate the
causes and remedies of the "liability insurance crisis" in that state. The Report of the Task
Force, dated January 1986, is available from the Office of the Governor, Denver, Colorado. This article is adapted from an address to the Colorado Defense Lawyers' Association, September 6, 1986.
1. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
2. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 4 (1974).
3. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Calabresi uses

the term topography as a metaphor for a "mapping of societal desires or values" onto the
substance of the law. Id. at 98-99.
4. Id. at 96- 100. See also B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 44-47 (1938).
5. G. CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 5.
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time of skepticism about the sufficiency of the common law's gyroscopes. It is an age of increasing interest in, even preference for, our
society's fashioning responses to matters of policy from the whole cloth
of legislation. America's recent legal history has been, so say the appellate-court-groupies among us, an "orgy of statute-making.'6
Gilmore seemed resigned to it. "Every Blackstone must have his
Bentham" he said, 7 thereby confounding with parable what otherwise
would have been clear enough. But if his reading of history is right,
then there is in Gilmore's theme a reason for us to begin this Symposium's analyses of tort reform - the Age of Anxiety's latest anxiety with some perspective on the more general implications of what it is we
do and how it is we do it.
Some who read the articles in this Symposium may conclude, as
some trial lawyers' associations have argued, 8 that the "crisis" in civil
liability has been a media extravaganza staged by firms in the insurance
industry acting, if not in concert, then at least in harmony. The issue,
however, is not whether we have experienced an insurance crisis; we
have. 9 What is genuinely at issue is whether there has or has not been,
beneath it and driving it, a crisis in the law. Mr. Nader denies it.' 0 For
him the causes lie rather in the financial management of the insurance
companies. That is what is to be legislated about, not the set of judgegrown rules by which (according to Mr. Nader) the moral and ethical
fibre of the marketplace is reinforced. 1' The tort-compensation system
itself (assuming that compensation is what tort law is for) 12 is working
efficiently, adds Mr. Habush. 13 Seldom, he might have pointed out,
have the media in their coverage of the law identified any of the dangerous articles which have not come to market because of the deterrent ef6.

G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95.

7. Id. at 68.
8. See, e.g., Baldwin, Setting the Standards, 21 TRIAL 4 (1985); Habush, "My ll'indow to
Shout Out of," 23 TRIAL 5 (1987); Perlman, "It's as American as the Fourth ofJuly," 22 TRIAL 5
(1986).
9. See generally R. Willard & R. Willmore, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group
on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, 6-15 (U.S. Dep't ofJustice 1986). And for one state in particular, see
J. Kezer, Special Report to the Colorado General Assembly on the Insurance Availability
Problems in Colorado 1985-1986 (Colo. Div. Insurance, Feb. 2, 1987).
10. Nader, The Assault On Injured Victims' Rights, infra pp. 625-39. See alsoGalanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What 14e Know and Don't Know (and Think l'eKnow) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4 (1983); M. GALANTER,
THE DAY AFrER THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1986) (disputing empirically the existence of

the litigation crisis).
11. Nader, supra note 10, at 631.
12. While compensation is a purpose of tort law, it is not the purpose. There are a
myriad of possibilities for effecting compensation. Deterrence and allocative efficiency are
more likely candidates for the purpose, if we were forced to choose only one. The tort
system is that process which appears on both lists - i.e., it accomplishes both compensation and deterrence/allocation at the same time. For a further discussion of this point, see
Dauer and Nichols, Economic Considerations in the Casefor Casualty Insurance Price Regulation,
(to be published by YALEJ. REG.).

13. Habush, The Insurance "Crisis". Reality or Myth?, infra pp. 641-50.
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fect of torts: "NO-ONE INJURED BY FAULTY POWER TOOL IN
SPRINGFIELD TODAY - TORT SYSTEM TAKES CREDIT!"
4
Pressler and Schieffer's focus on the joint and several liability rule1
exemplifies the clarion from the other side: There is no sufficient brake
in judicial law-making to cabin the growth of once good rules. To
Schwartz and Mahshigian the causes of the crisis are different but
equally plain 1 5 - an underlying tort system which creates rather than
minimizes uncertainty and instability. Is that unpredictability something
new? Or has it been there all along, only masked until now by the hap16
pier side of the well-known insurance pricing cycle?
The argument for predictability is attractive enough: Rules which
change between the time a risk is insured and the time its liability tail is
satisfied create uncertainties in the costs and therefore in the pricing of
future risks. Protective underwriting results. Jury awards which are outliers to "normal" statistical variation (and Mr. Nader would say that no
significant number are) 17require adequate reserves, and all of that goes
one way - not even insurers are risk-preferring.
It would seem, from looking at the results in many states over the
past year, that the argument for predictability has obtained. 18 It is the
single best hypothesis, I believe, to explain why some substantive revisions were enacted and others were not. Joint and several liability, for
example, is not unarguably either fair or unfair. The question is that of
who bears the risk of a co-defendant's insolvency - the plaintiff, or the
other defendants. 19 But it is as to this rule that in virtually every legislature a proposal for abolition has been made 20 (and in a large number,
been enacted 21 ). The rule requires a solvent insurer to respond for
14. Pressler and Schieffer,Joint and Several Liability: A Case For Reform, infra pp. 651-84.
15. Schwartz and Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution For Product Liability Crises: Uniform
Federal Tort Law Standards, infra pp. 685-702.
16. Underwriting profits and losses in the casualty insurance business show a clear
cyclic trend, at least since the early 1950's - three years of profits followed by three years
of losses, repeated five times from 1953 to 1984, with the swings of each cycle greater than
those preceding. See Report of the Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance,
Liability Insurance and the Law of Torts in Colorado - Problems and Remedies, A-2 (1986); and
The Property and Casualty Newsletter (June 1985).
17. Nader, supra note 10, at 634-35; see also Daniels & Martin, CivilJury Awards are Not
Out of Control, THE JUDGE'S J. 10 (Winter 1987).
18. As of June 1987, 45 states have enacted some form of legislation in response to
the "insurance crisis." In 13, punitive damages were restricted or limited; in 32 states,
joint and several liability was amended; and in 10 states caps were enacted on
"noneconomic" damage awards. Private communication from Brenda Trolin of the National Conference of State Legislatures (May 3, 1987).
19. Pressler and Schieffer, supra note 14; Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (1985). But see Steinberg, The Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability is
Properly Concerned with the Rights of Victims Rather than the Economic Wel-Being of Wrongdoers, 9
L.A. LAw. 35(3) (1986).
20. Some 46 states have had bills proposed in the last five years which deal with the
modification or repeal of joint and several liability. California repealed its joint and several liability rule through a general referendum. (Proposition 51). Private communication
with Brenda Trolin of the National Conference of State Legislatures (May 3, 1987).
21. Pressler and Schieffer, supra note 14, at nn. 26-31 and accompanying text notes
that at least 33 states did enact statutes which have eliminated or restricted joint and several liability.
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damages caused (or at least contributed to) by an insolvent defendant
whom it did not know and whose behavior it had no chance to assess, to
23
22
Caps on noneconomic harms
control, or intelligently to underwrite.
(those not amenable to strict financial quantification), and on punitive
damages 24 (not heretofore limited by the size of the economic risk),
their proponents declaim, will confine "lottery-like" jury awards 2 5 and
can therefore also be understood as devices not just to make losses
smaller, but to make the variability of losses less uncertain, the efficiency
of insuring higher, and the fidelity of insurance pricing to the real risks
of every activity greater again. Maybe so.
Vandall 26 and the Morrisons 2 7 display another contrast. For
Vandall, the market is the balm. Let there be free entry and there will be
supply-side correction. 28 Departures of prices from marginal costs can
persist only when there is out-and-out collusion, 29 or when there are
barriers to competition from new players. 30 The insurance industry is
too big for explicit collusion, but too "protected" for there to be free
3
entry in a run much shorter than half of the pricing cycle. '
For the Morrisons the corrective balances of the market have their
analogues within the law itself: What the legislature can take away, the
22. My colleague Stephen Pepper disagrees with this argument. To him, one is negligent in most jointly-caused torts at least partly because the other tortfeasor's behavior was
predictable and the harm from it avoidable by the person being charged with the full cost.
For example, it is negligent to let the bushes grow to block the sight line of the intersection partly because the risk of a drunk driver running the light on the crossing road is a
predictable event. If the bushes are in fact a "but for" cause of the accident, then the
owner's negligence caused all - not just part - of the loss; and leaving all of the loss on
him is not quite so offensive as some might otherwise believe.
Professor Pepper may be right, but I think the point is inapposite. For insurers to
underwrite (not for the courts to allocate) risks at prices faithful to the true cost of the risk
requires information. While the bush-grower's negligence may be predicated on the
probability of a drunk's running the light, that is a gross, retrospective figure. Unless the
joint and several rule operates on a "but for" basis, the insurer is not able to modulate its
pricing prospectively with respect to actual degrees of risk, nor to affect the behavior of the
drunk by pricing or withholding coverage. Private correspondence with Professor Stephen Pepper (Apr. 15, 1987).
23. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (Supp. 1986) which limits noneconomic
damages to $250,000 unless the court finds by "clear and convincing evidence" that the
award should be higher. In no case, however, can the noneconomic award be over
$500,000.
24. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1974 and Supp. 1986) which caps punitive
damages at the amount of actual damages awarded to the party.
25. The National Law Journal, June 9, 1986, at 15, col. I (critics of legal system claim
that "huge jury awards '. . . resemble lottery jackpots' " (quoting Galanter, Landscape of
Disputes, supra note 10, at 62-63)).
26. Vandall, Our Product Liability System: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, infra
pp. 703-17.
27. Morrison Jr. and Morrison, ConstitutionalChallenges to Tort Reform: Equal Protection
and State Constitutions, infra pp. 719-31.
28. Vandall, supra note 26.
29. P. SAMIJELSON, ECONOMicS 484 (11th ed. 1980).
30. Id. at 489.
31. See Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Propertv-Liabilitv Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J.

OF

ECON., No. 2, at 375 (1973).

One example of an entry barrier is the

requirement that adequate financial reserves be posted before the first policy is even written. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 700 to 700.05 (West 1972 and Supp. 1987); ILL. REX'. STAT.

ch. 73, § 625 (1965 and Supp. 1986).
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courts under color of constitutions can give back3 2 - within limits of
33
course. (Some already have.)
The point to notice about the articles which form the dialogues of
this Symposium, however, is not just whose view of reality embraces
more evidence or whose view of justice commands more support.
Neither is it my intention in this Introduction to cheer, Bronx or otherwise, what any particular legislature has done or is about to do. The
point I do wish to make is about a fact so obvious that it may otherwise
be lost in the din: These arguments, this evidence, these verities about
stability and markets and competition - they are all being addressed to
leeislatures.
Before the crisis was upon us, Torts was very largely the province of
the judiciary. We lived in an Age of Faith. Tending to the innards of a
large body of important social policy was a matter of deliberate, decentralized and incremental judicial effort. Torts is now somewhat more
statutory than it has been (and, to the extent that it is a body of legislative law, more stable too). That, quite apart from the substance of the
new rules, is a fairly significant fact. It poses other kinds of questions,
and challenges, to those of us who care about (or help in) the making of
the law.
Its implications are three.
The first comes from a fundamental difference in the attributes of
legislatures and courts. In matters of legal principles courts are expert,
34
and nonmajoritarian. Legislatures are majoritarian, and non-expert.
Certainly there are individual experts within (and lurking around the
lobbies of) the legislature, but as an institution a legislature is supposed
to be something like a jury - more vox populi and less self-consciously
jurisprudential than an appellate court is required to be.
That difference implies that once a legislature has taken a matter
up, it is both likely and appropriate that the outcome will be at least
resonant with the views of the constituents whom the legislators serve.
(Even special interest lobbyists cannot long prevail against the conscious
wishes of more numerous voices.) 3 5 Those views are in turn shaped by
the information which the wider public has (or is fed) about the matters
being debated. And where does that information come from?
32. Morrison Jr. and Morrison, supra note 27.
33. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (limits on medical malpractice awards in Virginia struck down); Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 730 P.2d 178
(Ariz. App. 1985) (law prohibiting emotional distress damages in defamation action held
unconstitutional); Pfost v. State of Montana, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985) (statute limiting
state tort liability invalidated); White v. State of Montana, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983)
(law prohibiting recovery of noneconomic damages from state, and law limiting economic
recovery from state held unconstitutional).
34. This statement is very general, of course. It does not take fully into account intricacies such as coalition building, committee structure, or the power of experienced committee chairs in legislative lawmaking. For a comprehensive analysis of the legislative
process, see, F. DICKERSON & C. NUTrING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1978);
0. HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (1980); M.JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

35. See supra note 34.

(3d ed.1977).
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The media. Most particularly, the morning paper and the evening
news. Whether they would choose the sobriquet or not, the news media
are the adult education system of the United States. Yet the contents of
their lessons are often more dependent upon factors relevant to the medium than they are to the subject being taught. Normally, the need to
sell papers does no harm. Although one fiery crash makes the headlines
while a trillion miles of accident-free transportation never even gets
mentioned, most newspaper readers are savvy enough about highways
and automobiles to be able to put the headline into the context of ordinary driving life. Commercial journalism may be macabre and perversely entertaining, but it is not misleading to anyone about the overall
sinews and synapses of the highway system. The pupils come to the lesson already equipped with a useful experiential background.
In areas where the public is inexpert, the selection process employed by the media lacks such external sources of correction. There is
no sufficient background in the public mind, equivalent to that of highways and cars, on questions concerning the relationships among legal
rules, social policy and economic activity. 3 6 The public's ability to place
into context what is reported about lawsuits and lawyers and litigants
and liability lines is therefore vastly less. The amazing cannot be distinguished from the ordinary, nor be understood within the context of the
necessary, by someone who has little prior sense of what the ordinary or
the necessary is.
Nonmajoritarian experts - courts - may have the (dis)advantage
of being relatively more isolated from public opinion and therefore from
the effects of its more transitory and malleable potentials, but a deliberately majoritarian institution - a legislature - depends sensitively for
the quality of its product upon the quality of the ongoing education attained by its constituents.
Over the past two years the insurance industry has surely used the
38
press to its advantage. 3 7 Mr. Habush would call it media hype.
Others might say it was an attempt to inform. Either way, in many states
it did have the effect it was meant to have. Thus from the insurance
industry's point of view, legislating with the aid of the press "worked" to
various degrees in various jurisdictions, a fact which should be of some
satisfaction to that industry's attorneys. There is, however, for them and
everyone else an implication to ponder: The ingredients of stirring
headlines may change over time. It is not a good thing for each new
legislative pen to write against a virgin slate. Good public education is by
36. Throughout the course of the debates in Colorado, for example, I did not once
see in any of the media a discussion of what the underlying issues in civil liability really are.
Total safety, as Arthur Best has reminded me, is impossible. The ultimate question is
therefore that of defining and efficiently implementing the optimal amount of safety - and
even more importantly, determining by the selection of a compensation system who it is
that will make this decision. Private correspondence with Professor Arthur Best (Apr. 10,
1987).
37. See, for example, the series of ads sponsored by Aetna Life and Casualty Co. on
civil justice reform in Time magazine from April to June of 1987.
38. Habush, supra note 13, at 644-45.
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contrast a policy rudder in an ocean of shifting political currents. Members of the legal profession in particular have an interest and an obligation in this regard - lawyers are not only operatives of the legal system,
they are an integral part of it. The goodness of the legal system is the
source of the goodness of lawyers. 3 9 In an age of statutes, the quality of
the public's legal education is a matter of increasing importance. Building that foundation should therefore be a matter of the legal profession's particular concern.
The second of the three implications has to do with how courts and
legislatures make decisions. A legislature has the advantage of being
able to look at a problem comprehensively, of being able to set rules
which deal with all of it, 4 ° while courts have the ability to modulate rules
to make good,just sense in individual cases. 4 1 That is the usual comparison. But there is another aspect to it, the induced drag of one element
of the stability already discussed: A court gets to revisit its rules almost
anytime a litigant wants to bring an argument about obsolescence to its
attention. If the court is convinced by the argument, the statement of
the rule can be modified just enough to reflect the new circumstances
(while respecting the old principle, of course.) The camel's nose destabilizes the legal tent. A rule of statute law has the contrasting advantage
of stability, but the disadvantage of being fixed in time. Grant Gilmore
put it this way:
One of the facts of legislative life . . . is that getting a statute

enacted in the first place is much easier than getting the statute
revised so that it will make sense in the light of changed conditions... The most difficult period in the life of a statute - as in
the life of a human being - is middle age. The statute is no
longer what it once was but there is life in the old dog yet. An
occasional subsection still has its teeth [and] there will [always]
be cases in which even the most disingenuous construction will
not save the day ...

Once the legislature has taken over a field,
2

4
only the legislature can effect any further change.
The legislature does not, however, revisit its work often enough. As
time passes the coalition of fervors which caused the statute to be enacted will have passed on to other things leaving, as Calabresi suggests,
a governing rule which would not likely command majoritarian support
as it enters its dotage. 43 There are, moreover, some interesting side
effects, perhaps the best example of which is told by Calabresi's own
work in torts. 44 When Workers' Compensation statutes were first en-

39. See Dauer and Leff, The Lawyer as Friend A Reply to Professor Fried,86 YALE L. J. 573
(1977).
40. See supra note 34.
41. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); B. KAPLAN, ENCOUNTERS
WITH O.W. HOLMES, JR., IN HOLMES AND THE COMMON LAW: A CENTURY LATER 2 (1983).
42. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 96-7.
43. G. CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 6.
44. Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Entep rise?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
313 (1978); Calabresi and Hirschoff; Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
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acted they included, typically, fixed schedules of benefits - so many
dollars for a lost arm, so much for this injury or that. 45 The schedules
may have been adequate when they were passed, and the tradeoff for
them was the exclusivity of the remedy against the employer; 4 6 but as
time went on inflation and our changing social valuation of the costs of
accidents caused many states' benefits schedules to become grossly inadequate. Courts could not amend the statutory schedules and legislatures did not; and so, during the statutes' middle age, there was a very
stable but very unsatisfactory system.
Then an odd thing happened. Some courts, faced simultaneously
with an inability to amend the statute and the problem of affording a
reasonable remedy to injured workers, developed an alternative not
foreclosed by the statute's exclusivity language. 47 Namely, they allowed
the employee to bring an action not against the employer, but against
the manufacturer of the lathe which injured him. That is how, in the
machine tool industry, the products liability explosion began. 48 It was,
in retrospect anyway, predictable.
The third and final implication of statutory law-making has to do
with a much more delicate and difficult subject. Every author of American jurisprudence has had something to say about the proper role of
courts in a system committed to the separation of governmental powers. 49 Most of them agree on two things (and not much else): First, is
the requirement of judicial restraint - the passive virtue 50 of deciding
only cases which need to be decided, and to be limited in the judicial
law-making function to the needs of that one particular case. 5 1 Therefore if an area of the law is ready for a wholesale rethinking, then a legislative review is surely appropriate. Courts utilize policy to make law.
Legislatures utilize law to make policy. Both are essential.
The second area of scholarly agreement, made all the more powerful by the surficial paradox ofJerome Frank 52 being its champion, is that
a broad and deep public respect for the work of the courts is an element
essential to efficient governance, and to domestic peace. 53 There is, on
45. See A. LARSON, 2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 58.10, at 10-311 (1987). For
an interesting historical essay on Workmen's Compensation laws, see, Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workmen's Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
46. See A. LARSON, supra note 45, at § 65.10, at 12-1.
47. G. CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 143.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., A. ADAMS, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: THE BEST MEDICINE, IN HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES 135 (1984); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67
(1969); B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 42; H. WELLINGTON, THE NATURE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW,
IN POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 157 (1985).
50. "Passive virtues" is a term first used by Alexander Bickel to describe judicial techniques for avoiding untoward law-making activity. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
51. Id. at 133.
52. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th ed. 1949).
53. J. FRANK, supra note 52, at 227. Frank quotes Demogue as saying:
On the whole it is to be desired that this ideal respect for the law, although it rests
at bottom on a mistake which the shrewd do not make, belief in the omnipotence
of law, be developed as far as possible; that it become a sort of religion because of
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the other hand, no question that in areas other than constitutional law
the superior branch is the legislature. 54 When the courts have gone
astray, when the syllogism of the precedents leads to an end beyond the
public's tolerance, it is the prerogative of the legislature to declare what
is trump. The trick then is to serve both of these goals at the same time
- to respect the hierarchy of the branches, yet to preserve to the courts
the public's respect. Whether that can be done depends upon how the
trump cards are seen to be played. If the debate is cast in terms of
where the law is going and where it should go, then the public is appropriately engaged. But if the colloquy is reported (ah, the news media
again) not in terms of the law, but in terms of the behavior of the judges
and the lawyers - the word "scoundrels" is the layman's collective
noun - then the delicacy of that important balance is put at risk. Law
reform then comes not in a way compatible with respect for the judiciary, but in a way antagonistic to it. It does not help in our efforts to
achieve a just and workable law for the public's interest in the process to
be whetted by an unwholesome view of the profession which is, inevitably, its husband.
What I have described as three implications of statutory law reform
are, again, not meant as kudos or critiques of any particular law revisions, or of their absence. (Me too, Queen Gertrude.) What they are
instead are some curious observations prompted by my recalling with
fondness the wily visage of the essential Gilmore. Yet to lawyers they
may be more than curiosities. They may, in fact, be very serious challenges not ever faced by our profession during its Age of Faith.
The first and third points may combine. The bar itself has an abiding interest in the quality of the legal education offered to the public by
the media. And an understanding style of reportage about the institutions
of the law is as important as is accuracy in reporting about the law itself.
The organized bar is the best and perhaps the only institution with both
the incentive and the ability to respond to those needs.5 5 While individthe resulting tranquility and economy of social forces, for then more profitable
and efficient action will be possible in other directions.
Id. at 227-28.
54. This, of course, is apart from certain fascinating issues fostered by the last sections
of such U.S. constitutional amendments as XIII, XIV, and XV, which provide Congress
with the "power to enforce" each amendment "by appropriate legislation." Arguably, on
the basis of these provisions, Congress can "go further" than the courts in creating (some
would even argue in eliminating) constitutional rights. See Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980) (city of Rome, Georgia forced to comply with preclearance procedure of
Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (provision in
Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowing Puerto Ricans to vote despite inability to read or write
English upheld); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (provisions of the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1970 forbidding the use of literacy tests in the election process held
constitutional); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1059-1104 (1985) (discussion of con-

gressional power to change constitutional rights); J.

NOWAK,

R.

ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CON-

STITUTIONAL LAW 802-26 (1986) (analysis of Congress' power to enforce civil rights).
Private correspondence and quoted from Professor George Pring (Apr. 15, 1987).
55. As the Model Code of Professional Responsibility points out, lawyers must strive

to improve the legislative system. See MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 8-

7 (1979) ("lawyers are a vital part of the legal system"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1979) ("lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contri-
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ual lawyers will continue to exercise their jealous zeal on behalf of their
clients - in the newspapers, if the matter is in the legislature 56 - the
bar associations are able to take a more capacious view. The public, and
the press, must understand things rightly. Legislative power is the
trump suit; its responsible exercise depends upon the sound education
of those whose tempers limit it.
As to the second point - the "fixedness" of statute-made law - the
bar has equally useful opportunities. One, for example, would be to
support (and where they do not exist, to create) working groups, of lawyers and others who can on an ongoing basis attend to whether the statute law is aging gracefully or not 5 7 _ to review and report on coming
obsolescences and other needs for updating and reform, lest we find
ourselves caught again (as we did with Workers' Compensation) between the Scylla of injustice and the Charybdis of judicial legislation.
One of the characteristics of the tort reform movement, as it is
chronicled in the papers of this Symposium, is that everywhere except in
the law reviews the issue is one more of crisis than of reflection. 58 Crises seldom bring about the quality of results which more considered action in anticipation could have attained. Review and revision in the age
of statutes could therefore benefit from being done in regular course
and apart from the context of urgency which inevitably takes its adverse
toll. It is indecent for Lady Justice, of all people, to marry in haste and
repent at leisure.
If the events of the Insurance Crisis and of Tort Reform in the 80's
are any indication, then the Age of Anxiety should be a very lively time.
It will by the same light be a time of challenge, as members of the legal
profession come to accept the need to exercise individually their customary zeal yet collectively to indulge in some passive virtues of their
own 59 with respect to championing legislation.
There is a final irony, a fit ending for a symposium introduction
built upon the thoughts of a departed colleague who enjoyed nothing
more than irony. Long ago, Grant Gilmore wrote a book review, an esbutions to the improvement of the legal system"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-9 (1979) ("lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed
changes and improvements").
56. But not for a matter in the courts. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1979) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (Discussion Draft 1983) (which prescribe acceptable levels of trial publicity).
57. There are at present nine states which have permanent law revision commissions:
California, (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 10300 to 10340 (West 1980)); Connecticut, (CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 2-85 to 88 (Supp. 1987)); Florida, (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.90 to .996 (Supp.
1987)): Louisiana, (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.201 to 08 (West 1975 and Supp. 1987)):
Michigan, (MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 4.322 to 24 (West 1981)); NewJersey, (N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1:12A-I to 9 (West Supp. 1986)); New York, (N.Y. LEGIS. § 70-2 (McKinney 1952
and Supp. 1981)); Oregon, (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 173.315 to 35 (1985)): and Washington,
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.30.010 to .060 (1987)).
58. A small sample: Keopp, Insurance Shock, 126 TIME 55 (Sept. 16, 1985); Powell,
Sorting Out the Liability Debate, 107 NEWSWEEK 60 (May 12, 1986); Szabo, No Reieffi'om the
Liability Crisis, 74 NATIONS BUS. 69 (Oct. 1986); Tompkins, Going Bare- 4nerica "Insuraince
Cisis, 129 READER'S DIGEST 49 (Oct. 1986).

59. Sorry, Alex. [Editor's Note, see, A. BICKEL, supra note 50.1.
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say which I can no longer find. He ended it by saying that he wanted to
repeat a favorite quotation. The quotation bore repeating but, Grant
warned, it had nothing whatsoever to do with the balance of the review.
He was right on both counts.
I too want to close with a quotation, which may be to this Introduction what Grant's quotation was to his review. It epitomizes that irreverent intellect which single-handedly resulted in Grant Gilmore's law
school being known as a home of old Turks and young fogeys. Its sardonic charm justifies, I hope, my abusing the privilege of the pen for one
more paragraph. Here, with the usual disclaimer of endorsement, is
how Grant Gilmore finished "The Ages of American Law" - or, Dauer
quoting Gilmore paraphrasing Holmes: 60
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a
society. The values of a reasonably just society will reflect
themselves in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the
less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the
lion will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing
but law, and due process will be scrupulously observed.

60(.

(G. GiiLMORE, supra note 1, at 1 10-11 1.

THE ASSAULT ON INJURED VICTIMS' RIGHTS
BY RALPH NADER*

INTRODUCTION

It is doubtful whether there has been anything like the present attack on injured victims' rights in the two hundred year history of the
American civil justice system. During the 1986 state legislative session,
forty-one states passed legislation to restrict the rights of innocent victims to sue, and to be fully compensated for their injuries. In a few
states, legislatures enacted across-the-board tort law changes overturning state common law which for generations had afforded harmed citizens a means of challenging injustice and negligence.'
Insurance industry advertisements suggest that recent tort legislation is the necessary consequence of an unrestrained jury system - "exorbitant awards and unpredictable results ' 2 which are not only crippling
the insurance industry, 3 but are, in the words of the insurance industry's
most powerful ally President Ronald Reagan, "eating away at the fabric
4
of American life.",
In almost every state, as well as in Congress, proposals abound to
restrict the rights of innocent victims to sue and to recover for their
injuries. These restrictions include: arbitrary caps on "pain and suffering" awards; 5 limitations on, or elimination, of punitive damage awards,
* B.A. Princeton, 1955; LL.B. Harvard, 1958. Mr. Nader is founder and director of
the Center for Study of Responsive Law (founded 1969). Attorney Joanne Doroshow provided research assistance for this article.
1. See Proffer, Coping With A Crisis, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept., 1986,
at 18.
2.

INS. INFO. INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS (1986).

3. The insurance industry has undertaken a "massive effort to market the idea that
there is something wrong with the civil justice system in the United States." NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2. The goal, in the words of one of the industry's leading
spokespersons, GEICO's chairman John J. Byrne, is "to withdraw [from the market] and
let the pressure for reform build in the courts and in the state legislatures." J. CoM., June
18, 1985, at 10A, col. 1.
The insurance industry has funded a $6.5 million dollar advertising campaign to convince the public a "lawsuit crisis" is responsible for the scarcity of affordable insurance
among certain individuals and businesses. J. Com., Mar. 19, 1986 at 1, col. 2. Magazine
and television ads include such captivating headlines as "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for
Babies," "Even Clergy Can't Escape the Lawsuit Crisis" and "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports."
4. President's Message to the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA"), 22
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 720 (May 30, 1986) [hereinafter President's Message].
5. Under these provisions, a passenger who became a quadriplegic after a defectively-designed jeep overturned, see Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D.
1979), and a person burned and permanently disfigured by an exploding Pinto gas tank, see
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), could
recover for only a fraction of their actual pain and suffering over a lifetime. Some caps
have been held unconstitutional. In striking down Virginia's $1.0 million legislative cap
on medical malpractice awards, a Virginia federal district court held:
[Tihe legislature may not mandate the amount of judgment to be entered in a
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which often serve as the only effective deterrent against intentionally unsafe practices; 6 mandatory limits on contingency fees for plaintiff law7
yers, without corresponding limitations on the fees of defense lawyers;
modification or elimination ofjoint and several liability, which results in
penalizing the victim by precluding full recovery in the event a culpable
party is unable to pay; 8 restrictions on lump sum payments; 9 repeal of
the collateral source rule;' 0 and relaxed liability standards, such as elimtrial. Such a measure not only infringes upon the right to a jury where that right
applies, but, when considered in the light of the proper functioning of the legislature and the judiciary under our system of separation of powers of the respective
branches, it also impermissibly interferes with the function of the judicial branch,
thereby violating the separation of powers. Viewed in this light, [the cap] is
clearly unconstitutional.
Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986).
6. Punitive damages are awarded only in the most serious cases where injury was
caused by a defendant's "aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice', or a fraudulent
or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton." W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (1984) [hereinafter KEETON]. For an example of statu-

tory limits on punitive damages, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (1986) which
provides:

In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done
to the person or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is
attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him
reasonable exemplary damages. The amount of such reasonable exemplary damages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual damages awarded to the injured party.
7. Defense lawyers, paid by the hour, may be motivated to increase their hours by
conducting unnecessary discovery, filing frivolous motions, or refusing to participate in
meaningful settlement negotiations until immediately before trial. Plaintiff's attorneys,
usually paid on a contingency basis, have no such motivations because they are only compensated upon recovery of a claim. Furthermore, access to legal services on a widespread
basis for non-wealthy individuals is made possible through the contingency fee system. See
generally Schmidt, Contingent Fee.- Key to the Courthouse, 92 CASE AND COMMENT 2 (1987).
,James L. Gattuso of the conservative Heritage Foundation pointed out that the contingency fee system acts not only to provide injured persons who could not otherwise
afford legal representation with access to the legal system, but it helps screen out baseless
lawsuits. Gattuso, Don't Rush to Condemn Contingency Fees, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at 28,
col. 3.
8. Ifjoint and several liability is eliminated, any one wrongdoer's liability is limited
to the "proportion of harm" attributable to that person's misconduct. This would be unfair to the victim in the event that one wrongdoer cannot or will not pay for injuries he
helped to cause. The common law ofjoint and several liability has long recognized that it
is more fair to allow an innocent victim to fully and promptly recover for injuries suffered,
and to let the wrongdoers decide among themselves, after the victim is compensated, how
to apportion the liability. See KEETON, supra note 6, at 328, 475. Those arguing to eliminate joint and several liability frequently overlook the fact that in virtually every jurisdiction, a defendant may be held liable in the first place only if the defendant's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431

(1965). Moreover, eliminating joint and several liability requires that a legal fiction be
introduced into the rules of compensation, by presuming it is possible to define precise
percentages of responsibility for an indivisible injury among several wrongdoers.
9. Provisions mandating that damage awards be allocated in periodic payments penalizes those victims who are faced with large medical costs immediately after an injury
and those who must make adjustments in transportation and housing. Periodic payments
allow insurance companies to pocket the interest earned while the funds remain in their
possession.
10. The collateral source rule serves to prevent a tortfeasor from reducing its liability
by payments that the injured party has received from sources collateral to the tortfeasor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1965) ("Payments made to or benefits con-
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ination of strict liability in product liability actions.''
These measures are aimed at weakening the American civil justice
system which, for all its embrace of noble concepts of justice, still confronts injured people with the difficult task of prevailing in court before
they may recover any compensation. Surveys indicate that these measures are not supported by the American people.' 2 Rather, they are part
of a legislative package advocated by various special interest groups: the
property/casualty insurance industry - seeking to enrich its already
large profits at the expense of innocent victims; the business and professional defendants' lobbies - seeking to immunize from suit the manufacturers of hazardous goods and toxic chemicals; and the Reagan
administration - pushing to federally regulate downward the decentralized state judicial system that has provided injured victims with access to
justice for over 200 years. They call this package "tort reform," but it is
one of the most unprincipled public relations scams in the history of
American industry.
I.

THE "INSURANCE CRISIS" MYTH

The "insurance crisis" has little to do with lawsuits, but everything
to do with a cyclical trend in the insurance industry. This "crisis" is a
self-inflicted phenomenon which last occurred in the mid-seventies, and
which invariably provokes frenetic talk of a litigation explosion and calls
for legislative limits on victims' rights. 13 The last cycle began several
ferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's
liability, although they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.").
See, e.g., Folkestad v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 813 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987).
Repeal of the collateral source rule means that payments taken from health insurance,
social security and other sources which have already been paid for by the consumer or
taxpayers, would be used to reduce a wrongdoer's financial responsibility for injuries to
consumers. This system provides a windfall to insurance companies, which have previously received payment of premiums from the victim.
11. The doctrine of strict liability ensures that the one who is responsible for bringing
a dangerously defective product into the marketplace or workplace compensates those injured by the product. This approach maximizes incentives for making safer products.
Strict liability does not mean absolute liability. In a strict liability action an injured
victim still carries a heavy burden. He or she must prove: (1) the existence of a defect
which renders the product in question unreasonably dangerous; (2) the manufacturer's
responsibility for that defect; (3) the nature and extent of plaintiff's injury; and (4) the
causal connection between the defect and the injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 395 comment b (1965). The additional proof requirements for recovery in product liability actions would increase the costs and evidentiary burdens, and generally make pursuit
of legal remedies more difficult for the average victim.
12. A nationwide poll conducted for one "tort reform" group, ATRA, shows that
while "[alt first glance the public appears receptive to a broad range of solutions to the
liability problem . . . focus group discussions reveal that this receptivity is easily reversed
when objections to reforms are raised." The Public Discusses the Liability Crisis, BURSON-MARSTELLER RES. at x (June 1986). When pushed to clarify what they really could support,
only two solutions could be agreed upon: "1. Educate the public on the proper use of the
civil court system; and 2. Impose penalties for frivolous or nuisance suits." Id. at xi. The
poll was conducted by interviewing a total of 1,002 American adults selected nationwide.
In addition, two focus group sessions were conducted involving twenty of the "influential
public," defined as heads-of-households with incomes of about $40,000 who voted in
1984. Id. at iii, iv.
13. J. Robert Hunter, Federal Insurance Administrator under Presidents Ford and
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years ago when interest rates were relatively high. Capitalizing on
higher interest rates, the industry lowered prices and insured poor risks
in order to obtain premium dollars which were then invested for maximum return. 14 When interest rates dropped, and investment income
decreased accordingly, the industry responded by sharply increasing insurance premiums and reducing the availability of coverage - a repeat
of their similarly mismanaged performance of the mid-seventies. In fact,
in all the controversy, there is remarkable agreement about the causes of
the insurance industry's problems.1 5 AJanuary 1987 editorial in Business
Week may have said it best in concluding that:
Even while the industry was blaming its troubles on the tort
system, many experts pointed out that its problems were
largely self-made. In previous years the industry had slashed
prices competitively to the point that it incurred enormous
losses. That, rather than excessive jury
awards, explained most
16
of the industry's financial difficulties.
Even through the most recent downturn the industry continued to
make money. Their profits are now soaring. 1 7 Insurance company
Carter, and now President of the National Insurance Consumer Organization ("NICO"),
testified before Congress in 1986:
On November 3, the Washington Post editorialized that liability insurance or the
lack of it is becoming a national problem.... They went on to say that there must
be a limit to all this, that the real beneficiaries of this may be the lawyers, and
there has to be a better way of compensating those to whom reparations are due
than the clumsy and expensive mechanism that exists today. That editorial was
November 3, 1976, and that is my point. We are in a typical cyclical pattern of the
insurance industry which is driving prices skyward. This is the insurance cycle .... [T]ypical bottoms were in 1965, 1975, and 1984 .... This .. .has gone
on since the early 1900's in fairly consistent patterns.
Costs and Availability of Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986) (testimony ofJ. Robert Hunter,
President, National Insurance Consumer Organization) [hereinafter Hunter Testimony].
See also MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STUDY OF THE PROFITABILITY OF COMMERCIAL LIAB. INS., (Nov. 10, 1986) ("The property casualty industry is cyclical in nature.
Data show that the industry has had profitability cycles at least since the 1920's") [hereinafter MICHIGAN REPORT].
James B. Stradtner, general partner at investment bankers Alex Brown & Son, Inc.,
described the "boom and bust nature of the industry . . .as predictable as the tide in a
three-year swing from flow to ebb." J. OF COM., May 15, 1986, at 14A, col. 1. Stradtner
was also reported as saying that "the commercial insurance industry has an almost incurable penchant for 'shooting itself in the foot.' " Id.
14. See, e.g., Hunter Testimony, supra note 13, at 26 ("In the early eighties they were
writing the MGM Grand Hotel fire after the fire, [which was, in effect] retroactive liability
insurance. They lusted after the cash-flow [of] liability policies. When the interest rates
dropped, they lost their lust.")(emphasis added).
15. For example, Maurice R. Greenberg, President and Chief Executive Officer of
American International Group, Inc., one of this country's leading property/casualty companies, told an insurance audience in Boston that the current industry problems were due
to price cuts "to the point of absurdity" in the early 1980's. Had it not been for these cuts,
Greenberg said, there would not be "all this hullabaloo" about the tort system. Greenwald, Insurers Must Share Blame: AIG Head, Bus. INS., Mar. 31, 1986, at 3.
16. What Insurance Crisis?, Bus. WE., Jan. 12, 1987, at 154. See also, e.g., NEW MEXICO
STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT

OF THE INTERIM

LEGISLATIVE WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

COMM. ON LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TORT REFORM (Nov. 24, 1986); MICHIGAN REPORT,
supra note 13; INSURANCE COMM. PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS IN PENNSYLVANIA (Sept. 29, 1986).

17. The property/casualty insurance industry estimates that its income after taxes for
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stocks are booming on the New York Stock Exchange, and investment
analysts and brokers recommend casualty insurance stock for
investment.1 8
Coming out of their bottom year of 1984, the insurance industry, in
conjunction with their foreign reinsurers, 19 saw a great opportunity to
limit their own future payout obligations by exploiting the business
community's natural eagerness for additional limitations on liability
from lawsuits. So they began dramatically increasing premiums and reducing coverage, and arbitrarily cancelling policies of daycare centers,
20
small businesses, and local governments.
When businesses, professionals and governmental entities protested, the insurers proclaimed, "Don't look at us. It's those courts,
those juries, those verdicts, those lawyers." And instead of saying,
"Well, can you prove that?", these frustrated groups blindly accepted
their insurers' rationale, and joined in lockstep with them to forge a
powerful new lobby designed to fight for measures which would further
limit their own liability for the damage they caused innocent victims. 2 1
Aimed in the direction of Congress and the state legislatures, this
coalition of insurance companies and corporate defense lobbies has relied on misinformation and anecdotal cases 22 to attack and destroy de1986 totalled $11.5 billion. Green, P/C Insurers Turned a Profit Last Year, J. OF CoM.,Jan. 6,
1987, at 1, col. 2.
Between 1976 and 1985, the property/casualty companies had a net gain of about
$81.0 billion on which they paid no federal income tax, according to the General Accounting Office. See The Liability Insurance Crisis, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986)
(statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division) [hereinafter
Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings].
18. See, e.g., Curran, Bargains Beckon in Insurance, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1986, at 217; Analysts Bullish On Insurer Stocks, Bus. INS., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1.
19. Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. The insurer pays the reinsurer
a premium, in exchange for which the reinsurer agrees to share the risk with the insurer.
Just as primary insurers have been raising the premiums they charge their insureds, reinsurers have been raising the premiums they charge the primary insurers. An independent
study for the Michigan House of Representatives found that "reinsurance serves to amplify
the [insurance] cycle." MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
20. A study based on a questionnaire to insurance companies, released June 9, 1986
by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, demonstrates that
the liability insurance industry actually paid out far less in claims than it received in premiums over the past decade, "undermin[ing] the companies' claims of massive losses and
rais[ing] the specter of price-gouging and bloated profits." Address by Rep. Peter Rodino,
Press Release (June 9, 1986).
21. At a January 17, 1986 press conference, a number of business, professional and
insurance trade organizations announced the formation of ATRA whose sole agenda is to
change this country's civil justice system.
Former Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti resigned as ATRA's general counsel
on October 28, 1986, after ATRA made "outrageous and untrue" statements about American lawyers. A TRA Counsel Quits Over Negative Remarks About Lawyers, MEALEY'S LITIGATION
REP. NAT'L TORT REFORM, Dec. 2, 1986, at 914.
22. Several victims whose stories have been distorted repeatedly in public statements
by tort-reform proponents were brought before a congressional committee in an attempt
to clear the record regarding their cases. See Liability InsuranceCrisis Hearings, supra note 17.
For example, Charles Bigbee, whose leg was severed after a car hit a phone booth in which
he was trapped (the door jammed after he noticed the car coming towards him), testified:
I believe it would be very helpful if I could talk briefly about my case and show
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cades of slow but careful progress made by state court after state court
respecting the physical integrity of human beings against harm.2 3 The
coalition is out to convince lawmakers to view this progressive evolution
not as a source of national pride, or as a source of public recognition
that the weak and the defenseless sometimes get justice, but rather as a
source of shame, as a source of economic destructiveness, as something
that should be stopped.
II.

THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF UNPREDICTABILITY KEEPS OUR TORT
SYSTEM STRONG

The fundamental message of this special interest coalition is that
the jury system is out of control because of the unpredictable nature of
the common law and ofjury awards. 24 Insurance companies dislike the
civil jury system because they dislike a system in which they cannot precisely budget liability as a cost of doing business.
It is this "cost unpredictability", separate from the gradual evolution of liability principles over the generations, which constitutes the
very essence of deterrence - a function of the civil justice system which
is equally important to compensating the victim, and which cannot be
quantified in dollars and cents. The common law of torts reflects and
renews ethical and humane traditions which have led to the deterrence
of unsafe practices, the disclosure of potential hazards to a wider public,
and authoritative expansions of respect for human life which serve to
distinguish our country from most other nations.
Our tort system provides several invaluable functions. It is the
means of protection for tens of millions of Americans who are less likely
to be injured because of the impact of lawsuits brought by prior victims.
The prospect of tort liability deters those manufacturers, builders, doctors and other tortfeasors from repeating their negligent behavior; it
provides them with a proper economic incentive to curb their damaging
practices and to make their endeavors more safe.2 5 Tort actions, when
how it has been distorted not only by the President, but by the media as well.
That is probably the best way to show that people who are injured due to the fault
of others should bejustly compensated for the damages they have to live with the
rest of their lives.
Id. at 45.
23. As Prosser noted, in the tort system "change and development have come as social ideas have altered, and they are constantly continuing." KEETON, supra note 6, at 19.
24. For example, one industry piece states, "[w]ith no way to gauge the risk of a lawsuit or amount of a potential court award, many businesses, professionals, municipalities,
manufacturers, and individuals are exposed to enormous unpredictability that makes it
difficult to do business."

The Lawsuit Crisis, INS. INFO. INST. (1986).

25. According to Prosser,
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of
the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the
courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there
is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infre-

quently one reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing
that incentive.
KEETON, supra note 6, at 25. See also Williams, The Aims of the Lau of Toil, 4 CURR. LEG.
PROB. 137 (1951).
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reported to millions of people through the mass media, increase public
awareness about harmful products, dangerous drugs, toxins and unsafe
practices and processes. The system functions to alert citizens to take
their own precautions, and to inform regulators and legislators as to the
advisability of broader safety laws and stronger safety standards for the
26
prevention of harm.
Finally, the civil justice system provides our society with the moral
and ethical fiber that establishes the proper duties and obligations between parties in the marketplace, the workplace, the government and
the community. The sources for these basic ethical/legal principles
elaborating government and corporate accountability are the trial courts
and appellate courts. The decisions of these courts establish limits, duties and rights to protect workers from employers, consumers from sellers, communities from corporations, citizens from governmental entities
and future generations from present recklessness. Judicial decisions
sow the seed of civilized behavior.
III.

A

CAMPAIGN OF MISINFORMATION

Why is the insurance industry so disturbed by this sensitive system?
Why do they advocate taking judgment away from the judge and jury
who hear the evidence and who have no personal stake in the outcome?
Why do they propose to replace judicial determination with a codified
system of compensation rates which can be later altered with the corruptive monies of political action committees and the special interest influ27
ence-peddling that often reaches the ears and pockets of legislators?
The answer must be premised on data. But the insurance industry relies
on alarmist, prejudicial, and sometimes unsubstantiated, data and
surveys which either belie credulity or are so manipulated and interpreted by the insurance lobby as to more closely resemble fiction than
fact. Often the insurance industry ignores reliable compilations of statistics which indicate that the American tort system is not out of control.
We know from data around the country that machines break and
chemicals burn their victims and that the cost of the casualty count in the
workplace and marketplace runs into the millions of dollars annually. 28
We also know that the auto, drug, chemical and other industries which
now seek greater protection from liability have been successfully taken
to court over and over again for seriously injuring the American public
with defective or toxic products, and that as a result of these lawsuits,
once dangerous products have been made safer or removed from the
26. For example, 20 years ago, United States Senator Gaylord Nelson, relying upon
data and sworn testimony from a 1965 lawsuit brought by an injured plaintiff against a
major tire manufacturer, sponsored legislation which resulted in the establishment of minimum tire performance safety standards. See 112 CONG. REC. 9614 (1966) (statement of
Sen. Nelson).
27. See generally Note, Curbing Injurious PAC Support Through 2 U.S.C. § 441d, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 869 (1984).

28. D. BOLLIER &J. CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM; THE CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF
HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 163 (1986).
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29
marketplace altogether.

However, only a very small fraction of these injured Americans actually reach the courtroom,3 0 and only about half of those who obtain
jury verdicts receive or collect any compensation. This is the sober reality - even according to figures released by Jury Verdict Research
("JVR"), the legal publishing firm whose figures are widely used by the
insurance industry, the United States Justice Department and other sup31
porters of "tort reform" to demonstrate a "lawsuit crisis."
In addition, statistics relied upon by tort reform proponents have
often been misused or misstated, and many have been substantially discredited. 3 2 For example, compilations of data from the federal courts
are frequently cited to evidence a United States tort litigation explo29. Among the well-known products which have been removed from the market are:
The Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, manufactured by A.H. Robins (see M. MiNTz, AT
ANY COST:

CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1979)); the Ford Pinto

exploding gas tank (see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1981)); and asbestos (see P. BRODEAU, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)).

Further, a recent survey of risk managers of 232 major U.S. corporations by the Conference Board, an industry group, found that product liability suits have had a minor impact on revenues, market share, and employee retention. Rather, the study found:
Where product liability has had a notable impact - where it has most significantly affected management decision making - has been in the quality of the
products themselves. Managers say products have become safer, manufacturing
procedures have been improved, and labels and use instructions have become
more explicit.
Product Liability, The Corporate Response, CONF. BOARD (1987). See also, Lambert, Suing for
Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 48 (lawsuits are effective in eliminating defective products).
30. In a recent study, University of Wisconsin Professor Marc Galanter found that
only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes and only a small portion of
these become lawsuits. Of those that do, the vast majority are abandoned, settled or routinely processed without full-blown adjudication. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think 11e Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5, 26 (1983). Galanter found that "a sizable minority
- probably less than one-fifth - of American adults have sometime in their lives been a
party to civil litigation." Id. at 21. Galanter's work in this area has been described as a
"masterpiece in the field of social research on law," Wall St.J., May 28, 1986, at 37, col. 3.
31. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE

AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT]. According toJVR, "the plaintiff recovery rate [was] 60%; 26 years ago it was also 60%... the
rate is well under 50%." Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 360 (testimony
of Philip J. Hermann, Chairman ofJVR).
32. A May 1986 report by the Ad Hoc Insurance Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General concluded:
[T]he major assumptions and conclusions underlying the Justice Department Report ... are substantially unsupported by the facts. The facts do not bear out the
allegations of an "explosion" in litigation or in claim size, nor do they bear out
the allegations of a financial disaster suffered by property/casualty insurers today.
They finally do not support any correlation between the current crisis in availability and affordability of insurance and such a litigation "explosion." Instead, the
available data indicate that the causes of, and therefore the solutions to, the current crisis lie with the insurance industry itself.
AD HOc INSURANCE COMM. OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY

OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, at 45 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT]. See also,
Farrel & Glaberson, The Explosion In Liability Lawsuits is Nothing But a Ilyth, Bus. WK., Apr.
21, 1986 at 24.

1988]

INJURED VICTIMS' RIGHTS

sion, 33 yet only approximately five percent of all tort filings are in federal court. 34 Increases in these filings largely can be explained by
removals from state courts, and by a few epidemic product liability cases
involving less than a dozen particularly dangerous products, such as asbestos, which have been the subject of recent litigation by thousands of
injured persons. 3 5 The best available evidence demonstrates that state
36
courts are not experiencing a litigation explosion.
Jury verdict data released byJVR is also frequently cited as support
for the insurance industry's position.3 7 However, according toJVR's recent studies and JVR's chairman, Mr. Philip J.Hermann, this data does
not substantiate any claim of recently escalating jury awards. 38 This is,
33. The JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT cites a 758% increase in product liability filings
in federal courts between 1974 and 1985 as evidence of a "litigation explosion." JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45.

Professor Galanter commented on the use of federal court data:
The only systematic empirical base that played a role in... formulations [of a
litigation explosion] was the statistics on the growth of caseloads in the federal
courts, including the growth of appeals. Typically, only gross figures on filings
were cited. The fact that little of this was full-blown adjudication was ignored. It
was often assumed that what was going on in federal courts was typified by large,
highly visible cases. It was further assumed that one could generalize from what
was happening in the federal courts to what was happening in courts generally .... The literature displays little effort to offset these biases of perspective.
But beginning with Barton's 1975 article [Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27
STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975)], there is a strong admixture of naive speculation and
undocumented assertion. Appearing in prominent law reviews, publications in
which, notwithstanding their prestige, there is no scrutiny for substantive, as opposed to formal, accuracy, these polemics were quickly taken as authority for what
they asserted.
Galanter, supra note 30, at 62.
Galanter explained that those who erroneously have cited federal court data as the
"scholarly foundation" of a litigation explosion tend to be "a narrow elite of judges
(mostly federal), professors and deans at eminent law schools, and practitioners who practice in large firms and deal with big clients about big cases .. . [who] have a limited and
spotty grasp of what the bulk of the legal system is really like." Galanter, supra note 30, at
61.
34. See, e.g., Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 169 (testimony of Robert
T. Roper, Director, Court Statistics and Information Management Project, National
Center for State Courts).
35. Id. at 301-06.
36. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAi. TREND DATA IN STATE TRIAL COURTS FOR 1978, 1981 AND 1984
(1986). The findings on torts filings are of particular interest. The increase in tort case
filings between 1978-81 was only two percent, while the population for those states grew
four percent during the same time period. Between 1981 and 1984 the population grew
another four percent while tort filings increased seven percent. For the entire period
1978-84 total tort filings increased nine percent. The population increased by eight
percent.
"IT]here is not one shred of evidence to indicate that there is a litigation explosion in the State court system," and "I do not know where Mr. Willard [of the
Justice Department] would gather that information, but we do not have it at the
National Center for State Courts, and we are the clearing house for all the
information."
Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 169 (testimony of Robert T. Roper).
37.

See, e.g., JusTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 31.

38. JVR figures demonstrate that the rate of increase ofjury awards has declined since
1981. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS 6
(1986) [hereinafter INJURY VALUATION].

JVR Chairman Philip Hermann has testified that:

[O]ur studies do not support any claim of recently escalating jury verdict awards. The
apparent reason for this erroneous impression is that a number of highly publicized news
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in part, due to JVR's methodology. JVR data, cited by industry, does
not reflect inflationary adjustments, and does not factor in settlements,
verdicts lowered on appeal, remittiturs, bench verdicts, verdicts for defendants, or verdicts involving no money. 3 9 Moreover, JVR's "average
jury award" figures are misused when cited to represent trends since
these averages ignore "zero" verdicts and are heavily influenced by a
few large ones. 40 "Median" figures are the correct measurement of typical awards, 4 1 and the median jury verdict has remained at approximately
$8,000 in 1979 dollars since 1959.42
JVR figures are also used by tort reform proponents to demonstrate
a surge in million-dollar-plus verdicts. 43 According to JVR figures, over

the last twenty-five years there have been 2,564 million-dollar verdicts,
many of which were settled for lower sums prior to appeal. 44 The claim
is made that in the biggest democracy and economy in the world, this is
some sort of scandal.
SinceJVR figures are not adjusted for inflation, they do not account
for the fact that the dollar today buys what thirty-nine cents purchased
in 1969. And byJVR's admission, the rate of increase of million-dollar
awards is slowing down. 45 Aside from this, in an economy with a $4.2
articles quoting our statistics, have grossly misstated them. Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 346-47.
39. See Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, L.,
MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1985, at 126. Localio is the Director of Research at the Risk
Management Foundation owned by Harvard University and the hospitals affiliated with
Harvard Medical School.
40. Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 594 (statement of A. Russell Localio).
When questioned aboutJVR's 1985 $1.8 million average product liability jury verdict
figure, repeatedly cited by tort reform proponents (see, e.g., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT,
supra note 31, at 36; President's Message, supra note 4), JVR Board Chairman Hermann
states that the figure "is the result of a lot of huge verdicts that distort the average, and as
a result those are unreliable figures to quote." Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note
17, at 185 (testimony of Philip J. Hermann).
Similarly, JVR had reported the 1978 average jury verdict for product liability to be
$1.7 million, up from $400,000 the year before and $800,000 the year after. After personally calling JVR to ask them why the jump, I discovered that it was because of a single,
$127 million verdict in the case ofGrimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). In that case, the plaintiff was a thirteen-year-old child, who was a
passenger in a Ford Pinto which was hit in a rear-end crash and resulted in a gas tank
explosion. The plaintiff was burned over 90% of his body. Evidence was introduced at
trial which demonstrated that Ford management knew the tanks were defective, yet chose
not to recall the cars "based on the cost savings which would inure from omitting or delaying the 'fixes.' " 119 Cal. App. 3d at 777.
The judge, in denying Ford's post-trial motions, reduced the award to $3.5 million.
119 Cal. App. 3d at 772. The verdict was upheld on appeal. The JVR figure did not take
into account this remittitur.
41. Localio, supra note 39, at 127.
42. The $8,000 figure was noted by Gustave Shubert in 1986. Address by Gustave
Shubert, Director, Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, before the National Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colorado (Jan. 4, 1986); Peterson & Priest, THE
CIVILJURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (Rand
Corporation Institute for Civil Justice 1982).
43.
44.
45.

See ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 36-39.
INJURY VALUATION, supra note 38, at 14.
INJURY VALUATION, supra note 38, at 29.
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trillion Gross National Product in 1985, 2,564 million-dollar verdicts
over a twenty-five year period is a scandal in reverse. Given the horrendous nature and tremendous volume of injuries and illnesses resulting
from corporate wrongdoing alone, there should have been more such
awards.
While the available evidence indicates that courts are not experiencing a litigation explosion, 4 6 the debate is bound to continue until insurance companies release information in their possession showing actual
payments to injured persons. 4 7 One suspects that if the insurance industry could substantiate their claims that people are paid too much for
their injuries, they would have revealed that data long ago. Until the
insurance industry furnishes this information, its allegations of excessive
damage payments and its drive to drastically increase premiums must be
viewed as a commercial strategy borne out of the industry's cyclical financial mismanagement of recent years.
IV.

SPECIOUS HOPES:

REDUCED PREMIUMS, INCREASED AVAILABILITY

According to the insurance industry, two of the purported benefits
of "tort reform" were to be a reduction in the price of insurance premiums and an expansion in the availability of insurance coverage. These
claims were misfounded and misleading. Changing liability laws will not
reduce premiums. As a matter of fact, leading property/casualty companies have filed rate documents notifying state insurance commissioners
that even extensive "tort reforms" will not reduce insurance rates. 4 8 Conversely, a survey of insurance departments by the National Insurance
46. See supra notes 32, 33, 36, and 40.
47. J. Robert Hunter commented that:
If the insurance companies have data that juries are running wild with their
awards, why don't the companies come forward with it? Don't they have the burden of proof if they want to take away our rights? The insurance companies simply refuse to put forth the data to let us analyze it. We've been asking since last
September, Where's the data?
Sherrill, One Paper That Wouldn't Shut Up, NATION, May 17, 1986, at 688 (quotingJ. Robert
Hunter).
48. Two leading property/casualty companies - Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. and
St. Paul Marine Insurance Co. - recently filed rate documents notifling Florida's insurance commissioner that even extensive "tort reforms" will not reduce insurance rates.
NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., "FORT

REFORM"

A FRAUD, INSURERS ADMIT (1986).

Filings

which calculate the effect of the 1986 Florida tort reform law, were made by 104 insurers
licensed in Florida. Out of 277 filings, 175, or 63%, showed no savings from tort reform.
while none showed savings of more than 10%; see also NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., TORr
REFORM WILL NOT REDUCE INSURANCE RATES, SAY 100+

FLORIDA INSURERS (1986).

State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. notified the Kansas Insurance Department that restrictingjoint and several liability and limiting punitive damages would have no impact,
while capping for pain and suffering would reduce rates by no more than one percent.
Great American West, Inc., told the Washington Insurance Department that tort reform
could well raise rates.
"'he Insurance Services Office, the insurance industry group that issues 'advisory'
rates, said its advisory rates would not reflect any reduction due to tort reform, and emphasized to its member companies that 'any beneficial effects of tort reform cannot be
quantified with any degree of accuracy.' "
See also Toit-reform legislation: Did state get 'suckered', The Seattle Times. July 1. 1986, at
1, col. I .
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Consumer Organization indicates that access to insurance is increasing
49
in states where tort reform was not enacted.
It also appears doubtful that changing liability laws will increase the
availability of insurance. In many jurisdictions the opposite is
happening.
In 1978, for example, Pennsylvania enacted a law immunizing all
Pennsylvania municipalities from most kinds of liability suits and limit50
ing liability for even catastrophic events to $500,000 per occurrence,
yet Pennsylvania cities and towns are still having their insurance policies
cancelled. 5 1
In Iowa, lawmakers abolished joint and several liability as applied to
defendants who were less than fifty percent at fault for all cases tried
afterJuly 1, 1984.52 Still in late 1985, forty-one Iowa counties had their
53
liability insurance cancelled.
In Ontario, Canada, most "tort reform" measures sought by the insurance industry are already law. These measures include caps on
awards for pain and suffering, restrictions on the award of punitive damages and prohibition of contingency fees. 54 In addition, Ontario court
rules require any unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs.
There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in Canada, so most trials
are before judges. 5 5 Yet the insurance industry is raising premiums for
many of its customers by 400% or more, cancelling coverage in mid56
term and refusing to provide coverage at any price.
Massive premium gouging, arbitrary cancellations and reduced coverage will be the cyclical pattern and industry strategy of the future unless the real causes of this insurance crisis - the cash-flow underwriting
practices of the insurance industry - are addressed. Stop the surge and
decline in this cycle and the trauma on the economic system will end,
and the attack on victims' rights will atrophy.
V.

PRESCRIPTION FOR REMEDY:

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

INSURANCE INDUSTRY REFORM

There is no doubt that reform is imperative if this insurance crisis is
to be abated. However, it is not the rights of victims which must be
evaluated and controlled, it is the unharnessed and grossly unscru49.

NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., SIX INSURANCE INDUSTRY FIBS

50.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8501 - 8528 (1978).

(1986).

51. See PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMM., HEARING ON MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE, SEPTEMBER 24, 1985, REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY OF TESTI-

(1985).

MONY

52.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 668.4 (West 1986).

53. Statement of Iowa State Sen. Lowell Junkins, before the Florida Senate Commerce Comm. (Jan. 7, 1986).
54.

See MINISTRY OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM., REPORT

ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 62, 74-78 (1979).

55. Id. at 74, 102-04.
56. See, e.g.,Liability Coverage Crunch May Shut Day-Care Agencies, Toronto Star, Aug. 1,
1986, at 1; Ski Team Can't Get Liability Insurance,Toronto Globe and Mail, Jan. 15, 1986, at
Al.
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tinized insurance industry itself that should be investigated and reformed. The special privileges enjoyed by the insurance industry are
largely responsible for the insurance crisis cycle. By virtue of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 5 7 the insurance industry is exempt from antitrust
laws. 58 It is also exempt from federal regulation and Federal Trade
Commission scrutiny. 59 These exemptions should be repealed by
Congress.

60

In addition, Congress should establish a federal office of insurance
to monitor the industry and to establish standards for state regulators to
follow. A national industry-funded reinsurance program should be established to compete with foreign reinsurers so as to exert downward
pressure on reinsurance rates and thus enable insurers to reduce their
rates.
At the state level, effective insurance disclosure laws are critical. Insurance companies must be required to routinely disclose in detail and
by subline - for day care centers, trucking concerns, municipalities and
similar institutions - how much they take in from premiums and investment income and how much they pay out for verdicts and settlements,
reserves and other expenditures. States should also establish joint underwriting authorities to provide insurance at actuarially sound rates to
those who cannot get insurance in the open market during insurance
cycle bottoms.
State insurance departments must be afforded more authority to
regulate rates, and state laws should provide for greater consumer representation before insurance regulatory bodies. This would include establishment of state consumer advocates to directly intervene in rate
proceedings as many states now authorize in utility matters. 6 ' State in62
surance departments also need greater funding and increased staffing.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 - 1015 (1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1982). This section provides that the Robinson-Patman Act
"shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof." Accordingly, the matter of regulation is left to state government. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982). This
section provides that: "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business." The law does retain, however, a prohibition against boycotts, coercion
and intimidation. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982). See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978) (insurance companies may not boycott their insureds by agreeing to
deny them coverage entirely).
59. 15 U.S.C. 1012(b) (1982) provides that: "No act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ... "
60. For a discussion on the merits of repealing these exemptions, see Glover It's Time
to Repeal McCarran-Ferguson,I ANTITRUST 31 (1987).
61. For example, New Jersey's law authorizes the New Jersey Public Advocate to intervene on consumers' behalf. The cost of intervention is billed back to the insurance company seeking the rate increase. 52 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-1 - 52:27E-19 (West 1986).
62. State insurance departments are lacking in investigators, auditors and other professionals and cannot effectively recommend the appropriate levels of insurance rates.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE
REGULATIONS OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS (1979); see also American Academy of Actuaries,

1986 Yearbook (Nov. 1, 1985). There are only 64 actuaries employed by state insurance
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Insurance companies should be required to engage in greater loss
prevention efforts as well as improvement of health and safety conditions. Presently, some insurance companies are ignoring hazards.
When an insurer knows that a claim is legitimate because of a wellknown specific hazard, the logical approach is not to cancel coverage,
raise rates or limit recovery. The solution is to pay the claim, go back to
the insured and make a hazard analysis of the product or unsafe circumstance, and then refuse to continue coverage until all hazards uncovered
by the analysis are eliminated or the risk of injury is reduced by specific
safeguards and warnings. Instead, the insurer typically ends up defending the hazard so as to shift liability to another party, and as a result,
often avoids paying the claim, thereby reducing monetary loss for itself
and its insured.
In addition, the absolute immunities enjoyed by employers under
worker compensation laws gives employers little incentive for hazard
prevention. In many circumstances the absolute immunity granted employers under workers compensation laws allows insured employers to
violate recognized hazard prevention measures with disregard for the
63
lives and safety of their employees.
Insurance companies should also participate in experience loss rating, 64 and should be required to disclose evidence of defective products
or hazardous conditions to the appropriate law enforcement and regulatory authorities.
Our industrial society produces diverse benefits but it also exposes
many people to avoidable injury and disease. Society is not harmed
when the rights of injured people are vindicated and when they are compensated - not as chattel - but as respected and dignified human beings. Society and its unafflicted citizens benefit from such justice and
from the corresponding deterrence of careless or unsafe behavior.
The insurance industry has looked for scapegoats - victims, lawyers, juries and judges - to cover up its own instability and mismanagement. Giving up basic victims' rights will not stop premium gouging
and policy cancellations. Only effective insurance reforms will stop the
cyclical insurance crisis which leads to the volcanic eruptions of premiums, and the reduced availability of insurance coverage in the business,
departments and 26 states have no actuary on staff. Aetna Insurance Company alone employs twice as many actuaries as all the states combined.
63. Bohyer, The Exclusivity Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer, 47 MoNT. L.
REV. 157 (1985).

64. Many professionals and small businesses pay a set rate regardless of their individual claims experience. For example, competent and conscientious doctors are unjustly
paying the substantial price of a minority of seriously incompetent, careless, undertrained
or disabled physicians.
A 1985 report to Michigan Governor James Blanchard by former University of Michigan President Robin W. Fleming found that for claims filed between 1976 and 1984,
"2.5% of physicians accounted for 19.7% of all claims and 19.3% of physicians accounted
for 72.2% of all claims." A study by the Orlando Sentinel reported that in Florida, "3
percent of doctors were responsible for 48% of the malpractice claims paid in the state
between 1975 and 1984. One doctor had 34 paid claims. Four others had 10 or more paid
claims." Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 19, 1986 at 1.
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639

professional and non-profit sectors. Increasing the number of obstacles
injured or sick citizens must overcome in the already difficult process of
prevailing in court is not a solution; it is a degradation of the just norms
of the common law which have elevated care, redress, deterrence and
knowledge of perils into our nation's consciousness.

THE INSURANCE "CRISIS":
PLAINTIFFS'

REALITY OR MYTH?

A

LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE

ROBERT L. HABUSH*

INTRODUCTION

As a trial lawyer-a plaintiffs' trial lawyer-one works on behalf of
clients who have been injured or harmed by the negligence or wrongful
actions of others. Most of these clients are injury "victims" who are
crippled or debilitated, frequently poor or middle class, unable to afford
legal representation, and unable to unlock other doors to justice. For
these people, and for their concerned families and loved ones, the plaintiffs' lawyer provides a remedy-by obtaining financial compensation for
economic losses and pain and suffering, and by securing, on a more
philosophical or idealistic level, some measure of justice. When the
plaintiffs' attorney is successful in proving to the jury, judge or appropriate societal institution that a given defendant is liable and therefore obligated to compensate the plaintiff accordingly, the client is recompensed.
Similarly, the attorney, who is frequently rendering legal services on a
contingent fee basis, is also remunerated after a determination of the
defendant's liability.' When the plaintiffs' attorney is not successful, the
injured party is left to their own resources, and the attorney receives
nothing. 2 This is the nature of the role of the plaintiffs' attorney in our
civil justice system.
Although this system has served society for two hundred years, it is
under fierce attack today by the wealthy and powerful insurance industry
and related special interests. 3 These special interest groups have
launched an assault on the civil justice system, in this author's opinion,
to reap higher profits and to further enrich their already crammed treasuries. They are not, as they contend, motivated by altruism or necessity. On the contrary, there is a great discrepancy between reality and
the insurance industry's perception of reality.
Unfortunately, it is the insurance industry's perception of reality
that has recently prevailed in state legislatures across the country. 4 The
purpose of this paper is to expose some of the inaccuracies and fallacies
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1959; J.D., Wisconsin Law School, 1961. Mr.
Habush is Immediate Past President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. This
article was adapted from a speech presented at the National Conference of the American
Bar Association in New York City, N.Y. on August 9, 1986.
1. For a thorough discussion of the contingent fee, see Schmidt, Contingent Fee: Key to
the Courthouse, 92 CASE & COM. 2 (1987).
2. Id.
3. See generally, The Truth Behind the Insurance Panic, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (1986) (discussing
several proposals to overhaul the tort system and various aspects of tort reform relative to
medical malpractice, legal malpractice, municipal liability and product liability).
4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4

propagated by the insurance lobby, and to demonstrate how the tort
system, although imperfect, operates as an efficient and indispensable
tool, of enormous significance to our American system and values.
I.

COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Several of my colleagues, members of that loyal opposition which
comprise the defense bar, are not reserved in their critical commentary
on American tort law. 5 Such commentators claim that the current tort
system is not the proper way to deliver benefits to injured people. And
they have not wavered from this position for the last two decades.
Although such discordant views are certainly worthy of respect and
study, they are not necessarily worthy of acceptance.
One of the techniques employed by critics of our tort system has
been to rely upon anecdotal references or headline-grabbing
"buzzwords" in order to emphatically disparage our present system. Indeed, rhetoric has been a common tactic among some critics. However,
those who have gone so far as to attach the label "lottery" to the civil
justice system's delivery of compensatory benefits 6 have grossly misconstrued the factors that cause people to make use of the tort system. This
term "lottery" connotes that people become involved in personal injury
litigation in order to win a prize. People who have suffered spinal cord
injuries, brain damage, disfigurement, or other serious injuries do not
consider their unfortunate situation as an opportunity to win a prize.
These victims seek redress. They simply employ the tort system to address the devastating effects such injuries have had upon their lives.
Contrary to the "lottery" notion, the overwhelming majority of tort vic5. Two of the most well-known and prolific defense-oriented commentators are Jeffery O'Connell and Victor E. Schwartz.
Mr. O'Connell is the John Allen Love Professor of Law at the University of Virginia.
See, e.g. O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
17(1986); O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault " Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Post-

accident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 903-04 (1985) (case study of an insurance
contract that provides no-fault coverage for catastrophically injured high school athletes);
O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical MalpracticeClaims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L.

REV. 1267 (1984); O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1982)
(discussing restrictions on personal injury claims).
Mr. Schwartz is a noted author, lecturer and product liability defense lawyer. He is
PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(7th ed. 1982). For a better understanding of the views of Mr. Schwartz, see Uniform Product Liability Law: Hearing on S. 2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-13 (1982) (statement of Victor

also coauthor of W.

E. Schwartz, Counsel to the Product Liability Alliance). Mr. Schwartz argues that product
liability laws are unfair to plaintiffs because legitimate claims may be barred by "the snafu
of product liability laws" and, also, unfair to defendants who are held liable in situations
where the product is misused. He concludes by advocating federal uniform standards for
product liability law. Id. at 10.
6. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY-ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN (1979).
See also Andresky, A World Without Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985, at 40 (citing statistics
which reflect a profound increase in filings of civil suits, the authors state: "Americans now
seem to look on a civil suit against a corporation or municipality as a kind of lottery-a
lottery to be played whenever they can."). For Mr. Schwartz's current views on this subject
see Schwartz and Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution For Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal

Tort Law Standards, infra pp. 685-702.
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tims would trade almost any amount of money for the restoration of
their health and the dignity of a normal existence.
A.

Adjudicative Efficiency: Facts About the Civil Justice System

Although spokespersons for the insurance industry and the defense
bar are oftentimes critical of the civil justice system's level of efficiency,
recent studies by Professor Marc Galanter, 7 of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and surveys included in a new book on the American
jurys prove beyond doubt that the United States tort system is efficient.
Consider the facts. Ninety-eight percent of all property/casualty claims
are settled without trial. 9 Only four of ten thousand claims are tried to
conclusion,' 0 and only one of every ten thousand reaches the appellate
level. 1 1 Furthermore, the occasional excessive jury award is subject to
the scrutiny of the trial judge and the appellate courts. And this scrutiny
does serve to reduce exorbitant awards. In fact, detailed analyses show
that the larger the original verdict, the larger the percentage reduction
and the lesser the net award. 1 2 Final judgments, arrived at after some
post-judgment reduction (whether by agreement of the parties or by order of the court), are significantly less than original verdicts and appear
to award the most worthy victims the greatest amounts. 13 Post-trial settlements also serve to reduce the unevenness of verdict amounts by decreasing, more than proportionately, some of the unusually high
original awards. 14 With very few exceptions this process corrects the unusual, the bizarre, or the unfair verdict. In these aspects the tort system
is working.
Critics also complain about the quantity of litigation supposedly
overburdening our judiciary and drastically increasing the cost of doing
business. 15 However, new studies have emerged that thoroughly dis7. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REX'. 4, 61-71

(1983) (arguing that the view of Americans as being unusually litigious is based more on
myth than careful analysis of the data).
8. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, (1987).
9. See Bailey, Managing Litigation, BEST'S REVIEW, Feb. 1985, at 62, col. 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.

ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS OF MILLION DOLLAR VER-

DICTS at i-ii (1986) [hereinafter MILLION DOLLAR VERDICTS]. Of 198 cases returning plaintiffs' verdicts which totalled $790.6 million, the actual amount paid out-after remittitur or
other post-judgment reduction or settlement- was $339.9 million. This amount represents forty-three percent of the original verdict amounts. Additionally, these post-judgment reductions decreased by four percent for every additional $1.0 million of the original
verdict amount.
13. Id. at ii. For example, 22 paralysis victims received an average verdict of $4.1
million and an average settlement of $3.7 million; 37 brain damaged plaintiffs averaged
$3.7 million and $2.3 million, and nine amputation cases averaged $3.5 million and $2.0
million respectively. d.
14. Id. at iii.
15. One of the most prominent critics has been former Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger:
In 1953 there were 279 authorized federal judgeships; today there are 647....In

1953 district court filings were about 99,000; there were about 3,200 courts of
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credit the notion that our court system is crumbling under a "litigation
explosion."' 16 These studies are in accord that the filing of cases in the
United States has not increased to an extent that could be even remotely
described as an "explosion." For example, data drawn from twenty
states, comprising twenty-nine limited and general jurisdiction, statewide court systems, revealed a moderate fourteen percent increase in
filings for tort, contract and real property claims between 1978 and
1981, but a four percent decrease for such claims between 1981 and
1984.17 Clearly the critics are confused about any "explosion."
B.

Sources of Misperceptions: Media, Lawyers and the Insurance Industry

Despite credible evidence of an efficient tort system, the public perception of personal injury cases is distorted, exaggerated and untrue.18
In part, this is probably because most Americans have little exposure to
actual personal injury cases or personal injury lawyers. Instead, they
rely on what they see, read, or hear in the media for information about
such cases and lawyers. What they get from the media is an incomplete
and distorted picture. 19 Additionally, the public reads only about the
filing of multimillion-dollar lawsuits, and assumes that such suits are the
norm. Unfortunately these casual observers do not follow the same
cases to final disposition; the public is rarely informed (by the same meappeals filings. Currently there are nearly 240,000 district court filings and
28,000 courts of appeals filings....
Address of ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger discussing the state of the judiciary. Presented
to the midyear meeting of the American Bar Association in New Orleans, Louisiana on
February 6, 1983 (reprintedin Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A.J.
442, at 443 (1983)).

16. See NATIONAL CENTER

NUAL REPORT

FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN-

1984 173, at 176-77 (1986) [hereinafter STATE COURT CASELOAD

STATISTICS];

see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986).
As to the cost of doing business, see DANIELS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: STORM ON THE HORIZON? (American Bar Foundation, Seminar 11, Feb. 8, 1986) (demonstrating that punitive
damages are not routinely assessed in cases where the plaintiff wins money); The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1986, at 544. Although filings of product liability
cases in federal courts have increased, damage claims linked to asbestosis victims account
for thirty-one percent of such cases. (Of 13,554 product liability cases, 4,239 involved
asbestosis claims.) This increase is not startling because the consequences of long-term
exposure to asbestos take years to become apparent. Id. at 546.
17. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 16, 173 (1986).

18. Have Anecdotes, Not Facts, Fueled the Insurance Crisis?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15
(reporting the results of a study conducted for the American Bar Foundation by Stephen
Daniels, Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University, which revealed that although
punitive damage awards greater than $1.0 million have generated tremendous publicity,
the median award for punitive damages throughout the country is actually less than

$50,000).
19. See Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES, Jan. 27, 1986, at 17 (commentary relying on
three examples of excessive judgments as justification for tort reform legislation). See also,
Sky High Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 27, 1986, at 35-39, 42, 43. In a
cover story citing increased filings of product liability cases, criticism is directed toward
such litigation and the corresponding bankruptcies of asbestos and IUD (intrauterine device) manufacturers. Although the article details the financial hardship incurred by these
large corporations, no mention is made of the human victims of these products. The tone

of the article is thusly demonstrated: "Anyone from Uncle Sam to Uncle Harry is open to
suit, now that the mood of society is to seek a culprit for all of life's mishaps."

Id. at 36.
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dia) as to the actual amount of the final results. This incomplete reporting and observation contributes to the misperception that excessive
personal injury awards are proliferating in our society.
In addition to the media, plaintiffs' lawyers have also contributed in
no small measure to this misperception in the last decade. First, lawyers, not unlike others, like to brag about their significant victories.
Some rush immediately to the newspapers and television stations to
trumpet successes. Others report exceptional or outstanding results to
such information-gathering organizations as Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
("JVR"). 2° Again, not unlike others, lawyers are loath to report their
dismissals, humiliating lost cases, or merely modest triumphs. Consequently, JVR only receives notice of the largest awards and the most
sensational judgments, without further determining how much money
was actually paid. As a result, JVR averages are flawed, distorted and
industry to influence
exaggerated, and are misused by the 2insurance
1
premiums, jurors and state legislators.
A second way that lawyers have fueled the misperceptions surrounding the civil justice system has been through the use of the ad
damnum clause. 2 2 Because the amount or demand set forth in this clause
often bears no relationship to the true value of a particular case, the
misperception that large suits are proliferating has been aggravated.
Finally, incidents occurring after the Bhopal disaster 2 3 and the
tragic Dallas/Fort Worth air crash 24 cause the public to stereotype all
plaintiffs' attorneys as avaricious vultures who rush to the scene of a disaster seeking clients. This impression is inaccurate and unfortunate.
In light of the misperceptions created by the media and by some
attorneys, the insurance industry has found it convenient to blame the
civil justice system generally, and to indict plaintiffs' lawyers specifically,
for the rising cost and shrinking availability of insurance in the "Great
Insurance Crisis of 1986."25 This tactic has been very successful; the alleged "crisis" provided impetus for the tort reform movement of 198687, which resulted in thirty-nine states passing some type of reform
20. JVR is a legal publishing company which collects verdict information, analyzes
personal injury litigation, and performs personal injury case evaluations for subscribers.

21. Of 472 verified cases involving judgments of $1.0 million or more obtained by
JVR and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 110 were unusable because there
was no response from the attorney of record, the verdicts were confidential, or for a variety of other reasons. MILLION DOLLAR VERDIcrs, supra note 12 at i, 2.

22. The ad damnum clause informs an adversary of the maximum amount of the claim
asserted without constituting proof of injury or of liability. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 35
(5th ed. 1979).
23. On December 3, 1984, more than 2,000 people died and tens of thousands were
injured as a result of a deadly gas leak from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India.
24. On August 2, 1985, windshear slammed a Delta L-101 I jet to the ground short of
the runway at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, killing 137. Washington Post, Aug.
4, 1985, at Al.
25. Sorry, Your Insurance Has Been Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16-20, 23-26; Liability Insurance Skyrockets, Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1985, at KI, K7-8. These articles cite the

huge increases in insurance premiums experienced by, to name a few, day care centers,
physicians and athletic equipment manufacturers.
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legislation.26
II.

A.

FALLACIES OF THE "INSURANCE

CRISIS"

Failed Investments by the Insurance Industry

For the several-year period prior to the "crisis," the property/casualty insurance companies had been underpricing their commercial line policies in order to raise funds that could be invested so as
to take advantage of escalating interest rates. 2 7 This ability to offset underwriting losses with portfolio investment income and income from
other sources has long been a significant factor in how insurance companies determine what they will charge for the insurance they offer. And
previously, insurance companies had been able to supplement any premium shortfall with such investment income. In the mid-1980's however, when interest rates unexpectedly fell, investment income did not
meet expectations; the companies panicked and attempted to even
things out in a single year. Accordingly, insurance premiums were
raised several-hundred percent, 2 8 and policies were cancelled in areas
which underwriters perceived as being too risky. 2 9 Then, in response to
protests from their insureds, the insurance industry launched a multimillion dollar advertising campaign to convince the American public
that excessive litigiousness and exorbitant jury awards 30 were to blame
for the premium increases and the unavailability of insurance coverage.
As a result, hundreds of enterprises, including day care centers, manufacturing concerns, governmental units and asbestos-removal companies, were left without insurance. 3 1 In reality, premiums increased and
26. Priest, Tort Reform Leislation.

..

Is Only a Start, Wall St.J., Feb. 3, 1987, at 26, col.

5.
27. A property/casualty insurance company basically derives its income from underwriting gains (the excess of premiums over claims and expenses) and investment gains.
Because of income from investment gains, a company can have net income even though its
premium revenues might not cover claims and expenses. Accordingly, for the past several
years property/casualty insurers charged relatively low premium prices, thereby generating increased business and a larger short-term, net cash flow. These monies were then
invested and the profit from investment income was used to satisfy any deficiency in premium income. In 1983, for instance, the industry's claims and expenses exceeded premiums, resulting in a loss of about $11.0 billion, but because of its pricing strategy and
investment income, the industry had a net gain of about $8.0 billion. See Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the Ways and Means Comm., 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 108, 111 (1986)
(testimony of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office). For a discussion of risk in the property/casualty insurance business,
see

J.

HUNTER

& J.

WILSON,

INVESTMENT

INCOME

AND

PROFITABILITY

IN

PROP-

Chapter 5 (1983).
28. Premiums Soaringas InsuranceCrisis Begins to Hit Home, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 20,
1985, at BI.
29. Sugawara, Day Care Insurance Imperiled, Washington Post, July 19, 1985, at C7, col.
1 (insurance for day care centers has become prohibitively expensive or unavailable).
30. In five different advertisements the Insurance Information Institute urged readers
to write for a free booklet on reforming the civil justice system. This course of action was
described as necessary to control increasing premiums and cancellation of policies. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE LAwsurr CRISIS (Apr. 1986).
ERTY/CASUALTY RATEMAKING

31. See The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1986, at 544 (reporting that
the "crisis" was caused by the insurance companies' poor management and investment
practices, not by the civil justice system. Additionally, the article points out that analyzing
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coverage became unavailable because the industry was reeling from mismanaged investments and retreating interest rates.
B.

The Special Problems of Medical Malpractice

One significant area that has not escaped the effects of the insurance company panic is the health care industry. Doctors and other
health care providers have been drastically affected by extraordinary increases in malpractice premiums. 3 2 The medical-malpractice problem is
further aggravated by the way in which insurance premiums for the medical profession are determined. Unlike other categories of insureds,
there is no experience rating among individual physicians.3 3 Instead,
groups or "pools" of health care providers are collectively rated. As a
result, the best obstetrician in town pays the same rate for insurance as
the worst. This system penalizes competent physicians.
Additional problems are caused by the relatively small numbers of
doctors making up any particular underwriting risk pool. In Wisconsin,
for example, only forty-nine neurosurgeons comprise one underwriting
pool; three hundred obstetricians makeup another.3 4 Obviously, a single claim-against only one errant doctor could adversely affect the premiums of every doctor in the pool. As a result of this system, good
doctors are forced to pay higher premiums because a colleague, over
whom they have no control, has made a serious error. Moreover, there
has been a woeful lack of discipline prescribed for incompetent doctors. 3 5 Studies in several states consistently show that one percent or
less of practicing physicians are responsible for twenty-five to thirty percent of all losses paid. 36 And yet, many of these doctors continue to
average awards is misleading because a few disproportionately large awards throw off any
average. Instead, it is the median award "that shows how the typical injured person is compensated." Id. at 546).
As an interesting historical note, during the insurance crisis of the mid-1970's, as insurance companies lobbied for tort reform, several commentators blamed the crisis on the
insurance companies' need for high premiums due to poor investments. See generally D.
LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 20.07, n.56 (Supp. 1979); Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INS. L.J. 90, 96 (1976); Oster, Medical
Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 228, 231 (1978); Koskoff, Physician Insure Thyself,
TRIAL, Dec. 1979, at 4.

32. See, e.g., Nelson, Medical Malpracticeand the Transformation in Health Care Delivery, 17
CUMB. L. REV. 313 (1987) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the effects of rising premiums and shrinking availability of insurance upon the health care industry).
33. See A. HOFFLANDER & B. NYE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
72 (1985).
34. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, FUND POPULATION BY ISO CODE AND PREMIUM CLASS
(1986).
35. See Brinkley, Should Doctors Be Given a More Thorough Examination?, N. Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 1985, at El0, col. 1. (After citing cases involving physician malpractice, this article
analyzes the limited extent to which governmental review of physician incompetence is
disclosed to the public.); see also Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York, Grand Jury Report, Report Concerningthe Care and Treatment of a Patient and the Supervision of Interns andJunior Residents at a Hospital in New York County, Dec. 31, 1986 (Supervision has been lacking and New York is responding by taking measures to increase the
supervision of student doctors caring for patients).

36. Medicine on Trial: The Malpractice Crisis, Case Study Finds When and lVhy, Orlando
Sentinel, Apr. 13, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
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practice.
C.

The Insurance Industry is Strong and Profitable
The true financial status of the insurance industry in no way resem-

bles the pathetic picture described by industry spokespersons. The industry has mislead the American consumer and media-in an
orchestrated fashion-by inflating the amounts actually paid on claims,
while at the same time underrepresenting the true profitability of the

industry as a whole. For example, congressional reports show median
awards to be, generally, only one-fifth the amount claimed by the insurance companies in their propaganda to justify insurance rate increases
and policy cancellations. 3 7

Further analysis indicates that these compa-

nies are undeserving of any sympathy or special consideration. To support this contention, one need only examine their financial condition.
The insurance industry reported record profits for 1986. Operating
profits were reported at $4.5 billion.3 8 Combined with their realized
capital gains and federal tax credits, the industry's net income was a record $11.5 billion in 1986, which represented an increase of 605% over
the 1985 figure of $1.9 billion. 39 "Available industry estimates show
that over the next 5 years, the industry expects substantial net gains ...
[C]alculations, made from industry estimates, indicate an expected net

gain before taxes of more than $90 billion over the years 1986 to
1990. '' 40 In addition to the favorable treatment afforded the insurance
industry under the tax laws, it is important to remember that the industry is also immune from federal antitrust regulation. 4 1 These sobering
and impressive facts make it absolutely clear that the insurance industry
is thriving. It certainly does not require, nor is it deserving of, the additional assistance which it seeks through enactment of legislative tort re-

form, at the expense of the legal rights of injured

victims.

42

37. Report on the Liability InsuranceCrisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 171
(Aug. 6, 1986) (testimony of Philip J. Hermann, Chairman of the Board, Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
38. Casualty Firms Report Profit, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1987, at C2. Operating profit
is investment income minus underwriting losses and other expenses. Underwriting losses
include not only money paid in actual claims but those amounts set aside for anticipated
claims. The latter sums are tax free and interest earning.
39. Id.
40. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 56 (1986) (testimony of William J.
Anderson, Director, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
41. Solutions to the Liability Insurance Crisis, 138 CONG. REC. H 1595 (daily ed. Mar. 25,
1986) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (In addition to criticizing the inflated statistics employed by the Insurance Services Office in raising premiums, LaFalce, in posing solutions
to the insurance crisis, has suggested that the antitrust exemption enjoyed by the insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act be repealed or amended.)
42. Hunter & Angoff, Tort Reform Legislation . .. Ought to Reduce Premiums, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 3, 1987, at 26, col. 3 (additional support for the contention that insurance companies
need no additional legislative protections; in fact, these companies are now claiming that
tort reform will have a negligible effect on premium rates. For example, the St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company, while concluding that tort reforms "will produce little or
no savings to the tort system as it pertains to medical malpractice," was simultaneously
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III.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AMERICAN TORT SYSTEM

The misperceptions and fallacies alluded to above are threatening
the essence of the American civil justice system. Coalitions have sprung
up all over the country, 4 3 condemning the system and advocating radical
change. A lynch-mob psychology has set in-one that seeks to emasculate our tort compensation system, to eliminate our cherished seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, 44 and to significantly reduce the substantive rights of injured American citizens.
Many of these tort reform coalitions include people who really
know, or should know, the true value of our civil justice system, not only
as an effective way to compensate injured people, but also as a mechanism to goad faceless corporations into shouldering social responsibilities that outweigh an absolute yearning for profit.
The tremendous societal benefit provided by the tort system, in its
present form, should not be underemphasized. Personal injury lawsuits-not tough government regulations or self-discipline by conscience-stricken corporations-forced the redesign of certain dangerous
products or their removal from the marketplace. Some of these lawsuits
revealed industrial conspiracies or exposed corporate coverups in addition to compensating the victims of such wrongful conduct. The fiftyyear conspiracy to coverup the hazards of asbestos was uncovered by a
handful of plaintiffs' lawyers who brought this evidence to light on behalf of their injured clients. 4 5 A contraceptive device, marketed as the
"Dalkon Shield," was known to be unsafe but was manufactured and
sold anyway, until lawsuits forced it off the market. 46 The continued
manufacture and installation of the poorly designed Ford Pinto gas tank
was another example of a calculated corporate strategy exposed by
plaintiffs' lawyers doing their job in our civil justice system. 47 Other
examples include the redesign of the Drano can, 4 8 the effort to keep
threatening to withdraw from the West Virginia medical-malpractice market. The reason
for this threat was the legislature's failure to pass legislation significantly limiting damages
for pain and suffering or restricting joint and several liability. Id.)
43. See American Tort Reform Association, A CivilJustice System Out of Balance, Press
Release (Jan. 16, 1986).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
45. P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT - THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985) (asbestos-related diseases were known forty years before the Manville Corporation
claimed that the adverse health consequences of such exposure was known, and much
earlier in Europe. Id. at 10-14).
46. M. MiNTz, AT ANY COST - CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(1985) (a detailed analysis of the A. H. Robins Company, manufacturers and marketers of
the Dalkon Shield).
47. Pinto gas tanks, when struck from the rear, had a high failure rate resulting in
frequent violent explosions. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 777,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (1981) (Ford management based its decision to go forward with
the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank design was unsafe, on the profit
which would result from omitting or delaying the necessary "fixes").
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969).
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flammable children's pajamas from the marketplace, 49 and the redesign
of gas tank caps on tractors. 50 The tort system and plaintiffs' lawyers are
largely responsible for these accomplishments; lives have no doubt been
saved, and injuries lessened.
CONCLUSION

Critics of the civil justice system, even if they acknowledge that
some social benefits are derived from the system, still complain about
the cost of delivering justice. They also complain that the process is ponderous and time-consuming. Whatever its faults and costs, our system
ofjustice, not unlike our democratic form of government, is immeasurably better than any known alternative. The right to a court hearing is as
treasured as the right to vote, the right to bear arms and the right to
freedom of religion. People in the Soviet Union do not concern themselves with the cost of compensation systems. Victims of the Chernobyl
nuclear accident do not even consider obtaining compensation from juries of their peers. And yet, some in this country advocate reducing the
rights of our citizens.
Is the tort system perfect? No. Can it stand some fine tuning? Yes.
Should there be some alternatives to courts for some categories of
cases? Absolutely. And what about the lawyers? Plaintiffs' lawyers who
prosecute meritless or frivolous lawsuits should be dealt with severely
through sanctions by the bar associations. 5 1 Defense lawyers who present frivolous defenses or unnecessary delays should be treated similarly. 52

And

lawyers who

charge excessive

fees

should

also

be

disciplined by the bar associations and the supervising courts in the re53
spective states.
The faults of our tort system and its players, like the supposed economic plight of the insurance companies, are greatly exaggerated. In
both instances, there is a problem of myth versus fact. Hopefully, the
leaders of the various bar associations in the United States will help the
public to distinguish fact from fiction, truth from distortion and myth
from reality. This kind of educational process is imperative if we ever
hope to lead the American citizenry to a realization that our civil justice
system is working. In the meantime, while this educational process is
evolving, we must guard against the continued erosion of individual
legal rights for the sake of protecting the purses of wealthy and influential special interests: the profitable insurance companies, the manufacturers of dangerous products, and the negligent providers of vital
services.
49. See, e.g., GRYC v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980); Weems v.
CBS Imports Corp., 46 Or. App. 539, 612 P.2d 323 (1980).
50. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Mendoza, 532 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
51. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE AsSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA ON FRIVOLOUS COURT ACTIONS, CONTINGENCY
FEES, INFLATED DAMAGE CLAIMS, CLIENT SOLICITATION, AND LAWYER ADVERTISING

52. Id.
53. Id.

(1986).

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:

A CASE

FOR REFORM
SENATOR LARRY PRESSLER*
AND KEVIN V. SCHIEFFER**

INDEX TO ARTICLE

Page

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

VII.

VIII.

Introduction .............................................
Background ............................................
The Developing Law Affecting Joint Tortfeasors .........
A. Procedural Joinder .................................
B. Definition of Joint Tort .............................
C . Contribution ......................................
D. Contributory Negligence ...........................
E. Com parative Fault .................................
F. Jury Apportionment of Damages ....................
G. Alternative Liability ................................
H . Burdens of Proof ..................................
I.
R elease ...........................................
Doctrinal Justifications .................................
A . M oral Fault ........................................
B. Compensating the Innocent Plaintiff ................
C. Loss Distribution ..................................
D . A bility to Pay ......................................
Concurrent Torts ......................................
False Labels and Confused Applications .................
A. Tortious Conduct ..................................
B . Causation .........................................
C. Indivisibility ......................................
Related Problems: Release Offsets and the "Empty
C h air ....
............................................
A. Release O ffsets ....................................
B. "Em pty Chair" . ...................................
Suggested Reform .....................................
A. Operative Language ...............................

652
654
660
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
669
669
669
669
670
671
672
673
676
6 77
678
679
680
680

*
United States Senator, South Dakota; B.A. 1964, University of South Dakota;
M.A. 1966, Harvard University;J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Senator Pressler is a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the author
of several pieces of legislation dealing with the issue ofjoint and several liability. In Committee hearings and on the Senate floor, he has been the leading advocate of reform.
.,
Chief of Staff to Senator Pressler; B.A. 1982, University of South Dakota; J.D.
1987, Georgetown University. As Chief Legislative Counsel, Mr. Schieffer formerly assisted Senator Pressler on issues before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B. Burdens of Proof ..................................
C. "Empty Chair" Problems ...........................
D. Offsetting Adjustments for Release .................
E. Policy Considerations ..............................
IX . C onclusion ............................................
I.

[Vol. 64:4
682
682
682
682
684

INTRODUCTION

One of the great strengths of the common law is its ability to adapt
to a changing legal environment. Its flexibility allows courts to weave
from ancient doctrines new rules to resolve problems as they arise in an
increasingly complex society. Occasionally the courts' handiwork becomes so entangled in confused definitions and internal inconsistencies,
and travels so far from a doctrine's original rationale, that it cries out for
reform. Such is the case with joint and several liability.
The doctrine of joint and several liability works to hold any one of
multiple tortfeasors liable to a plaintiff for the entire harm caused by
their combined acts.I This doctrine applies even when the trier of fact
determines that an individual tortfeasor's proportionate share of fault is
slight.2 Thus, theoretically a party found one percent at fault can be
held liable for the entire amount of damages awarded.
As a result of this shortcoming, plaintiffs often target persons they
perceive to have the greatest resources from which to pay claims. Commonly known as "deep-pocket" defendants, they are especially likely to
be brought into a suit when it appears that the party most responsible
3
for the harm is judgment-proof.
Some argue that the deep pocket abuse is curtailed effectively
through the common law rule requiring that a party be determined
to have been a "legal cause" 4 of the harm in order for liability to attach. 5
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977); Prosser,Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 418 (1937); Jackson,Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX.
L. REV. 399, 404 (1939); Recent Developments, Torts-Joint Tortfeasors-Liabilityand Contribution for Indivisible Injury, 45 TENN. L. REV. 129 (1977) (citing Velsicol Chemical Corp. v.
Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976)); W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].

2. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 34 (1956 & Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Rozevink v. Faris, 342
N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1983) (defendant adjudicated to be seventeen percent negligent was
jointly liable for entire amount of damages); Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of
New York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), 81 A.D.2d 755, 438
N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, O'Connor v. City of New York,
58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 1983) (defendant adjudicated to be
four percent at fault was required to pay entire judgment for personal injuries).
3. It has been argued that "[d]efendants are brought into a lawsuit not so much
because [they are] responsible in a practical sense. They are brought in because of their
deep pockets." Executive Session No. 20 of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12, 1986) (Statement of Senator Pressler).
4. "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion" than the issue
of "proximate cause" or "legal cause." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41, at 263.
Generally speaking, once it has been established that an act or omission is a "cause in fact"
of a harm, an additional legal test must be met before liability attaches. That test requires
"that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant
and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Id. It "is merely the limitation which the
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However, this rule has proved ineffective because 6 typically it has required little more than an indirect contributory role. Because the chain
of causation becomes tenuous at best in these cases, 7 this approach has
been criticized. 8
The thesis of this article is that the doctrine of joint and several
liability should be refined to accommodate the current law on joint torts
and to reflect the original policy goals underlying its common law origins. The purpose of this article is to assist the reformer in identifying
the various issues which should be addressed in any reform proposal, to
discuss and develop the theoretical and policy rationale for reform, and
to recommend specific reforms. This article will critically examine the
courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct." Id. at 264. Historically, this has been termed as "proximate cause," although Prosser prefers the "more appropriate term" of "legal cause." Id. at 273. Despite concerns
over semantic purity, the two terms are used synonymously. Id. at 263.
5. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41, at 264.

6. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14,
1985). In Sills, a driver high on drugs collided with another automobile as he ran a stop
sign. The city was found to have jointly caused the accident because it failed to trim the
hedges near the intersection. The driver was insolvent and the city was required to pay
almost all of the $2.16 million judgment.
Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152 (San Diego Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1984). In
Duggan, a drunk driver smashed into a car with three passengers as he crossed the center
line on a curve. The City of San Diego was joined as a defendant based on a claim that the
accident was "caused" by a faulty road design. The drunk driver settled for $25,000. After initial court proceedings, the city settled for $1.6 million.
Laurenti v. Tiffenbauch, No. A-6247-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984) (on
appeal from N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.). In Laurenti, a "chopped" motorcycle collided with a
full-size automobile when it was unable to stop in time to avoid the oncoming automobile
making a left-hand turn in front of it. A passenger on the motorcycle was wearing a large
metal belt buckle. Upon impact the passenger came forward and forced the belt buckle
into the driver's back, resulting in a serious injury. Among others, the driver named Rayco
of Trenton, Inc. as a defendant, alleging that Rayco, who had reupholstered the seat, had
stretched the material too tight making the seat "excessively slippery." The plaintiff alleged that this act had "caused" the injury and the lower court agreed. Before trial, the
driver of the automobile settled for her insurance policy limit of $25,000. Other defendants named had little or no assets and thus Rayco became liable for the balance of the $2.5
million verdict plus $900,000 in interest. After an appeal was filed and briefed, the case
was settled for $1.1 million. For an extensive narrative of this case, see Availability and Cost
of Liability Insurance.- Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68 (1986) (statement of Mr. Bradford W. Mitchell) [hereinafter
1986 Insurance Hearings).
Cini v. Vaughn, No. A893-81T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 1983) (on appeal
from N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Atlantic County, No. L-17175-78). In Cini, the plaintiff was
injured when defendant Vaughn fell asleep behind the wheel on the expressway, allowing
his car to veer off the road and collide with a tow truck that was parked on the shoulder of
the road to assist a disabled vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the tow truck, parked approximately ten feet behind the disabled vehicle with its lights flashing, was "improper[ly]
locat[ed]." The tow truck owner was named one of the numerous defendants. The sleeping driver settled for his insurance policy limit of $30,000. After an initial summary judgment for the defendant tow truck owner was reversed, the owner settled for $242,500. See
Claim No. A50-11 22 06-R, Harleysville Insurance Companies, Harleysville, Pennsylvania
(settlement figures relating to the tow truck owner). Two other named defendants - The
Atlantic City Expressway Authority and the architect of the expressway - also settled after
the reversal of the summary judgment.
8. See generally Product Liability HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter 1986
Product Liability Hearings].

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4

theories and justifications underlying the ancient common law doctrine
ofjoint torts. It will apply them to today's legal setting by focusing on
relatively recent common law developments such as the advent of comparative fault 9 and alternative liability, 10 and illustrate the need for
change. Finally, the article will discuss how joint and several liability
reform can (1) lead to more equitable results in the majority of cases; (2)
punish the true wrongdoers; and (3) eliminate a great deal of uncertainty in the law of joint torts.
II. BACKGROUND

The current insurance "crisis"I' has given joint and several liability
reformers new impetus. Joint and several liability has been named by
the insurance industry and other deep-pocket defendants as one of the
leading culprits in causing skyrocketing liability insurance premiums.12
Local governments have cited it as a reason for increasing taxes and
eliminating public facilities and services. 13 Because of their deep pockets, public entities, particularly municipalities, are often brought into
suits for their passive roles in "causing" accidents. For example, cities
have been held responsible for virtually the entire damages in million9. For a discussion of comparative fault, see infra notes 68-76 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of alternative liability, see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying
text.
11. Although there has been a substantial amount of discussion as to whether recent
developments within the insurance industry constitute a "crisis," the present problems in
obtaining affordable insurance coverage have been often referred to as such. See generally
Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Business, Trade, and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter 1985 InsuranceHearings]; 1986 Insurance Hearings,supra
note 7; The Cost and Availability of Liability Insurancefor Small Business Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985, 1986) [hereinafter Small Business
Insurance Hearings].
12. Report of the Committee on Municipal Tort Liability of the National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers, pp. 38-42, Annual Conference, Fort Worth, Texas (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter
Report on Municipal Liability]; American Insurance Association Memorandum from Dennis
R. Connolly, Vice President for Liability, to all Regional Vice Presidents (Nov. 12, 1985)
[hereinafter AIA Memorandum] ("The elimination ofjoint liability... is perhaps the most
single [sic] important across-the-board tort reform"); Letter from Leslie Cheek, Vice President of Federal Affairs, Crum & Forster Insurance Companies to Senator Larry Pressler
(March 10, 1986) (abrogation ofjoint and several liability "would remove the single most
serious common law impediment to the underwriting and pricing of product liability insurance"). See generally 1986 Product Liability Hearings, supra note 8; 1986 Insurance Hearings,
supra note 7 (these records are replete with evidence of the problems caused by the joint
and several liability doctrine).
It should be noted that opponents of tort reform strongly disagree as to the causes of
insurance premium increases, citing reasons such as poor industry underwriting practices,
the cyclical nature of the insurance industry, and an insurance industry conspiracy to dramatically raise prices in an attempt to gain long-coveted tort reform. 1986 InsuranceHearings, supra note 7. There is insufficient evidence to unequivocally support any of these
competing theories. It is the writers' opinion that the insurance problem is a result of a
combination of the factors referred to above. And, although it is doubtful the insurance
industry is engaged in a conscious conspiracy to raise prices in an effort to prompt tort
reform, at the very least it appears that the industry is taking advantage of the "crisis" in its
push for reform and using it to deflect criticisms of its own contributions to the problem.
13. See Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 35-38.
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dollar awards because they have failed to trim hedges on private property, "causing" a vehicle whose driver was high on drugs to collide at an
intersection equipped with stop signs; 14 because they have located a
street light too close to the curb, "causing" injury upon impact when a
driver veered off the road and ran into a light pole; 15 because their traffic lanes were too narrow, "causing" a collision between negligent drivers; 16 because they failed to place warning signs along a beachfront
during the off-season, "causing" injury to a man who ran into the surf
and dove into shallow water, hitting his head on a sandbar and leaving
him a quadraplegic. 17
As long as the plaintiff can convince the trier of fact that the deeppocket defendant was a contributing factor in bringing about the injury,
and thereby a legal cause,' 8 the doctrine of joint and several liability
potentially exposes it to entire liability. Although juries commonly find
that the deep pocket's responsibility for the harm caused is very slight,
often only a few percentage points, 19 this is sufficient to establish liability for the entire judgment. Although deep-pocket defendants have a
right of contribution against the remaining defendants, those parties are
20
often insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof
The issue ofjoint and several liability has received extensive debate
14. Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985).
The plaintiff argued that the city should have installed signs to warn of the upcoming stop
signs. The jury returned a verdict of $2.16 million. The negligent driver had no money
and three other co-defendants settled for their insurance policy limits, a total of $200,000,
leaving the city to pay the balance.
15. Isom v. City of Antioch, No. 225117 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1984).
The plaintiff argued that the light should have been mounted on a break-away pole. The
city pointed out that break-away poles also have created municipal liability for the damage
caused when they fall. However, because of the joint and several liability law, the City of
Antioch settled the case in 1984 for $400,000.
16. Anderson v. City of Signal Hill, No. SOC-60893 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1984). The jury returned a verdict of $1.5 million against the city and two negligent drivers also involved in the case. The two drivers' policy limits totalled $115,000,
leaving the city responsible for the balance of $1.385 million. The city later settled the
case for $400,000 and monthly payments of $4,000 over the next 10 years, plus additional
payments to related parties in excess of$10,000 per month for varying time periods. The
city was held liable because it had restriped the traffic lanes six years earlier making them
10 feet wide - a width accepted as safe in the state highway authority's CALTRANS traffic
manual.
17. Taylor v. City of Newport Beach, No. 354623 (Orange County Super. Ct. October
29, 1984). The city was ordered to pay $6 million. Shortly after the verdict, the city's
insurance coverage was cancelled.
18. For a discussion of legal cause, see supra note 4; see also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of New York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425
N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), 81 A.D.2d 755, 438 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184,447 N.E.2d 33,
460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 1983) (city adjudicated only four percent at fault but held liable
for the entire judgment); see also Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 30-38.
20. Indeed, it is often argued that the primary reason a public entity is brought into
the suit in the first place is because the defendants most responsible are judgment-proof.
See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY
REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1986) (majority views); 1985
Insurance Hearings, supra note 11, at 155-57 (statement of Mr. Quinn, vice president of the
Maryland Municipal League, urging repeal of the doctrine of joint and several liability).
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at the federal level for the first time since uniform product liability legislation was introduced seven years ago. 2 1 Efforts are now being made by
federal legislators to limit the doctrine. 2 2 The Reagan Administration
has urged complete repeal except in cases involving "concerted action". 2 3 The most recent product liability bill reported by the Senate
Commerce Committee contains an amendment abrogating joint and
24
several liability for noneconomic damages.
Also, many states have begun to focus on the issue ofjoint and several liability. Twelve years ago, joint and several liability was universally
applied in every state. 25 Since then, however, at least thirty-three
states 2 6 have either abolished 2 7 or substantially limited 28 joint and sev21. See H.R. 1061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1676, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). Early product liability legislation did not focus on the issue of joint and several
liability. Cf. infra notes 22-24. But with the convergence of the general liability insurance/tort reform and product liability issues, joint and several liability became a major
element in the product liability hearings during the 99th Congress. See, e.g., 1986 Product
Liability Hearings, supra note 8 (joint and several liability amendment proposal discussed
February 27 at p. 6 and identified as the "one tort reform that would do the most to
improve the availability and affordability of liability insurance," February 27, at p. 14. Specific joint and several liability amendment filed March 11, at p. 210).
22. The early federal product liability and tort reform legislation, although generally
including some type of contribution provision, did not attempt to abrogate or substantially
limit joint and several liability. See, e.g., H.R. 1061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 44, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); see also S. 2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (would abolish joint and several liability for noneconomic damages); Pressler Amendment to S. 1999, 1986 Product Liability Hearings, supra note 8, at 210 (would abolish joint and several liability in all product liability
actions except for cases involving concerted action; the amendment was debated, but no
vote was taken); Pressler Amendment to Committee Working Draft, Executive Session No. 20
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,99th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12,
1986) (would limit joint and several liability to economic damages in product liability actions); see generally Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, Depts. of Justice and
Commerce, at 64 (February 1986) [hereinafter Administration Report] (Recommendation
No. 3 urges abolition of joint and several liability except for cases involving concerted
action).
23. AdministrationReport, supra note 22. Concerted action is discussed infra notes 43-44
and accompanying text.
24. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 308 (1986) (Section 308 was added to the original
Committee bill as an amendment. Section 308(c) defines noneconomic damages as
subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation; the term does not
include objectively verifiable monetary losses including, but not limited to, medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair
or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, rehabilitation and
training expenses, loss of employment or loss of business or employment
opportunities.)
25. Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A.J. 61, 62 (July 1985).
26. See infra notes 27 (three states abrogated prior to 1986), 28 (nine states modified
prior to 1986), 29 (fifteen states abrogated or modified in 1986), 30 (one state modified by
1986 referendum) and 31 (ten states abrogated or modified in 1987). The reader will note
that of the thirty-eight states referred to in this footnote, five states - Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico and Texas - enacted joint and several liability legislation or
decided joint and several liability court cases in successive years. Therefore, a total of
thirty-three states have either abrogated or substantially modified joint and several liability
laws in recent years.
27. In 1986, Colorado, Utah and Wyoming abrogated joint and several liability. See
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eral liability. In 1986 alone, fifteen state legislatures enacted joint and
several liability reform laws. 29 Additionally during 1986, voters in Caliinfra note 29. North Dakota followed in 1987. See infra note 31. Additionally, Kansas,
Ohio and New Mexico abrogated joint and several liability prior to 1986.
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978) (abolished joint and several liability through
interpretation of a 1976 comparative negligence statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, 60258b (1983)); see also Ebeling v. General Motors Corp., No. 57,700 (Kan. Feb. 21, 1986).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Anderson 1981) (abolished the rule in favor

of several liability); Steams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985);
Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d
1185 (Ohio 1983); see also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.4, at 258-59 (2d

ed. 1986).
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. 1982) (abolished the
rule in favor of several liability through interpretation of a state supreme court decision,
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981), which earlier adopted comparative negligence).
But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-3-1 at infra note 31. It remains to be seen how the New
Mexico courts will interpret the "public policy" exception of the 1987 statute in light of
Bartlett.
It should be noted that in addition to the statutes and decision just mentioned, a 1981
New Hampshire comparative negligence statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983),
appeared to have completely abrogated joint and several liability. The statutory language
appears to have abolished the rule in favor of several liability, but thus far the courts have
not decided the issue. However, given the 1986 New Hampshire modified joint and several liability statute cited infra note 29, this now seems an unlikely result.
Finally, while some thought that Vermont's comparative negligence statute, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1981), abolished the rule in favor of several liability, see Granelli, supra
note 25, at 62, which suggests the Vermont courts seem to have held otherwise. English v.
Meyers, 142 Vt. 144, 454 A.2d 251 (1982); see also V. SCHWARTZ, supra § 16.4, at 259.
28. As discussed infra notes 29-30, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Washington, West Virginia
and California substantially modified joint and several liability in 1986. Nine others followed in 1987 - Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Dakota and Texas. In addition to these twenty-two states, nine others - Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Texas - substantially modified joint and several liability prior to 1986.
Nevada, Texas, Indiana, Louisiana, Oregon and Pennsylvania all limited the rule so
that it applies only when plaintiff's negligence is less than defendants'. Several liability
applies when plaintiff's negligence is greater than defendants'. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.141(3) (1986); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5 (Burns 1986); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1972); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.485 (1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982); General State

Auth. v. Sutter Corp., 452 A.2d 75 (N.Y. 1982) (reform via court decision rather than
through legislation).
Iowa limited the rule so it would not apply to defendants found to bear less than fifty
percent of total fault assigned to all parties, leaving them liable for their several amount.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1-668.3, 619.17 (West Supp. 1987).
Minnesota limited the rule only insofar as the share of an uncollectable defendant's
damages would be reallocated among all others, including a partially negligent plaintiff.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1987).
Oklahoma limited the rule to cases where damages cannot be apportioned or where
plaintiff is not at fault. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980);
Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
29. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming all
enacted legislation during the 1986 session to abrogate or substantially modify the doctrine of joint and several liability.
Of the fifteen states, three enacted an outright abrogation: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2 1111.5 (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("[N]o defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that
represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such
defendant."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78 27-38 (Supp. 1986) ("[N]o defendant is liable to any
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant."); Wvo. STAT. § 1-l-109(d) (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("Each defendant is liable
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fornia approved an initiative measure abolishing the doctrine as it peronly for that portion of the total dollar amount [correlating to] the percentage of fault
attributable to him as determined by the jury.").
The remaining twelve states enacted substantial modifications: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.080 (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("[A] party who is allocated less than 50 percent of the
total fault allocated to all parties [including plaintiff] may not be jointly liable for more
than twice the percentage of fault allocated to that party." § 09.17.080 (d)); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-572h (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[E]ach person against whom recovery is allowed
shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable . . .
damages .. .except [that when] damages [are] uncollectable [the court] shall reallocate
such uncollectable amount among the other parties according to their respective percentages."); FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Liability of each party is determined "on
the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint
and several liability [except for] economic damages [in cases where the defendant's] fault
equals or exceeds that of [the] claimant."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1986)
("Joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors [whose 'degree of negligence is less than
twenty-five percent'] .. .is abolished" for noneconomic damages except in actions involving environmental pollution, asbestos-related and toxic torts, intentional torts, strict and
products liability, and aircraft and certain motor vehicle accidents.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, paras. 2-1117, 2-1118 (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("Any defendant whose fault.., is less than
25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and
any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally
liable for all . . .damages" other than medically related expenses. § 2-1117. However,
joint and several liability is retained in medical malpractice and environmental cases. § 21118.); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987) ("In a personal injury action
involving fault of more than 1 party... a person shall not be required to pay damages in
an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault." § 600.6304(1) & (5). However, if
the court determines that "all or part of a party's share of the obligation is uncollectible,"
it "shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties according to their
respective percentages of fault" not to exceed "that party's percentage of fault."
§ 600.6304(6). In addition, joint and several liability is retained in "a products liability
action," § 600.6304(4), and in cases where "a plaintiff is not at fault," § 600.6304(3)).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[T]he state or a municipality [whose] fault is
less than 35 percent ... is jointly and severally liable for an amount no greater than twice
the amount of fault.") (See also MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1987), supra note 28.);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.230(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1987) ("defendant ['health care provider'] ...jointly liable only with those defendants whose apportioned percentage of fault
is equal to or less than such defendant"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:9 (Cum. Supp.
1986) ("[G]overnmental units or public employees shall be liable only to the extent that
their acts or omissions contributed to the causation" of harm "arising from a pollutant
incident" if that fault is less than fifty percent of the total.); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R 1601,
1602 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[I]n an action involving two or more tortfeasors ...
or in a claim against the state [where] the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such defendant . . . for non-economic loss shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share
determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss." § 1601. But § 1601 does not apply to
intentional torts, actions taken in concert, workers' compensation cases, or administrative
proceedings. § 1602.); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (Cum.Supp. 1987) ("The liability of
each defendant shall be several only and shall not be joint" if the action involves fault of
more than one party - except in cases involving concerted action, hazardous waste sites,
business torts, and manufacturers of fungible products.); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 (Cune.
Supp. 1987) (eliminates joint and several liability "against and among all defendants which
bear less than twenty-five percent of the negligence attributable to all defendants" in medical professional liability actions) (Section 29-12A-7(d) similarly modifies joint and several
liability in actions against a political subdivision or its employees.).
Joint and several liability reform measures were introduced in at least twenty-seven
states during the 1986 legislative session. See Liability Alert, Capitol Impact Publications,
Vol. I, No. 1 (Feb. 28, 1986). Other states are considering joint and several liability reforms which still may be enacted in 1987. For example, one bi-monthly publication which
tracks state tort reform efforts has identified at least twenty jurisdictions in which bills to
abolish or modify joint and several liability have been introduced. See Liability Alert, Capi-
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tains to non-economic damages.3 0 And already in 1987, at least ten
31
states have enacted legislation reforming joint and several liability.
tol Impact Publications, Vol. I, Nos. 22-24, Vol. II, Nos. 1-9 (Jan. 15-June 30, 1987). Arizona, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee and Texas have all had legislation introduced which would abolish joint and
several liability. See also infra note 31 in which it is noted that in at least ten of these states,
legislation has been signed into law during 1987.
30. California Proposition 51, entitled the "Fair Responsibility Act of 1986," was approved with a sixty-two percent majority in the June 3, 1986 primary and became effective
immediately. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431.1-.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1987).
31. North Dakota enacted outright abrogation. Nine others enacted substantial modifications. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) ("[w]hen two or more parties are
found to have contributed to the injury, the liability of each party is several only, and is not
joint, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party" except in cases involving concerted action); Act of Feb. 12, 1987,
ch. 1, § 2, 1987 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. I (West) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122506) ("[Tjhe liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint"
except in cases involving concerted action, hazardous wastes, or where "a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party."); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Cum.Supp. 1987)
("Where .. .the plaintiff is himself to some degree responsible for the injury or damages
claimed, the trier of fact ... may apportion its award of damages among the persons who
are liable and whose degree of fault is greater than that of the injured party.... Damages
: ..shall be the liability of each person against whom they are awarded [and] shall not be a
joint liability."); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3)-(7) (Cum.Supp. 1987) ("The common law doctrine ofjoint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action .. .where [persons]
were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another
party... relating to hazardous or toxic waste or substances or solid waste disposal sites ...
[or] arising from the manufacture of any medical devices or pharmaceutical products.");
Act of Apr. 14, 1987, § B, 1987 Mo. LEGIS. SERV. 49 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 509.050.41) (Joint and several liability is retained except where plaintiff is contributorily
negligent. If any defendant's equitable share is determined to be "uncollectible," it is
reallocated to the remaining parties; but "[n]o amount shall be reallocated to any party
whose assessed percentage of fault is less than the plaintiff's so as to increase that party's
liability by more than a factor of two."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2)-(3) (1987) ("Any
party whose negligence is determined to be 50% or less of the combined negligence of all
persons . . .is severally liable only and is responsible only for the amount of negligence
attributable to him, except . . . if [they] acted in concert . . . or if one party acted as an

agent of the other."); Nevada S.511 (to be codified at NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 41.141(4)-(5))
(signed by governorJune 22, 1987) ("a defendant whose negligence is less that that of the
plaintiff or his decedent is not jointly liable and except [for cases involving strict liability,
intentional torts, toxic or hazardous substances, concerted action, and product liability]
each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only for that portion of the judgment
which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to him"); Act of Apr. 7, 1987,
ch. 141, § 1, 1987 N.M. STAT. ANN. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 852 (to be codified at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-1) [hereinafter N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-3-1] ("joint and several liability upon
two or more wrongdoers whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is
abolished" except in cases involving intentional torts, vicarious liability, product liability,
and in "situations ... having a sound basis in public policy"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-8-15.1 (Supp. 1987) ("any party who is allocated less than fifty percent of the total
fault allocated to all parties may not be jointly liable for more than twice the percentage of
fault allocated to that party"); Act of June 16, 1987, ch. 2, § 2.09, 1987 TEX. SEss. LAWv
SERV. 81 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013(a)-(c))
("[A] liable defendant is liable to a claimant only for the percentage of the damages found
by the trier of fact equal to that defendant's percentage of responsibility with respect to
the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which the damages are
allowed ...[unless] the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater
that 20 percent; and .. .[in comparative responsibility cases, where] the percentage of
responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater than the percentage of responsibility
attributed to the claimant ...[or in cases where] no percentage of responsibility is attributed to the claimant and the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is
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THE DEVELOPING LAW AFFECTING JOINT TORTFEASORS

The doctrine of joint and several liability, holding any of several
tortfeasors responsible 32 for the acts of all, has its origin in the common
law. 3 3 Originally, its application was limited to joint tortfeasors3 4 acting
in concert,3 5 and was subject to strict procedural limitations. Rules relating to joint tortfeasors, procedural joinder, and tortfeasors acting in
concert, as well as other rules governing application of the doctrine of
joint and several liability have changed gradually over the centuries.
However, the doctrine of joint and several liability itself has not been
modified in conjunction with these developments; rather, it has remained stubbornly entrenched in the common law. A brief survey and
discussion of the developing law regarding other rules applicable to
multiple tortfeasors is necessary to provide an understanding of the
problems caused by the curious stagnation of joint and several liability
and to demonstrate why reform is necessary.
A.

ProceduralJoinder

At common law, the concepts of procedural joinder and joint and
several liability were indistinguishable because there could be no joinder
of parties unless it was alleged that they were jointly responsible for acts
done in concert. 3 6 Because procedural joinder was limited to cases involving concerted action, 3 7 the American courts began equating "joinder" with "joint liability." With the advent, in the mid-19th century, of
greater than 10% . . . [or in cases where] claimant's . . . injury . . . resulted from a 'toxic
tort'.").
32. The term "responsible" is used here even though in American courts today "liable" or "entirely liable" may be preferable in a technical sense. But, as will be discussed
below, a central theme of this article is that any reform effort should focus on returning
"responsibility" as the primary touchstone for liability. At its inception, joint and several
liability was based on vicarious liability, which is an indirect legal responsibility for the acts
of another. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322.
33. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46 at 323; 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY].
34. The terms "joint tortfeasor" and "joint tort" have been the subject of a great deal
of confusion and have been the source of many of the problems in this area as is discussed
infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. See Prosser, supra note I, at 413 (the terms mean
"radically different things to different courts");Jackson, supra note i, at 403 ("[joint tort']
• . . is often used in different senses by the same court"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 46, at 322.
35. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 33; 1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3.6. at
392-93 (1983) [hereinafter SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS]. It is illustrative of the confusion that
has grown out of the law of joint torts to note that the phrase 'joint tortfeasors acting in
concert" would have been redundant at common law. Today it is a necessary distinction
as tortfeasors no longer need to "act in concert" before they are considered join
tortfeasors.
36. Prosser, supra note I, at 414-15; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at
7-8.
37. HARPER,JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 8 n.24; see also PROSSER & KEETON
citing FIELD CODE OF PROCEDURE OF NEW YORK (1948) as statute authorizing settlement of
questions connected with one transaction to be joined in a single suit.
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codes of procedure allowing joinder, 38 the American courts gradually
began to liberalize the rules. Today procedural joinder no longer requires an assertion of entire liability. 39 Confusion results because the
courts have continued to equate "joinder" with "joint liability" even
though the rules for joinder have become more liberal. 40 This has had
the illogical and unfortunate effect of allowing the substantive law of
joint and several liability to sometimes turn on the procedural issue of
41
joinder.
At common law, because courts required joint and several liability
as a prerequisite for procedural joinder, pure several liability would
have been difficult if not impossible to administer. However, under
modern codes allowing for permissive joinder, a rule of pure several
liability has become feasible and would be much easier to administer
and enforce than was the case at common law. Procedural joinder gives
the trier of fact a perspective of totality of evidence relating to all persons involved in the suit, thus facilitating the allocation of responsibility
on a proportionate basis.
B.

Definition ofJoint Tort
Generally speaking, a joint tort can be defined as an act causing

harm for which two or more persons can be held liable. 4 2 At common

law, ajoint tort required a concert of action, a common plan, or later in
time, the breach of a joint duty. 4 3 Originally, it required a true joint
enterprise so that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party,
the act of one is the act of all .... ,,44 Today the definition has been
expanded to include additional categories so that, generally, a joint tort
has been found by courts in cases involving (1) concert of action; 4 5 (2)
48
47
46
(3) vicarious liability; and (4) concurrent torts.
common duty;

38. See Harris,Joinderof Causes and Parties, 36 W. VA. L.Q 192 (1929-30) (summary of
the development ofjoint and several liability).
39. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 47, at 325-26.
40. Prosser, supra note 1, at 416-18.
41. This is one of the confused results of later courts' interpretations of tile early
common law. They doggedly equated "joinder" with "joint liability" even though there
was no indication that the common law courts intended to do so. A second area of confusion, involving the definition of a joint tort, is discussed infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. These sources of confusion, and the law which grew up around them, are
important to an understanding of where the law is today with respect to joint and several
liability, and to understanding the theoretical arguments urging reform in the wake of
comparative fault, alternative liability theories, and other recent developments in the law.
42. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322-23. But Prosser points out that
the definition of a joint tort has "meant very different things to different courts, and often
to the same court .. ." Id. at 322.
43. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 2.
44. SirJohn Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); see also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 46, at 322-23.
45. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co. v. Polak, 7 F.2d 583, 584 (9th
Cir. 1925), cert. denied 269 U.S. 581 (1926); Bobich v. Dackow, 229 Ky. 830, 18 S.W. 2d
280, 281 (1929); Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764, 766 (1920); Oliver
v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666, 667 (1926); Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N.C. 530, 46
S.E.2d 302 (1948); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
46. Simmons v. Everson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891); Klauder v. McGrath, 35
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As late as post-World War I, joint and several liability was largely
restricted to its common law origins. 49 But during the last half-century
there has been a substantial expansion ofjoint and several liability, due
in large part to the expansion of the definition of "joint tort." The law
has been expanded so that persons acting independently of each other
can be held liable as joint tortfeasors. 50 Joint and several liability also
has been expanded from intentional torts to negligence and strict liability. 5 ' Thus, while 'joint tort" classifications have increased in number
and complexity, the central consequence flowing therefrom has remained unchanged: entire liability attaches. This is true even though
there are clear distinctions in the degree of participation and culpability
'5 2
as between the different types of "joint torts."
C.

Contribution

Under contribution principles, a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered is entitled to recover on a proportionate basis from
other joint tortfeasors who also were liable to the plaintiff for contributing to the injury. 53 While contribution actions were prohibited at common law, 54 today they are allowed in the overwhelming majority of

states. 55 Abolition of the rule against contribution was a response "to
the injustice of one defendant shouldering the responsibility of
others,"' 56 particularly when he was acting independently and the harm
Pa. 128 (1860); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744, 746 (1897); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
47.

Mayberry v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N.W. 356 (1907); Ver-

linda v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 44 Mont. 223, 119 P. 573 (1911); Allen v.
Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841, 844 (1924); Schumpert v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 S.C.
332, 43 S.E. 813 (1903); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
48. Way v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern R.R., 239 Iowa 244, 29 N.W.2d 867
(1947); Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 8 A.2d 201 (1939); Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.,
218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758 (1944); Schools v. Walker, 187 Va. 619, 47 S.E.2d 418
(1948); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347-48.
49. See generally Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923). In this short article, Wigmore laid
out a thoughtful and persuasive case for broadening the scope of joint liability. Other
commentators, and gradually the courts, built upon and followed this lead; this persuasive
logic has been cited by many famous and not-so-famous authors on the subject. See, e.g.,
Prosser, supra note 1, at 438 n.161; Jackson, supra note 1, at 420-21 & nn.92-93.
50. See, e.g., Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976). In this
action for indemnification brought by a chemical company against other manufacturers,
the court found that contribution was the appropriate remedy. Where tortious acts of two
or more wrongdoers cannot be apportioned, wrongdoers may be held jointly and severally
liable for the entire damages and the plaintiff may choose whether to proceed against all or
one in one single suit.
51. SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS supra note 35, § 3.6.
52. See generally, Prosser, supra note I (discussion of intentional concerted action v.
independent negligence).
53. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799); Greer v. Intercole Automation, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 375 (D. Colo. 1982); see HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33,

§ 10.2, at 39; Prosser, supra note 1, at 425-29.
55. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.7, at 273.
56. Recent Developments in Joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1334
(1973) (citing rationale for New York Legislature's enactment of N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
1401 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987)).
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was unintentional. 5 7 The primary reason for allowing contribution
rather than simply abrogating joint and several liability was the desire to
compensate the innocent plaintiff.58 Clearly it was not based on the de59
gree of the defendant's moral fault.
In this sense, the right of contribution was a substitute for pure several liability. The problem in justifying this substitute today is that the
plaintiff often is no longer "innocent" as a result of changes in the con60
tributory negligence laws.
D.

Contributory Negligence

Contributory negligence is negligent conduct by a plaintiff which is
a contributing cause to his own harm. 6 1 Historically, contributory negligence was asserted as a complete defense, and if proven, barred the
plaintiff from recovery. 6 2 When recovery was barred due to contributory negligence, the right of contribution was theoretically a more justifiable alternative to eliminating joint and several liability than is the case
today. This is true because the original justification for allowing contribution as an alternative to pure several liability was that as between two
parties, the one most responsible ought to shoulder the burden for
63
harm caused by a judgment-proof third party.
As the law has continued to evolve, however, in a majority of states
the concept of contributory negligence as a defense barring recovery has
been replaced with the concept of comparative fault. 6 4 However, comparative fault, because it does not prohibit recovery does not necessarily
mean that the plaintiff is totally innocent. Indeed, often he may be more
65
at fault than the defendant against whom he is collecting damages.
Thus, the rationale behind the original justification disappears, and it
57. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875) (contribution action permissible); see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 426-27.
58.

See, e.g., Wigmore,joint-Tortfeasorsand Severance of Damages; 11aking the Innocent Party

Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923).
59. "Moral fault on the part of the defendant" as a justification for imposing joint and
several liability is discussed infra note 103 and accompanying text.
60. The plaintiff lacks innocence in the sense that, like culpable defendants, his conduct is below the standard to which he is legally required to conform for his own protection. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(comparative negligence approved); see also discussion of contributory negligence infra
notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
61. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 809, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977).
62.
63.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 65, at 451-52.
See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.2, at 44-45.

64. See discussion of comparative fault, infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text; see
also Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465 (1963).
65. See, e.g., Ambriz v. Kress, 148 Cal. App. 3d 963, 196 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1983). In
Ambriz, plaintiff was found to be twenty percent negligent, defendant Kress was found to
be seventy percent negligent and defendant McDowell was found to be ten percent negligent. For all practical purposes Kress was judgment-proof, leaving McDowell liable for
the entire amount of defendants' liability under the doctrine ofjoint and several liability.
The result was that defendant McDowell could have ended lip paving ali award in excess of
S300,000 to a plaintifwho wasfound to be twice as much atfault. The court relieved the inequity by granting defendant McDowell's motion for contribution against Ambriz.
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logically follows that the liability of defendants less responsible than the
plaintiff for the total harm caused ought to be several. This much is
required to effect the policy considerations preferring contribution as an
alternative to the abrogation of joint and several liability. 6 6 Whether
application of pure several liability is feasible as a practical matter is an67
other question, to be addressed later in this article.
E.

Comparative Fault

The concept of comparative fault provides a basis for reducing
damages awarded to a plaintiff in proportion to the determined percentage of his fault. 6 8 Perhaps the most significant development in the area
of multiple torts is the almost universal acceptance of comparative
fault. 69 Today, at least forty-four states have adopted comparative fault
as an alternative to contributory negligence. 70 Comparative fault statutes already have played a key role in abolishing or substantially limiting
joint and several liability in some states. 7 1 But in most states in which
the question has been decided, the courts generally have retained joint
72
and several liability absent specific statutory language to the contrary.
Aside from the policy justifications for imposing joint and several
liability, 7 3 a powerful and often-cited practical argument in favor of the

rule has been

the inability to apportion damages

among joint

66. See supra text accompanying note 58.
67. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. One alternative in dealing with this
problem is to retain joint and several liability where the plaintiff is completely innocent,
but apply pure several liability when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. At least one
state, Oklahoma, has adopted this approach (discussed in V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27,
§ 16.4, at 259). Anderson v. O'Donoghue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983) (joint and several
liability imposed when plaintiff found not negligent); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071
(Okla. 1978) (liability apportioned where plaintiff was found contributorily negligent).
Another approach is to retain joint and several liability as to individual defendants whose
percentage of fault is greater than that of the plaintiff, even though plaintiff was partially at
fault, but to apply pure several liability to those defendants whose percentage of fault is
less than that of plaintiff's. Oregon uses this approach. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1985).
Either of these options would work to avoid the inequitable result described in supra note
65.
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 471-72.
69. There are two types of comparative negligence statutes that predominate: (1)
pure comparative negligence statutes, which allow a plaintiff to recover damages regardless of his degree of fault; and (2) mixed comparative negligence statutes, which preclude a
plaintiff from recovering damages when his negligence exceeds a statutorily specified percentage in comparison to the defendants. For a summary of these types of comparative
negligence statutes, see Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983).
The term "comparative fault" is used interchangeably with "comparative negligence,"
but the authors prefer the term comparative negligence when discussing cases that do not
involve traditional fault-based liability.
70. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 1.1, at 3. The six states that have not adopted
comparative fault, either through legislation or judicial decisions, are Alabama, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
71. See supra notes 27-28.
72. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.4, at 258-61.
73. See Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Iehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE
L.J. 964, 964-67 (1959) ("moral" fault cannot be practically determined, and apportioning
recovery based on moral fault would impair the benefits of distributing the risk to the
widest possible segment of society).
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tortfeasors. 74 But the adoption of comparative fault negates any procedural relevance this argument may have had in the past. In addition, the
acceptance of common sense approximations in apportionment of damages 7 5 addresses the argument as it relates to practical problems in determining exact percentages in apportionment. 76 Therefore, the advent
of comparative fault has seriously undermined one of the most powerful
theoretical underpinnings of joint and several liability.
F. Jury Apportionment of Damages
At common law, juries were prohibited from apportioning damages
among the parties. 77 As a practical matter, this rule made it impossible
to impose anything less than entire liability. Thus, at common law there
was no basis for pure several liability. Today, through modern comparative negligence statutes, juries not only are allowed but usually directed
to apportion fault. 78 But the ability to apportion fault has yet to lead to
its logical conclusion of equating responsibility 7 9 with liability. Instead,
application of responsibility principles has been limited primarily to
contribution actions and comparative fault.
74. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 470; Jackson, supra note 1, at
408; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 5; SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra

note 35, § 3.7.
75. It never has been required and indeed is impossible to reduce damage apportionments to exact percentages. It has been left to the trier of fact to estimate approximate
percentages based on all the evidence presented. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 402 n.9
("[T]he approved practice is to leave [the computation of damages] to the good sense of
the jury, as reasonable men, to form from the evidence the best estimate that can be made
under the circumstances.") (quoting Mark v. Hudson R. Bridge Co., 103 N.Y. 28, 8 N.E.
243 (1886)); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 135 ("juries should not be held to
great ... accuracy ofjudgment in ascertaining the damages to be assessed against each of
the tortfeasors and the court should be slow to interfere with such verdicts") (quoting
Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 78 S.W. 93 (Tenn. 1903)); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, § 52, at 345 (apportionment will be made "[wlhere a factual basis can be found for some
rough practical apportionment").
76. Exact apportionment of damages can never be achieved in an absolute sense.
This determination is necessarily dependent upon the trier of fact's subjective determinations as to legal cause and cause in fact. See discussion of causation infra notes 129-50 and
accompanying text.
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46 at 323 n.5 and accompanying text; Prosser, supra note 1, at 414; Recent Developments in joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1319, 1333 (1973); 46 A.L.R.3D 830 (1972); 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 76, at 684 (1974). It is
interesting to note that notwithstanding the courts' instructions to the contrary, many juries made ingenious attempts to circumvent the harsh result ofjoint and several liability.
However, these efforts to deliver an equitable damage apportionment were met with
rather hostile treatment by the courts. See, e.g., Detroit City Gas Co. v. Syme, 109 F.2d
366, 369 (6th Cir. 1940) (jury returned two separate verdicts, forcing court to order new
trial); Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, 215 Cal. App. 2d 231, 30 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1963) (court disregarded jury apportionment of $37,000 judgment among four defendants and held the defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire damage award); Weddle v. Loges, 52
Cal. App. 2d 115, 125 P.2d 914 (1942) (The jury returned a single $5,000 judgment for
plaintiff, apportioning damages between two defendants at $4,250 and $750, respectively.
The court disregarded the jury's apportionment and held defendants jointly and severally
liable for the full $5,000).
78. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 2.3, at 41.
79. "Responsibility" is used here in lieu of "fault" or "negligence" to avoid semantic
problems in cases of strict liability. See supra note 32.
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Alternative Liability

Where one of several alternative parties is responsible for the harm
caused, but it is difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to prove which
party caused the harm, courts will shift the burden of proof as to who
caused the harm from the plaintiff to the defendants. 80 However, if defendants are identifiable, some factual basis for a rough apportionment
of responsibility exists. Even in those cases where there is insufficient
evidence to make a studied comparison of relative degrees of responsibility, juries can, and often do, resort to an equal or approximate division of damages. 8 1 The real problem exists where it is impossible for
the plaintiff to identify which of several wrongdoers caused or contributed to the harm in question. To address this problem, courts have developed theories of alternative liability, 8 2 which subsequently have been
83
incorporated into the Restatement.
However, it must be remembered that the central issue in these
cases is really one of causation rather than apportionment. It is important that this distinction remains clear. If the inquiry is "which of these
negligent actors caused harm," and it is impossible for the plaintiff to
prove who caused the harm, then a theory of alternative liability can
shift to the defendants the burden of proof as to causation. If the defendants cannot meet that burden, they should be held severally liable
for the harm caused. However, where the inquiry is "how responsible is
each contributing wrongdoer for the harm caused," it should remain for
the trier of fact to make the best estimate as to the proper apportionment of responsibility.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B and Comments (1977) (citing Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)); Cummings v. Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d 549, 107
P.2d 282 (1940).

81. See, e.g.,
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& GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.2; see also sources cited supra

note 75.

82. See, e.g., Borel v. Fireboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (worker
exposed to asbestos manufactured by at least eleven different companies was unable to
ascertain which manufacturer's product actually caused asbestosis); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (patient having appendix removed awoke with injured
shoulder - impossible to identify which of numerous hospital personnel caused the injury); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (third hunter struck when two
companions simultaneously fired guns in his direction - impossible to identify which
companion fired the shot that accidentally hit plaintiff).
83. (1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that the

tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the
plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the
burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty

as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he
has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1977).
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Burdens of Proof

One issue to be resolved in a pure several liability reform measure
is the allocation of the burden of proof for correct apportionment of
84
damages. Early cases on the issue placed the burden on the plaintiff,
but the modern approach has been to place it on the defendants. 8 5 The
burden requirement evidently came about as a result of confusion between the 'fact of damage," which has to do with causation, and the
"amount of damages," which involves apportionment.
In arguing against the practice of placing the burden of apportionment on the plaintiff, one distinguished writer concluded that a plaintiff
"should not be denied any recovery simply because the amount of damages, as distinguished from the fact of damage, is impossible of exact
ascertainment."' 86 This argument is wholly logical and well grounded in
fairness and equity. But it does not logically follow that the burden
should be placed on the defendants in these cases. To do so would
mean that failure to prove an exact apportionment formula, which is
often inevitable, would lead to entire liability. It is neither fair nor necessary to require a defendant to prove he was only one percent responsible for the harm caused and, if he fails, to hold him one hundred percent
liable.
There is no need to impose a requirement that any particular party
bear the burden with respect to apportionment. At least one of the
recent joint and several liability reform bills provides some support for
this position. 8 7 This legislation provides that all parties should have the
opportunity to present evidence to the trier of fact, and the trier of fact
should determine apportionment without requiring that either party
88
prove which apportionment formula should be used.
Generally, the burden of proof as to causation should be on the
plaintiff, as is the case today. For those problem areas where that burden is impossible to meet, the theories of alternative liability usually suffice to prevent injustice to the innocent plaintiff. However, to require
any party to prove the "correct" apportionment is unfair and, in many
cases, impossible.
There are sufficient incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants to
84. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 400-0 1; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at
134; Wigmore, supra note 58.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1977); SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS,
supra note 35, § 3.7; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33; Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1208 (8th Cir. 1982); Borel, 493 F.2d at 1095.
86. Jackson, supra note 1, at 402 (emphasis added).
does not specify who has the burden of proof as to apportionment of
87. "[This bill]
non-economic loss. Based on the evidence presented, the trier of fact should apportion
responsibility among all parties. All the parties will have an opportunity to present their
case to the trier of fact as to the appropriate apportionment of responsibility, so that liability can be assigned based on that apportionment. The trier of fact shall make a determination as to apportionment without a requirement that any particular party 'prove' which
apportionment formula should be applied." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 69-70 (1986) (majority views).
88. Id.
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argue vigorously their respective perceptions as to the degree of responsibility attributable to each wrongdoer. All parties should come to
court, make their case, and leave to the trier of fact the task of extrapolating from the evidence a logical, common sense apportionment. The
imposition of burdens confuses the issue and makes impossible any
chance of reform.
I.

Release

A release is the "abandonment of a claim to the party against whom
it exists .... ,,89 However, it does not necessarily mean that in giving a
release the plaintiff has received full satisfaction of a claim. 90 At com-

mon law, the release of one of several tortfeasors released all. 9 1 But for
independent multiple tortfeasors this is no longer the law. 9 2 If full satisfaction is not received, claims against defendants other than the ones
released are not discharged. 9 3 When a release is conditioned on settlement, an offsetting credit is usually allowed to diminish the amount of
damages recoverable against the remaining defendants. 94 Such a rule is
95
justified as an encouragement for the plaintiff to settle.

However justified, the development of this rule is a clear example of
the dual standards that exist in the law of multiple tortfeasors. For purposes of release, mere concurrent torts, which are concurrent wrongful
acts or omissions of two or more persons acting independently, 96 are
correctly considered independent and separate claims. Release of one
concurrent tortfeasor does not release all. 9 7 But in cases involving concerted action, the acts of several joint tortfeasors give rise to but one
99
cause of action, 9 8 and release of a single joint tortfeasor releases all.
A clear distinction is drawn here between concerted actions and independent but concurrent torts, with great emphasis placed on the independence of each cause of action against concurrent tortfeasors.10 0
For purposes of invoking ultimate liability, however, the distinction
disappears and tortfeasors are treated as one, regardless of whether they
act independently or in concert.' 0 ' The distinction recognized between
different types of multiple torts for purposes of release should be carried over to the doctrines of liability.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

& GRAY, supra note 33.
Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 423.
Prosser, supra note 1,at 423.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 333-34.
Id. at 335.
Id.; see also Schmelzer v. Farrar, 48 Ohio App. 2d 210, 356 N.E.2d 751 (1976).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 333.
Concurrent torts are discussed infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,§ 49, at 432.
Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 422-23.
Prosser, supra note 1, at 245.
See supra note I and accompanying text.
HARPER, JAMES
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IV.

DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS

In tracing the policy development of the doctrine, it is interesting to
note the changes in justifications for imposing joint and several liability
as the doctrine has continued to expand in scope. There are four fundamental and sometimes conflicting policy justifications for joint and several liability: (1) moral fault; (2) compensating the innocent plaintiff; (3)
10 2
loss distribution; and (4) ability to pay.
A.

Moral Fault

The need to punish moral fault or culpability was considered adequate justification for the common law cases involving concerted action. 0 3 As the doctrine of joint and several liability was expanded to
apply to non-intentional, independent torts, moral fault alone obviously
would not justify the imposition of joint and several liability.
B.

Compensating the Innocent Plaintiff

When moral fault proved to be an insufficient justification, the policy considerations began to focus on the need to compensate the innocent victim. 10 4 In the wake of comparative negligence, as discussed
earlier in this article, compensation of innocent victims should not justify imposition ofjoint and several liability in cases where the plaintiff is
10 5
not wholly innocent.
C.

Loss Distribution

Loss distribution is another justification for joint and several liability. It favors distributing the loss throughout society by way of insurance
companies, large self-insurers, or some type of social insurance program. 10 6 Perhaps the biggest problem with this policy is that it works
too well. The resulting increase in insurance rates and product costs is a
painful illustration of its success. 10 7 In addition, local governments attribute recent tax increases and service cutbacks directly to their deep08

pocket exposures. 1

D.

Ability to Pay

More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on shifting the
loss to the party best able to pay' 0 9 - the deep pocket. Ultimately,
102.
103.
104.

See Note, supra note 73; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 141.
See Note, supra note 73, at 964 n.i.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

105. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
106. See Note, supra note 73, at 966-67; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 13.
107. See sources cited infra note 110.
108. See, e.g., 1985 Insurance Hearings, supra note 11, at 155-57; Report on Municipality
Liability, supra note 12, at 731-36.
109. Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 141 (citing authority which recognizes that,
in addition to the traditional justifications such as responsibility for harm, it is appropriate
for courts to consider who is best able to bear the loss in determining liability of the
parties).
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however, the deep-pocket defendant has the ability to pass the cost on to
society as a whole. Higher prices, increased taxes and reduced services
are examples of how this cost is passed through to society. Thus, in
these cases, the ultimate burden does not fall on the defendant who is
best able to bear the loss. More accurately stated, the initial burden falls
on the defendant who is best able to distribute the loss among those who
ultimately bear the burden - consumers and taxpayers. 1 10
In this sense, the civil justice system is being used as a national social insurance program. If that is the desired result, it could be administered much more efficiently through means other than the legal system.
The policy of equating liability with responsibility would avoid the unfair
result of imposing the ultimate burden on those who are completely innocent and wholly unassociated with the case.
Before turning to specific reform proposals, it is necessary to put
some remaining problematic issues into perspective.
V.

CONCURRENT TORTS

A concurrent tort occurs when the harm is proximately caused by
the concurrent wrongful acts or omissions of two or more persons acting independently.1 l' It is important to understand that the classification of "concurrent torts" is a broad heading which can be subdivided
into many different categories. Clear theoretical distinctions can be
made between these categories and the circumstances which accompany
them. As to the defendants' position, there are three general categories
worthy of note.
First, the defendants' acts individually may not be sufficient to cause
any harm by themselves, but combine to result in actionable harm to the
plaintiff."1 2 Second, each defendant's act alone would cause some of the
harm, but all acts combine to result in the total harm." l 3 Third, each
defendant's act is sufficient in itself to cause the entire harm, but combines with some redundant force which, although a legal cause of the
14
harm, is unnecessary in bringing about the result."
It is also important to consider the position of the plaintiff when
concurrent torts are involved.' 15 First, the plaintiff may be completely
110. See Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 35-36; see also SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP.

No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-71 (1986) ("Unlike private companies, local governments do not always have the flexibility of withdrawing a service because it entails high
risks.... Payment has been guaranteed because in most cases, cities are required by law
to pay their liability obligations and are able to spread the liability among many people in
the form of taxes or other levies. In this way municipalities act as ad hoc insurance companies providing compensation to the injured."); see generally Small Business InsuranceHearings,

supra note 11, at 614 (discussion of the disproportionate cost of insurance).
111. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 405 n.24.
112. Id. at 407.
113. Id. at 415.
114. Id. at 413.
115. The effect of plaintiffs' responsibility vis-a-vis defendants generally has not been
considered by commentators in discussing the type of liability that should attach to multiple tortfeasors. It has been said that the plaintiffs' conduct is not "tortious" and therefore

1988]

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

innocent, harmed by the acts of the defendants through no fault of his
own. Second, the plaintiff may come to the case bearing some comparative responsibility for causing the harm. Finally, there may be multiple
plaintiffs, with some of them sharing in the responsibility for causing the
harm, and some of them completely innocent.
Theoretically, there are strong justifications for treating these distinct classifications differently for purposes ofjoint and several liability.
For example, the strongest case for imposing joint and several liability
might involve a defendant whose act alone is sufficient to cause the entire harm and a plaintiff who is wholly innocent. The strongest case for
pure several liability might involve a defendant whose conduct alone is
not sufficient to cause the entire harm and a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent.
However, these distinct classifications often disappear in practical
application because the trier of fact can eliminate them arbitrarily
through subjective causation determinations. 116 When contributory
negligence was the majority rule, this was often the case. Juries tended
to ignore what appeared to be partial negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in order to avoid the harsh result of barring any recovery.' 1 7
To further complicate the matter, there are many situations involving harm for which non-parties are responsible, where it is impossible to
bring those parties into the case. Examples include cases involving immunity, 118 lack of jurisdiction,'' 9 and acts of God. 120 Because of the
problems in formulating criteria to distinguish between these theoretical
categories, and because of the endless number of circumstances in
which they can arise, the authors urge that a single rule should be formulated for all multiple tortfeasors acting independently of each other.
VI.

FALSE LABELS AND CONFUSED APPLICATIONS

The general rule of joint and several liability is that "[e]ach of two
or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured
party for the entire harm."' 12 1 Applying this principle, all concurrent
tortfeasors discussed in the preceding section are jointly and severally
should not affect the joint liability of the tortfeasors. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589-90, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189
(1978).
116. For a discussion of causation see infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
117. An example of this is the famous case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d
1 (1948). In Sunmers, the plaintiff, who was in the same hunting party as the two defendants, acted outside accepted hunting norms when he forged ahead of his two companions
rather than staying abreast of them. Yet this fact was conveniently ignored by the trier of
fact.

118. See, e.g., Beck v. Wessel, 90 S.D. 107, 237 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
119. See, e.g., Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt.
Inc., 101 N.M. 84, 678 P.2d 712 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
120. See, e.g., Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co., 134 Neb. 44, 277 N.W. 830 (1938) (severe windstorm asserted as an act of God).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) (emphasis added).
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liable for the entire harm caused. This should not be the result. Thus,
the problematic aspects of the general rule stated above are highlighted
and discussed in the following paragraphs and then some recommendations for changes are proposed.
A.

Tortious Conduct

The argument advanced for retaining the doctrine of joint and several liability in the wake of comparative negligence is that application of
the doctrine is limited to defendants. 122 It has been said that the plaintiff's conduct only creates a risk of self-injury, and therefore cannot be
tortious. 1 23 Since tortious conduct is a requirement for imposition of

124
joint and several liability, the doctrine is limited to defendants.
Joint liability, however, should not turn on whether conduct technically is considered "tortious." A plaintiff's acts may not be "tortious" in
the sense that no legal duty exists to exercise due care for one's own
safety. However, failure to exercise that care most certainly harms
others in that it can result in others ultimately becoming exposed to unlimited liability for the consequences of a plaintiff's negligence.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,125 a landmark case
that limited the imposition of joint and several liability to defendants
because of the tortious conduct requirement, somewhat inconsistently
based liability on the principle that "a tortfeasor is liable for any injury
of which his negligence is a proximate cause. Liability attaches . .. not
because he is responsible for the acts of other[s] . .. but because he is
responsible for all damage of which his own negligence was a proximate
cause."' 2 6 However, the plaintiff's "proximate cause" is conveniently
ignored. The plaintiff is treated differently because his conduct is not
considered "tortious." And this is so even though the plaintiff's actions
clearly harmed the remaining parties by increasing, indeed often creating,
their liability exposure. Without the artificial distinction between "tor-

122. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
123. Id. at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
124. Id.
125. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). The plaintiff sought
damages from motorcycle organizations which sponsored a cross-country race in which he
was seriously injured. He claimed that the defendants had negligently designed, managed,
supervised, and administered the race. The defenses raised included a claim that the injured party's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries, and that the injured
party's parents were negligent in failing to exercise their power of supervision over their
minor child. Defendants argued that their liability should be limited to the percentage of
damages allocated to them under the recently adopted rule of comparative negligence. In
essence, defendants argued that California's comparative negligence rule abrogated the
rule of joint and several liability.
126. Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187; see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 35, at
951-52 (1955). Note the different bases for imposing joint and several liability on concurrent tortfeasors. At common law, joint and several liability was based on vicarious liability
because it was limited to true "joint torts." See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
More recently in concurrent torts, vicarious liability is specifically rejected as a basis,
and is replaced by the proximate cause basis discussed in the text accompanying this note.
Cf. discussion of doctrinal justifications, supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
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tious" and "negligent," combined with the American Motorcycle Association
court's refusal to apply the proximate cause test to the plaintiff, this inconsistency cannot be reconciled. Further, it hardly can be considered
fair to the defendants.
The artificial, theoretical distinction between "tortious" and "negligent" conduct, as applied to joint and several liability, is perhaps the
strongest illustration of the inadequacy of the joint and several liability
doctrine in the face of comparative fault. 12 7 Plaintiffs and defendants,
who can be equally at fault, are treated differently in sharing the responsibility of third parties. If joint and several liability is to be retained, the
authors maintain that it should be applied to all persons whose negligent,
as opposed to tortious, conduct is the legal cause of the harm. 128 The
obvious problem with such an approach is that it would lead to the same
type of inequitable results as did the contributory negligence rule where
a partially negligent plaintiff was barred from any recovery.
B.

Causation

In addition to tortious conduct, a second prerequisite to the imposition of joint and several liability is a showing of proximate or legal
cause. 129 Proximate cause is a limitation imposed by the courts requiring that a sufficient causal connection - between the actor's conduct
and the harm caused - be proved as a prerequisite to the imposition of
liability.130 It serves to exculpate one whose act, although a cause in fact
of the harm, is extremely remote or has resulted in unforeseeable consequences.' 3 1 However, the problem of determining whether the proximate cause requirement has been met has created a great deal of
32
confusion and disagreement in the law.1
To further complicate matters, "proximate" or "legal" cause seems
to be more broadly defined in the law of joint tortfeasors, 33 which exacerbates the problem of determining whether the proximate cause requirement has been met in cases involving multiple tortfeasors. First, in
the context of multiple tortfeasors, it is not clear whether the proximate
cause test is to be applied to the act of each tortfeasor, 13 4 or to an event
127. It has been pointed out that "where one of the injurers is also the victim [as in]
contributory negligence.., it is analytically the same as the joint tortfeasor case." Landes
& Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9

J.

LEGAL STUD.

517, 518

(1980).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 875 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 47; 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 62
(1974); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 102 (1955).
130. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
131. Id. at § 43; see also North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).
132. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
133. Conduct that otherwise would be considered innocent becomes a legal cause and
therefore tortious when several parties are involved. See cases cited supra note 7; see also
infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) (liability is joint and several
when each person's conduct is a legal cause).
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toward which each tortfeasor's act contributes. 135 It appears that either
will suffice.
Generally, an act is tortious only when a harm is proximately caused
by the breach of an existing duty,13 6 except that in strict liability cases it
is not necessary that a duty be breached. 13 7 In cases involving joint
torts, the elements of harm or proximate cause, or both, often would be
absent if a single tortfeasor's actions were isolated. For example, conduct which alone would be considered innocent has been found to be
tortious when the proximate cause test is applied by combining such
conduct with the conduct of other parties to determine ultimately that
38
the combined event caused the harm.'
The authors do not suggest that a tortfeasor whose act, by itself, is
not sufficient to cause the harm should escape all liability under such
circumstances. But it is urged that an independent tortfeasor's liability
should be limited to what the trier of fact considers to be his share of
responsibility for causing the ultimate harm. It is unreasonable to hold
any one of a number of independent tortfeasors completely responsible
for the acts of the others because his act is a cause of the harm, as is the
case in jurisdictions continuing to follow the doctrine of joint and several liability. The authors suggest that complete liability should be invoked only for those damages for which a tortfeasor's act is the cause of
the harm. 139 If one were to follow the logic of the American Motorcycle
Association court, making "proximate cause" the touchstone for joint and
several liability, there would be no recovery for the plaintiff where his
act constitutes a proximate cause because he too would be subject to
joint and several liability. As was ably pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, the majority's proximate cause argument "proves too
135. See 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 62 (1974) (joint and several liability applicable when "two
or more persons [acts] are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause"); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 102 (1955) (joint and several liability applicable when "the concurrent negligence of two or more persons combined results in an injury").
136. See W. PROSSER,J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, Cases and Materials on Torts, at 144 (7th
ed. 1982).
137. Id. at 705.
138. See, e.g., Sills v. City of Los Angeles, No. C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 1985) (the failure of the city to trim the hedges would not have been considered tortious had the driver high on drugs been alert enough to stop for the sign, as other drivers
apparently were able to do); Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152 (San Diego Super.
Ct. Mar. 1, 1984) (the road curve design would not have been considered tortious had the
drunk driver not been over the center line); Laurenti v. Tiffenbach, No. A-6247-82 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984) (the act of stretching the material too tight would not
have been considered tortious had the automobile driver not turned in front of the motorcycle, or had the driver of the motorcycle been able to stop); Cini v. Vaughn, No. A89381TI (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 1983) (the act of parking the tow truck on the
shoulder of the road would not have been considered tortious had the driver of the automobile not fallen asleep and veered off the expressway).
139. As Justice Clark pointed out in his dissenting opinion in American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 611, 578 P.2d 899, 920, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 203
(1978) (Clark, J., dissenting), to say otherwise "proves too much." If joint and several
liability were to attach anytime one's act constituted a cause of the harm, contributorily
negligent plaintiffs theoretically should be denied any recovery (notwithstanding the artificial distinction between "tortious" and "negligent" conduct discussed supra notes 122-28
and accompanying text).
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much."1 4 0 And the artificial distinction between "tortious" and "negligent" conduct does not undermine the logic of the proximate cause
analysis. 141
The second major problem with causation in the area ofjoint torts
is its inherent subjectivity. 14 2 Findings of proximate cause sometime
seem to be more the result of the jury's desire to compensate the plaintiff than a dispassionate assessment of the wrongdoer's actual responsibility. These result-oriented determinations are most obvious in cases
14 3
where the true wrongdoer is judgment-proof.
Causation determinations often involve a mixture of fact and polEven in determining cause in fact, as opposed to legal cause, a
great deal of discretion is left to the trier of fact in judgment, evaluation,
interpretation, and policy considerations.1 4 5 For policymakers, the subjectivity problem raises an issue of equity; for insurers and insurance
consumers it raises an issue of uncertainty.
It seems contrary to our sense of retributive justice to allow the negligent, drunk, and drugged drivers and other wrongdoers to go virtually
scot-free.' 4 6 Yet it is also unfair to require the victim, wholly innocent
or only partially at fault, to go entirely uncompensated. Confined to the
parameters of tort law, the policymaker is faced with a Hobson's choice
in attempting to resolve the dilemma of compensating an innocent
plaintiff when the wrongdoer is truly judgment-proof. However, the
'judgment-proof" wrongdoer under today's legal system is not necessarily unable to pay, 1 4 7 and the policymaker's imprisonment within the
icy.

14 4

140. Id.
14 1. For discussion of tortious conduct see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text;
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 127.
142. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956) (determination of cause in fact is influenced by policy evaluation as well as factual
considerations).
143. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 7.
144. See Malone, supra note 142.
145. Id.
146. It seems inherently unjust and inequitable to require someone who reupholstered
a motorcycle seat to be liable for a $3.4 million claim because a car turned in front of a
motorcycle that could not stop soon enough to avoid the collision. See Laurenti v. Tiffenbach, No. A-6247-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984). It is also unfair to require
taxpayers to absorb a $1.6 million settlement because a drunk driver went over the center
line when he was unable to negotiate a curve. Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152
(San Diego Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1984). Likewise it is unfair to require taxpayers to pay $2.16
million because a driver high on drugs ran a stop sign. Sills v. City of Los Angeles, No. C333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985).
147. In pointing out how the majority's opinion in American Alotorcycle Ass'n frustrated
the doctrine of comparative responsibility, Justice Clark's dissent indirectly alludes to
three instances in which a person might be considered judgment-proof: he may be unavailable; he may be insolvent; or he may have settled. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 611, 578 P.2d 899,
920, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 203 (1978). (Clark, J., dissenting). In each of these situations
policy-makers could find ways to reduce drastically the number of "judgment-proof" persons if there was sufficient impetus to do so. Briefly those instances considered are:
Responsible actor unavailable. The actor may be unavailable in a number of ways. For
example, (1)he could be outside the reach of the court's jurisdiction; (2) he could be able
to escape service of process; (3) he may be unidentifiable; (4) the plaintiff may be unable to
locate him; (5) he may have died; (6) he may be immune; or (7) the act may have been an
act of God. (These are examples of the empty chair problems discussed in/ra notes 165-67
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confines of tort law is self-imposed. 14 8
The remaining issue raised by the problem of subjectivity in causation determinations is one of uncertainty. There are virtually no guidelines by which a particular defendant or potential defendant can
estimate with any degree of certainty what his liability will be in any
given case. Identical facts can mean very different things to different
juries. One jury may consider a particular person's role to be too insignificant to impose liability, whereas anotherjury may find partial responsibility sufficient to hold that person liable for the entire amount of
damages awarded. This all or nothing game makes risk assessment virtually impossible, 14 9 leading to higher insurance costs and decreased
availability of coverage at any cost. 150 Because of the inherent problems

of subjectivity in causation determinations, the only reform option
which the authors believe could return a degree of certainty or predictability to individual risk assessment is the abrogation ofjoint and several
liability.
C.

Indivisibility

One final problem with regard to causation is the unwarranted focus on the indivisibility of the harm caused by concurrent tortfeasors. In
determining whether a single independent tortfeasor should be held
jointly and severally liable for the acts of all, it has been said that "the
true distinction to be made is between injuries which are divisible and
those [which] are indivisible." 15'
For harm which is "indivisible," the
under the heading of "Release"). In the first two examples, much more could be done
both domestically and internationally to bring elusive parties to justice. In the third example, courts already have gone far in developing theories of alternative liability. These theories could be expanded. Assistance could be provided in the fourth example, but it
would be an admittedly expensive proposition with uncertain results. As to the last two
examples, little or nothing can be done to prevent the actor from being unavailable.
Responsible actor insolvent. For those instances in which a person is truly without money
or assets, nothing can be done. But there are numerous cases where bankruptcy laws,
corporate veils, and property owner protection laws render a person with some or all of
the necessary assets "judgment-proof" for purposes of enforcing a judgment. For "nondeep-pocket" individuals, personal insurance policy limits often represent the extent of
their effective liability exposure.
Responsible actor settled. This area is perhaps the ripest for reform, and is discussed
supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text under the heading of "Release."
This article does not advocate all of these changes. Indeed, the authors would consider some of them to be inadvisable. The policy arguments against them may be so
strong as to outweigh those in favor of the uncompensated victim. The purpose of this
note is simply to point out that there are many instances where the "judgment-proof"
defendant is able to pay, even though the legal system is presently powerless to make him
pay.
148. There are means other than tort law through which injured parties may be compensated. See discussion of suggested reform infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., U.S. Reinsurance Market Reaction to the U.S. Civiljstice System, White Paper
by the Reinsurance Association of America, at 48 (March, 1986); AIA Memorandum, supra
note 12, at Discussion Paper, p. 4 ("Individual insureds must be measured on their individual capabilities and risk potential. It is only under a system of several liability ... that
this can be accomplished").
150. See sources cited supra note 149; see also 1985 Insurance Hearings, supra note 11; 1986
Insurance Hearings, supra note 7.
151. Jackson, supra note I, at 406; see also Prosser, supra note 1,at 442.
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liability will be joint and several.1 5 2 This rule is based on the reasoning
that harm which is indivisible leaves no logical basis for apportionment.15 3 Such tortured analysis has survived unchallenged far too long.
It does not follow that simply because the harm is indivisible there is
no basis for apportionment. It is the responsibility for causing the harm
which should be the focus of the inquiry. 154 The distinction between
"harm" and "responsibility for causing that harm" is in some cases completely lost and hopelessly confused. 15 5 Indeed, it is something of a
contradiction in terms to speak of a harm which is divisible. If injury is
capable of division, then in reality there are two separate injuries.
It has been said that there are two basic categories of indivisible
injuries. The first is injury incapable of theoretical division; the second,
56
although theoretically divisible, is injury incapable of apportionment. 1
A discussion of a classic example of the distinction may prove helpful.
Two negligent defendants, acting independently with separate guns,
shoot the plaintiff, wounding her in two different places. 15 7 If she dies,
the harm is said to be indivisible because there is no logical basis for
dividing death.1 58 If she lives, however, the harm is said to be divisible,' 59 even though certain elements of the damages, such as pain and
suffering, are difficult to apportion.1 60
In both of these examples there exists a logical basis for apportionment. That basis is the responsibility of the defendant for bringing about
the result. Lack of ability to apportion damages, based on the indivisibility of harm, is not a sound argument for retaining joint and several
liability. It is the ability to allocate responsibility for that harm which is the
key. Where that allocation is impossible, alternative liability theories
still provide a mechanism for resolving the case.
VII.

RELATED PROBLEMS:

RELEASE OFFSETS AND THE "EMPTY

CHAIR"

Another major problem in addressing the law related to joint
152. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347; Recent Developments, supra
note 1, at 157; SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 35, § 3.7, at 400; HARPER, JAMES &
GRAY, supra note 33.
153. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347.

154. This is the approach taken by the Product Liability bill which recently passed the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No.

422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1986) (majority views).
155. See, e.g., 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 122, at 318 (6th ed. 1913); Recent
Developments in Joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1973). Similar
problems are noted in this excerpt from a discussion on concurrent torts: "recovery was
allowed because the plaintiff suffered an 'indivisible injury' [i.e., harm] for which there was
no logical basis for apportionment. Each actor was responsible for part of the damage but
it was impossible to tell how much."
156. Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 132.
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 345.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. But note that regardless of Prosser's seeming preference for a contrary result,
the defendants contributing to the non-fatal wounding could still be held jointly and sever-

ally liable in jurisdictions where the doctrine is still applied.
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tortfeasors is the fact that many times one of the responsible actors
never makes it to court. This is an issue that must be addressed in any
comprehensive reform.
A.

Release Offsets

Although an offsetting credit is appropriately allowed in cases
where a defendant or potential defendant is released by the plaintiff following a settlement, 161 the manner in which the offset is calculated can
result in inequitable treatment of the remaining defendants. In many
jurisdictions, the offset is calculated by simply deducting the amount of
the settlement from the final award. 162 When a release is given for a
reason other than settlement, such as a gratuitous release based on a
plaintiff's relationship with a potential defendant, there is no offset even
though the person released is responsible for a substantial percentage of
the harm. This result is inequitable. Whenever the plaintiff releases one
of several potential tortfeasors for any reason, the ultimate judgment
should be reduced and the correct offset calculation should be based on
the settler's percentage of responsibility in causing the harm.
Two arguments against this approach are readily apparent: (1) it
would be difficult for the trier of fact properly to assign the correct percentage of responsibility to a person not a party to the case; and (2) it
would discourage settlements. With respect to the former, sufficient incentive exists for the remaining parties to argue vigorously the relative
responsibility of the person released. The trier of fact should determine
the settler's responsibility for the limited purpose of allocating responsibility. The settling party could be called as a witness or be asked to
produce evidence even though liability could no longer attach due to the
release. As long as the evidence can be presented to the trier of fact,
and the incentive for fully developing that evidence remains intact, allocating responsibility to a "nonparty" should not present a substantial
problem.
The second argument is a matter of policy. Out-of-court settlements are clearly preferred to the costly, time-consuming, and uncertain
process of litigation. From the government's perspective, settlements
relieve the congested judicial system of time-consuming cases. From the
plaintiff's perspective, a settlement provides a sum certain now, without
the time, expense, and uncertainty involved in litigation. From the defendant's perspective, settlement limits an otherwise uncertain liability.
These legitimate policy goals would not be affected by adopting the
"percentage of responsibility" offset approach recommended in this article. Although it is conceded that some settlement agreements made at
the expense of parties not privy to the negotiations may indeed be dis161.

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.

162. See, e.g., Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519 S.W.2d 74 (1975);
Greier v. Wikel, 4 Kan. App. 2d 188, 603 P.2d 1028 (1979); Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d
409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
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couraged, the authors argue that this would produce a more equitable
result in those cases.
A settlement is a trade-off. In exchange for swift and certain compensation, the plaintiff waives his right to attempt to extract, through
litigation, a potentially larger but less certain judgment. The basic concept of settlement would remain unchanged under the "percentage of
responsibility" offset approach outlined above.
When multiple defendants are involved, the plaintiff sometimes enjoys a settlement "windfall" of sorts when the "amount of settlement"
offset approach is employed. 16 3 The plaintiff can receive a sum certain
portion of compensation now, without waiving his right to pursue the
larger judgment he initially sought. Thus, in cases involving multiple
tortfeasors, the plaintiff has an additional incentive to settle with at least
one of the tortfeasors since he loses nothing. Settling with only one of
them, however, does not further any policy objective. The case lives on.
The judicial system is still bogged down; the plaintiff essentially gives up
nothing, and the remaining defendants are subject to liability not only
for their own actions, but for those of the settling parties. Contribution
actions often are not available to correct this inequity even when the
64
settling party is solvent.1
Settlement between any one of several potential defendants and the
plaintiff should be driven on its own merits, the same as in cases involving a single tortfeasor. Under the "percentage of responsibility" offset
approach suggested here, there would be no additional disincentives in
cases involving multiple tortfeasors.
B.

The "Empty Chair"

When a person responsible for a portion of the harm caused cannot
be brought into the suit, many courts do not recognize the absent party
which is commonly referred to as the "empty chair."' 165 As a general
rule, only parties to the transaction should be considered in apportioning responsibility. If a person who is responsible for a portion of the
harm is not brought into a suit, the litigant in the best position to join
such person in the lawsuit but who fails to do so, should assume the
unnamed but partially liable person's percentage of responsibility. This
163. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.5, at 264.
164.

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2504 (Supp. 1978) ("release . . . given . . . to

one of two or more persons . . . does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors [and iut
discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution"); IOWA
CODE § 668.7 (1979) ("release . . . discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. 507:7h (1974) ("release . . . discharges that person . . . from all liability for

contribution, but it does not discharge any other person liable upon the same claim"); and
WYo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977) ("release ... does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
* . . and [iut discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribu.

tion"). But cf IDAHO CODE § 6-806 (1979) (release . . . does not relieve him from liability to
make contribution ... unless ... [it] provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata

share of the released tortfeasor") (emphasis added); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-43
(1977) (similar to Idaho).
165. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.5, at 263.
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would help insure either that all responsible parties are brought into the
suit, or that the percentage of responsibility allocable to any unnamed
responsible persons is taken into account. If a person is not brought in
because of plaintiff's release, then the plaintiff. should accept responsibility for the released person's percentage of responsibility.
However, if the defendant fails to bring in a potentially liable person through available impleader practices or other procedures, he has
no one to blame but himself. When the "empty chair" is the result of
the defendant's failure to bring in a responsible person, that person's
percentage of fault should not be considered by the trier of fact. The
defendant is often in the best position to know who the other responsible actors are, and thus it is reasonable that he bear the burden ofjoining other potential tortfeasors.
There remains to be considered the "empty chair" problem which
develops when, regardless of the best efforts of either plaintiff or defendant, the "person"' 16 6 responsible cannot be brought before the
court.' 6 7 Analytically, the empty chair problem presents the same dilemma presented in the case of a truly insolvent defendant. The responsible person is judgment-proof, and we are left to decide who is to
shoulder his burden. It is unjustifiable to require the remaining defendants to shoulder the burden of the insolvent tortfeasor. They should not
be required to pay for harm they are able to prove has been caused by
another person who, through no fault of the remaining defendants, cannot be brought before the court. As discussed below, options other than
the tort system are available to compensate the plaintiff when this type
of "empty chair" problem exists.
VIII.

SUGGESTED REFORM

To summarize the basic provisions which should be included in
joint and several liability reform legislation, 168 some of the issues set
forth above are revisited in the following discussion.
A.

Operative language

The operative language abrogating joint and several liability should
consist of a simple across-the-board abrogation, with the exception of
cases involving concerted action. It is important to include a clear statutory definition of "concerted action" in order to give the courts and parties proper guidance. Such a definition should require that the actors
consciously work together, intending to do the wrongful act which
166. For convenience of discussion, the term "person" as used in this context also
would be applicable to acts of God.
167. For examples of empty chair problems see supra note 147, which also discusses
ways to deal with the problem outside of the joint and several liability context.
168. For an example of a specific joint and several liability reform legislation incorporating the provisions urged in this article, see Amendment No. 2844 to S. 2760, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc., S12852 (Sept. 17, 1986) (amendment proposed by Senator Pressler); see also S.217, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (TheJoint and Several Liability
Tort Reform Act of 1987 as introduced by Sen. Pressler Jan. 8, 1987).
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causes the harm. For example, liability for two negligent component
manufacturers normally would be several if they acted independently.
However, if they agreed to "cut corners" to come up with a cheaper
product, they would have acted in concert and should be jointly liable.
For all multiple torts independently committed, liability should be
several, not joint. Liability should be equated with apportioned responsibility. There are numerous other options the reform-minded legislator might consider, but all are similarly plagued with either theoretical
problems of justification, or practical problems in implementation, or
both. 169
169. Some examples of alternative reform approaches and a short discussion of each
follows:
Limited to noneconomic damages. This approach retains joint and several liability for economic damages such as pain and suffering. See, e.g., California Proposition 51; S. 2760,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 308 (1986). The object of this alternative is to make plaintiff whole
in an economic sense, while limiting other defendants' joint liability to objectively determined damages. Although there exists a clear policy rationale for the distinction, there is
scant theoretical justification for differentiating liability based on the type of damage involved. This approach represents a political compromise.
Threshold percentage requirement. This approach allows for the abrogation of joint and
several liability, contingent upon the defendant falling below some threshold percentage
requirement after which joint and several liability would be invoked. For example, if the
threshold were set at twenty-five percent, a defendant whose responsibility was less than
twenty-five percent would be severally liable. Those whose responsibility is in excess of
twenty-five percent would be jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., supra note 29 (New
Hampshire fifty percent threshold). The idea behind this approach is to prevent the most
egregious applications of joint and several liability involving deep-pocket defendants
whose contribution in causing the harm is slight. The problem with such an approach is
that the threshold percentage figure is purely arbitrary. Also, juries might tend to simply
assign a higher percentage to the deep pocket than would otherwise be the case in an
attempt to compensate the plaintiff.
Defendant's responsibility compared to plaintiff s. This approach involves a comparison of
the responsibility of the plaintiff to each defendant. If the defendant's responsibility is
greater than the plaintiff's, he is jointly and severally liable. If the defendant's responsibility is less than that of the plaintiff's, he is severally liable. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.141(3) (1986). While theoretically justifiable, the jury again might be led toward result-oriented determinations regarding the allocation of responsibility.
Plaintiff's conduct. This approach retains joint and several liability when the plaintiff is
completely innocent. In cases involving contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, however, the liability of the defendants will be several. See, e.g., Boyles v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980). Thus, the application of joint liability is
contingent upon the conduct of the plaintiff. Although a rational approach, it involves
exactly the same problems found in the old contributory negligence rule in that plaintiffs
clearly contibutorily negligent were found to be completely innocent in order to avoid
barring any recovery. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Other defendants'conduct. This approach compares each individual defendant's percentage of responsibility with that of the other tortfeasors. A defendant is jointly liable only
with those defendants whose apportioned responsibility is less than his. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 538.230(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
Judgment-proof defendants. This approach is directed at the allocation of a judgmentproof defendant's liability. Joint and several liability is retained, but the plaintiff has an
obligation to use his best efforts to collect individually each defendant's apportioned share
of liability, rather than allowing him to collect the lump sum from any of the defendants,
leaving them to initiate contribution actions against the remaining defendants. If, after
using best efforts, the plaintiff is unable to collect from a judgment-proof defendant, that
defendant's share is reallocated among all responsible parties, including the plaintiff,
based on their apportioned responsibility. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
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Burdens of Proof

There should be no burden of proof as to apportionment of responsibility. It should be left to the trier of fact to make its best estimate
based on the evidence presented. Apportionment need not be reducible
70
to an exact mathematical computation.'
C.

"Empty Chair" Problems

As a general rule, only parties to the case should be considered in
apportioning responsibility. This policy is to ensure that the trier of fact
has the benefit of the best evidence available. However, in those cases
where the plaintiff chooses to release persons who are potentially liable,
or where it is impossible for a defendant to implead a responsible party,
those parties should be considered in allocating responsibility.
D.

Offsetting Adjustments for Release

When the plaintiff releases a defendant or potential defendant, the
final award accordingly should be offset by the percentage of responsibility, as opposed to settlement dollar amount, attributable to that defendant or potential defendant.
E.

Policy Considerations

Anyone attempting to articulate specific reform proposals immediately confronts an insoluble policy dilemma. Some substantially innocent parties will suffer. The reason for this sad state of affairs is that the
doctrine ofjoint and several liability makes a difference only when a true
wrongdoer is judgment-proof. If all responsible parties had money, the
difference between right of contribution (the present alternative to several liability) and pure several liability (the approach advocated here)
7
would be one largely of administrative convenience and efficiency.' '
The limitations of any reform effort must be realized with frustrating clarity. The goals of the reform effort then come into sharper focus,
as we realize that we can never reasonably expect to bring complete justice to this area of the law. The best that can be hoped for is to minimize
the injustice to both plaintiffs and defendants. The issue, then, boils
down to two fundamental questions. First, upon whom do we place the
burden of responsibility for the wrongful act of a judgment-proof third
party? Second, what is the most efficient means of accomplishing this
task? There is no "right" answer to the first question. The policy decisions which flow from this analysis are necessarily laden with strong
§ 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 38 (Cum. Supp. 1987). This relatively mild reform is an improvement,
but it fails to address the crux of the issue.
"'Crisissensitive'"reform. This approach limits reform efforts to specific classifications of
defendants, such as municipalities or public entities generally, or to specific types of actions, like product liability or medical malpractice. See, e.g., S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 308 (1986) (reform limited to product liability actions).
170. See discussion of burdens of proof, supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 127, at 529.
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philosophical prejudices, and the resolution of both questions is
uniquely political.
As has been illustrated previously, it is no longer possible categorically to answer the first question based on the "innocence" of the plaintiff. At first blush, it might seem that if the plaintiff - who may or may
not be at fault - is to shoulder the burden of the missing third person's
responsibility, liability should be several. If it is to fall on the shoulders
of independent defendants who already have paid for their apportioned
share of responsibility, liability should be joint and several. Still, the
inquiry must go deeper. Regardless of how the first question is answered, the second question regarding efficiency inevitably should lead
to a pure several liability approach.
Under today's system ofjoint and several liability, the liability of the
missing third person is generally borne by some deep-pocket defendant
who then distributes the loss throughout society. The cumbersome and
costly legal process necessary for this system to work is expensive in
terms of both time and money, making it grossly inefficient.1 72 Add to
that the artificial market distortions caused by deep-pocket defendants
passing costs on to consumers, and the system quickly becomes difficult
to defend - at least if one accepts the proposition that deep-pocket defendants, such as manufacturers, insurance companies, municipalities,
and large corporations, are capable of passing the costs on to unrelated
third persons such as consumers and taxpayers.
Even if the answer to the first question involves a conscious policy
decision to compensate the plaintiff, that goal could be met much more
efficiently through the adoption of several liability supplemented by
some type of compensation system other than tort litigation. Examples
173
include a national insurance plan or a "tort trust fund" approach.
These could be administered much more cheaply and efficiently than the
present system and would ensure that the plaintiff is fully compensated.
The several liability approach places greater emphasis on individual
responsibility,1 74 times. Logically, it also would lead to greater efforts
75
toward punishing the true wrongdoer.1
172. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE UNIFORM
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, S. REP. No. 918, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 7 (1984) (majority views);
("for every $59 that is paid to claimants in product liability cases, $99 is paid for legal
services," not including court and other administrative costs); see also LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 127, at 529 (discussing the relative inefficiency of contribution actions).
173. This approach is not necessarily urged here. The point is that there are much
more efficient means other than the tort system to compensate an injured party when the
wrongdoer is found to bejudgment-proof. Detailed discussions of alternatives may prove
to be fertile ground for future articles.
174. It should be remembered that this does not leave the plaintiff unable to protect
himself. First, the remaining tortfeasors are liable severally for the portion of the harm for
which they are responsible. In addition, the harsh results of this rule inevitably would lead
to greater reliance upon individual liability insurance, which should be considerably easier
to afford.
175. Pure several liability would place greater emphasis on holding the true wrongdoers responsible. Under the present system, deep-pocket defendants become proxies for
the "judgment-proof" wrongdoers, often as a matter of convenience rather than necessity.
"Judgment-proof" can mean many things. The party may be immune; the court may not
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CONCLUSION

The theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine of joint and several
liability, as applied to concurrent torts, have been eroded gradually by
parallel developments in the law. Except for cases involving concerted
action, the doctrine should be abrogated. In its stead should be instituted a system of pure several liability, based on the common sense apportionment of each wrongdoer's responsibility.
This system would not be perfect. Apportionments are not reducible to exact mathematical computations. Undoubtedly, there would be
cases where justice may be better served under the present system.
There is no "right" answer. The issue involves a fundamental policy
question of who should shoulder the burden of actions for which a third
party is responsible. Faced with that question, the result will never lead
to perfect justice. The goal of the reform urged herein is to minimize
the injustice. At one point in our legal history, joint and several liability
may have served that purpose better than the approach suggested in this
article. But in the wake of developments such as comparative fault, alternative liability and jury apportionment of damages, that no longer is
the case.
Originally joint and several liability was applied to punish the
wrongdoer and protect the innocent plaintiff. Today, the true wrongdoer often escapes all liability because the focus is on the deep pocket;
the compensated plaintiff no longer is always innocent; and the substantially innocent third parties, or more likely consumers and taxpayers
who are completely innocent and totally unrelated to the case, ultimately
pay the bill for all of them. "This all goes to show that a rule of law
76
applied without regard to its reason may become a rule of injustice." 1

have proper jurisdiction; a proper defendant may be "insolvent;" he may be uninsured; his
insurance company may be "bankrupt;" or, as a practical matter, his assets may not be
worth pursuing because they are too difficult to liquidate. All of these factors make it
much simpler for the court or plaintiff or defendant seeking contribution to focus on the
deep pocket with ready cash. Indeed, one judgment required that "'recovery of contribution be limited to recovery from [third-party defendant's] insurer to the extent of...
coverage .. .and that no contribution be recoverable from [third-party defendantl individuallyv. "
Ambri: v. Kress, 148 Cal. App. 3d 963, 970 n.5, 196 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 n.5 (1983) (quoting
the judgment) (emphasis added).
More emphasis needs to be placed on punishing the wrongdoer rather than limiting
liability to insurance coverage. Pure several liability would force parties, courts, and legislatures to go beyond the insurance companies and paper corporations, and collect for the
heretofore "uncollectables" as an alternative to not compensating the plaintiff.
176. WIGMORE, supra note 58, at 460.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a French phrase, Plus ca change, c'est la meme chose, which
translates: "The more things change, the more they remain the same.",
This is indeed applicable to the most recent product liability crisis. The
basic causes have changed little. The 1970s had its own product liability
crisis and at that time the federal government created the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, chaired by the Department of
Commerce, to examine the product liability system and the reasons for
its failure. 2 After eighteen months of study, the Task Force found two
basic causes of the product liability crisis that occurred in the 1976-1978
period - uncertainties and unpredictability in tort law, and overly subjective insurance pricing. 3 Other causes, such as the increase in the
number and complexity of products, and product misuse, also were
4
noted.
Congress addressed the product liability insurance aspect in 1981
by passing the Federal Product Liability Risk Retention Act. 5 This Act
states, in plain language, that if a small business, or group of businesses,
* Partner in the law firm of Crowell and Moring, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1962,
summa cur laude, Boston University;J.D. 1965, magna cum laude, Columbia University. Mr.
Schwartz is the drafter of the Uniform Product Liability Act, formerly Chairman of the
Working Task Force of the Federal Interagency Task Force of Product Liability, and
Chairman of the Federal Interagency Council on Insurance. Mr. Schwartz is co-author of
W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 1982),
author of V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, (2d ed. 1986), and co-author of V.
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KELLY, GUIDE TO MULTISTATE LITIGATION

(1985).

** Liberty Mahshigian is an associate at Crowell and Moring; B.A. 1980, Stanford
University; J.D. 1983, cur laude, University of California, Hastings College of Law. The
views expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and are not intended to
reflect views or opinions of any clients of the firm of Crowell & Moring.
1. J. BARTLETT, BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 514 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Alphonse Karr, Les Guepes (anvier 1849)).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
3. Id. at 1-21-24, 26-29. The Task Force also identified unsafe manufacturing practices by some manufacturers as a cause of the product liability problem. The Task Force
suggested the use of product liability prevention techniques in the area of manufacturers'
quality control and greater economic incentives to reduce risk as means of helping to solve
the problem.
4. Id. at 1-29-31.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-04 (1981). The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981
helped to alleviate the insurance rate-making problem by permitting businesses to form
self-insurance cooperatives or to band together as purchasing groups to bargain collectively for insurance rates. This legislation was designed to encourage commercial insurers
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believe that the insurance pricing mechanism is unfair, they can set up
their own self-insurance groups. Some businesses have done so, but
most have not. The common sense explanation for the lukewarm reception to this legislation is that the uncertainties and unpredictability in
our tort law remain unaddressed. Nothing has yet been done about this
principal cause of the crisis, the same cause that existed a decade ago
when the Task Force issued its Final Report in 1978.
I.

THE UNPREDICTABILITY PROBLEM

Unpredictability lies at the heart of product liability crises. Dramatic
and unpredictable changes in tort law rules have made it difficult, if not
impossible, for insurers to accurately price various classes of liability insurance. Commercial general liability insurers, in particular, have had
great difficulty pricing their product because the insured's risks are sub6
ject to continuous change in both scope and size.
Product liability law, for the most part, is common law. It has been
developed by judges and juries sitting in state courts. Thus, the rules
vary from state to state, and sometimes from case to case within each
state. Because the rules of liability are constantly changing, an insured's
exposure to liability for damages cannot be predicted with any degree of
precision. A judicial decision expanding tort law liability may subject
the insured to new types of claims that could not have been brought or
anticipated when the insurance policy was originally written. For example, some courts have decided that a person can bring a tort claim
merely because they watched someone else being injured. 7 There is no
way for an insurer to anticipate this kind of occurrence.
Constantly changing rules mean that looking at an insured's past
claims experience does not give the complete picture in assessing that
insured's future risks and in determining the corresponding price that
must be set for liability insurance premiums. Similarly, data regarding
past losses for a particular class of risks, for instance drug companies,
may be insufficient for setting today's commercial liability insurance premiums for that class of policy holders. In addition to merely evaluating
past losses, changes in tort law and cases involving this class and related
classes of insureds must also be considered.
The common law has always been flexible and subject to change.
to offer product liability insurance at competitive rates and to set premiums more
accurately.
6. The problems in the insurance industry have generated much debate. See, e.g.,
Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearing before Subcommittee on Business, Trade and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. Serial no. 99-567 (1985); Availability and Affordability of Liability Insurance:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,99th Cong., 2d Sess.

Serial no. 99-633 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(mother who witnessed child run down by an automobile and killed could recover for
emotional distress even though the mother herself was not in physical danger); Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (mother watched baby gag on
substance in baby food).
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However,
mentally.
examples
decisions
applied.8
1.

in the past, the common law moved in small steps or increToday, fundamentals can fall in a day. There are numerous
of judicial decisions that create massive potential liability setting forth new rules which are sometimes retroactively

Strict-Strict Liability

Some courts have decided that a product manufacturer may be held
liable for risks that it could not have discovered by any scientific means
which might have been available at the time the product was made. 9
These decisions go beyond strict liability as it was developed in the
1960s and 1970s. Originally, strict liability allowed the claimant to prevail even though he or she did not prove that the defendant was negligent. '0 Nevertheless, fault remained as a basic ingredient in the lawsuit.
Fault arose both in the test that led to proving the product was defective,
and in permitting defendants to show that they neither knew nor could
have known about the product's risk."
The few courts that apply
"strict-strict" liability do not permit defendants to show that the risk was
not knowable at the time the product was made. While the new "strictstrict" liability rule has only been adopted in a few states, it has created
an area of severe instability in liability law. If manufacturers are held
responsible for risks that could not have been known at the time of manufacture, their exposure is completely open-ended. Thus, risks that are discoverable because of new scientific technology create enormous
potential liability for products manufactured years ago. And, liability for
8. When a decision adopts a new rule of liability or otherwise modifies product liability law, the new law applies to the product involved in the case - a product that may have
been manufactured many years ago. The new rules apply to conduct that occurred in the
past. Thus, in this sense, the rules may be retroactively applied.
9. "Strict-strict" liability, for the purposes of this article, refers to a heightened form of
strict liability which imposes a duty on manufacturers to assume the cost of damages
caused by unreasonably dangerous products. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 147 Ariz.
242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985) (a strict liability design defect case in which knowledge of risks
known at time of trial was imputed to a manufacturer regardless of whether the risks were
knowable at the time the product was made); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986) (holding that the manufacturer's ability to know of product's
danger was irrelevant if the "product is unreasonably dangerous per se," that is, one which
"a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product ..
"); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass.
407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984) (In a case alleging that the manufacturer of a snowblower
breached its warranty of marketability, the court held that adequacy of warning is measured by all risks presented by the product regardless of whether manufacturer actually
knew or should have known of such risks.); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434
(Mo. 1984) (in a design defect case alleging that asbestos insulation material was defectively designed, the "state of the art" defense not allowed); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine
Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (knowledge of risks available at time of trial was
imputed to manufacturer in evaluating reasonableness of product's design or warning
under strict liability theory); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982) (a strict liability case for failure to warn of asbestos dangers in which the
"state of the art" defense was not allowed).
10. See generally Smith, Tort and Absoltte Liability, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 319, 409
(1917); HAPER, LAw OF TORTS §§ 155, 203 (1933).

11.

Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1983).

DENVER UNIVERSITY 14 W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4

these risks was impossible to predict at the time insurance premiums
were set and insurance contracts were signed.
In 1982, the seminal decision imposing "strict-strict" liability was
handed down by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Beshada v. JohnsManville Products Corp., a case involving asbestos litigation.1 2 The court
in Beshada held that culpability is irrelevant in strict liability cases and,
thus, state-of-the-art defenses are not allowable.' 3 The New Jersey
court, however, engaged in a partial retreat in 1984, limiting the effect
of its earlier decision. 14 Meanwhile, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 15 and the Supreme Court of Arizona 16 had already applied
the original Beshada decision to a snowplow and a machine tool, respectively. To the surprise of many experts, "strict-strict" liability was also
recently applied in Louisiana.1 7 Clearly then, "strict-strict" liability may
be applied in any jurisdiction. However, even if adopted, there always
remains the possibility of principle retreat, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. Whenever decisions of this type arise, insurance
carriers must examine all existing reserves for pending claims and augment those reserves when appropriate. Further, carriers must reserve
funds for additional future claims likely to be reported because of such
decisions.
These courts have not only changed the rules of liability so that a
manufacturer can be liable even for dangers that were undiscoverable at
the time the product was made, but they have changed the liability rules
without any alteration of tort damage rules which are based on fault.
Instead, they have required unknowing manufacturers to pay damages
in the same manner as those manufacturers who have acted wrongfully.
The basic predicate for these decisions is that the manufacturer is "perceived" to be in a position to absorb the costs of accidents. For example, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated:
Of course, some losses from scientifically unknowable dangers
may prove to be uninsurable for producers also. Manufacturers as a class, however, are still in a better position than consumers to analyze and take action to avoid the risk, to negotiate
for broader insurance coverage, and to pass losses on in the
form of price increases. 18
The premises underlying this statement may not be true. First,
many tort claimants have already received a substantial share of their out12. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
13. Id. Accordingly, the defendant could not base its defense on the fact that the medical community was unaware of the dangers of asbestos.
14. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (in the
typical design defect or warning case, the issue of whether the manufacturer knew, or
should have known, of the dangerous propensity of its product, is relevant).
15. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984).
16. Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985).
17. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (manufacturer held liable for injuries caused by product deemed dangerous per se, even though the
manufacturer could not have known of any danger).
18. Id. at 118-19.
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of-pocket costs through workers' compensation, or health and accident
insurance. 19 Second, accident insurance is a much more efficient form
of spreading risks than liability insurance - more of the premiums end
up in the hands of the injured party under health and accident insurance. 20 Finally, many businesses cannot afford to absorb the costs of
"strict-strict" liability and cannot obtain affordable insurance in an attempt to do so.
2.

Liability Without Defect

Until recently, liability has been imposed only in cases where the
product was defective, 2 l that is, something had to be "wrong" with the
product. A recent decision, however, shows that even this rule is not
inviolable.2 2 The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that a manufacturer of a "Saturday night special" handgun may be held liable for
the shooting of a person in a grocery store robbery. 23 Traditionally,
courts have held that a gun manufacturer may be liable only if there is a
"defect" in the gun; for example, if it were mismanufactured and parts
were missing or parts were assembled improperly, or if the gun did not
include an effective safety device. 24 In the Maryland case, however, the
court held that liability could be imposed, not because there was any
defect in the gun, but because the particular type of handgun at issue (in
the court's subjective view) had no legitimate purpose and the manufacturer "[knew] or ought to [have] know[n] that the chief use of the product is for criminal activity."'2 5 Interestingly, in a further demonstration
of the legal instability of product liability law, a court in California held
for the same defendant manufacturer because there was no defect in the handgun, the opposite ruling reached by the Maryland court. 26 The Maryland decision, imposing liability without a showing that the product was
defective, created a completely new area of exposure for manufacturers.
This type of extreme change in the law could not be foreseen by the
insurer at the time it insures the gun manufacturer. The underlying
principle of the decision could conceivably allow liquor manufacturers
19.

See

ANCE DATA

HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSUR3 (1984 update); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COM-

1 (1985).
20. See Schwartz, Tort Law Re]orrn: Strict Liability and the CollateralSource Rule Do Not M.ix,

PENSATION LAWS

39

VAND. L. REV. 569, 573-74 (1986).
21. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 99 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); see

also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22. Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
23. Id.

24. See W.

D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY:
41 (1980); Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liability for Products,
755, 756-57 (1977).

KEETON,

CASES AND MATERIALS

10

IND.

L.

REV.

25. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159.
26. See Moore v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986). The court in
Moore, contrasting the decision in Kelley, supra note 22, concluded that "there [was] no
indication in California law or public policy that the courts would distinguish 'Saturday
night specials' from other handguns or find them of so little utility that the risk of injury
outweighs their beneficial uses for recreation or protection." Moore, 789 F.2d at 1327.
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to be liable for alcoholism, sellers of sugar liable for tooth decay, and
fast food hamburger restaurants liable for fostering heart disease!
3.

Liability Without Injury

A federal court in Mississippi recently permitted recovery for a former shipyard worker's medical probability of developing cancer in the
future.2 7 Not only could a claim be brought for mental stress relating to
the fear of getting cancer, but a claim also could be brought for the
"probability" of getting cancer in the future. 28 Both bases of recovery
are a major departure from traditional tort doctrine. 29 The potential
liability exposure caused by persons who worry about suffering an illness
they might get in the future is limitless.
In another non-injury case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently decided that a woman could recover a substantial tort judgment
because she noticed an object which turned out to be a piece of "Goodn-Plenty" candy in a soda bottle.3 0 Again, she merely noticed the piece of
candy. It never touched her lips, it did not harm her, it merely made her
3
upset. 1
These examples of expanded liability and recovery, under "strictstrict" liability, liability without defect, and liability without injury, represent a dangerous trend. Notice that in the expansion of liability under
the first category, the innocent pays. In the second example, liability can
be imposed when there is no defect or anything wrong with the product.
In the third example, a person can recover when he or she has no traditionally-recognized present injury. Consequently, if a court were ever to
combine these rules, a person could recover tort damages even when
there has been no fault, no defect, and no injury!
4.

What Is Next? An Example of How One Case Could
Radically Change Liability Exposure

There may be other types of tort liability that cannot even be foreseen at this time. With tort law constantly in flux, it is impossible to
predict the new areas of liability which courts may create. For example,
some plaintiffs' attorneys have asserted that an automobile which does
not contain an air bag is defective.3 2 No appellate judicial decision has
27. See Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (evidence
showed that the plaintiff, who currently was suffering asbestosis, had a greater than 50%
chance of getting cancer), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
28. Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411-12.
29. Id. at 414-15; see Gale & Goyer, Recoveryfor Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer,
15 CUMB. L. REV. 723 (1985).
30. See Ellington v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986).
31. Id. at 109. Plaintiff, upon noticing what she thought was a worm in her soft drink
bottle, but which actually was the piece of candy, became physically ill, the complications
of which resulted in "a kidney infection and other physical irregularities such as diarrhea,
fever and nausea." Id.
32. See, e.g., Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (The
district court granted the manufacturer's motion for partial summary judgment on two
grounds: (1) the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1392
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upheld this theory.3 3 Nevertheless, the potential liability that would be
created if a series of judicial decisions held that an automobile without
an air bag was defective could impose catastrophic liability damages on
motor vehicle manufacturers and their insurers.
There are approximately 45,000 motor vehicle highway deaths each
year.3 4 Only a small fraction of these deaths are caused by defective
motor vehicles.3 5 Most accidents are caused by driver error such as
speeding and intoxication. 3 6 In those cases in which an injury is attributable to a defective motor vehicle, it is usually limited to a specific model
of a specific make of car manufactured by a particular motor vehicle
manufacturer. Therefore, in those situations where a court determines
that a particular model of car is defective, the total number of vehicles
with such a defective design or component is only a small fraction of the
total number of motor vehicles in use. In contrast, if courts should hold
that motor vehicles without air bag systems are defective, 100 million
cars would immediately be defective, resulting in the creation of potential liability for automobile manufacturers for all deaths and injuries in
which air bag systems could have, arguably, reduced or prevented injury.
This potential liability is speculative. In assessing the liability risks
of automobile manufacturers, insurance companies can only guess as to
whether and when this type of liability might be applied. The absence of
any past data on this type of liability and the impossibility of predicting
judicial behavior makes it difficult to factor this potential liability into
the exposure to liability that is considered when setting premiums.
Opponents to federal product liability legislation have pointed to
this "absence of claims data" as a reason to take no action to reform the
tort system. 3 7 But what good are claims data in an area where the future
may have relatively little to do with the past? The hunt for perfect
(1982), preempted any state motor vehicle standards; and (2) under the "second collision"
doctrine first announced in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
an automobile without a defective airbag could not be considered unreasonably
dangerous.).
33. See, e.g., Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984 (11 th Cir. 1985).
34.

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 1 (1985)

[hereinafter ACCIDENT VICTIMS]. The losses - in human and economic terms - are staggering. In 1982, for example, there were 46,000 motor vehicle deaths and 1.7 million
disabling injuries. The economic cost to society arising from all motor vehicle accidents in
1982 totalled $41.6 billion. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1983). This
amount included losses from medical expenses, insurance administration, wage loss, motor vehicle property damage, fire loss and indirect work loss. ACCIDENT VICTIMS at 4.
35. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 48 (1983). In 1982, for example,
vehicle defects were cited in only eight percent of fatal motor vehicle accidents occurring
in urban areas. Most of these "defects" were not of the type attributable to manufactures,
but rather to inadequate owner- performed maintenance such as balding or under-inflated

tires, improperly maintained brakes or non-working headlights. Id.
36. According to the National Safety Council, in 1982 improper driving accounted for
62.3% of all fatal highway accidents in urban areas, and 31.5% were caused by speeding.
Id. Alcohol has been cited as a factor in more than 50% of fatal motor vehicle accidents.
Id. at 52.
37. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-11 (1986) (minority views of Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings); 132 CONG. REC. S12,756 (daily ed. September 17, 1986) (statement of

Sen. Hollings).
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claims data is a misplaced and misleading enterprise. Product liability
tort law is not like life insurance or accident insurance in which the past
tells us a good deal about what will happen in the future. Product liability laws are constantly changing, opening up new areas of potential liability. Unless the system is stabilized and reasonable uniform federal
rules are enacted, we will continue to have severe instability, and insurance availability and affordability problems will not abate. That is one
reason why the Federal Product Liability Retention Act, which facilitates
self-insurance, 3 8 has not been utilized by many businesses. The uncertainties are the same for all, self-insured and commercially-insured alike.
The one thing certain about the past in product liability is that hindsight
alone will not predict the future.
II.

FAIRNESS

The current system, in which the rules establishing a manufacturer's
obligation and an injured person's right to compensation vary depending upon which state's law applies, is inherently unfair. There is one
basic idea that provides the overriding rationale for a federal product
liability law: product liability rules should be the same in every state.
Products constantly move in interstate commerce. The liability of a
manufacturer or product seller should be determined by the same legal
standards no matter where the product is sold or where an injury occurs.
Accordingly, an injured person should have the same right to recovery
for harm no matter where that person resides, where the injury occurs,
or where an action for damages is brought. This rationale is based on
fairness, logic, simplicity and the nature of our commerce.
Because the rules vary from state to state and are continually in flux,
both manufacturers and claimants spend unnecessary time, effort and
resources in determining what the applicable legal rules are, and in investigating, pursuing and defending product liability claims. This difficulty in evaluating the merits of a claim not only raises the costs of
litigation, but it inhibits the possibility of settlement.3 9 In many cases, it
is unclear what the legal standards are or should be, and this results in
excessive litigation. Legal costs and managerial time diverted by manufacturers to the assessment of legal claims are passed on to consumers in
the form of higher product prices. 40 Legal fees also devour judgments
41
won by claimants successful in product liability suits.

38. Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, supra note 5, at §§ 3901-04. Under
the Risk Retention Act, a group of product manufacturers and sellers can form a selfinsurance group merely by being registered in one state. Id. at § 3901. Once chartered,
the group can then operate in other states by submitting certain information to the insurance commissions of those states. Id. at § 3902. The Act also permits organizations, such

as trade associations, to purchase liability insurance on a group basis. Id. at § 3903. For a
brief discussion of the history and purpose of the Act see Home Warranty Corp. v. Elliot,
572 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Del. 1983).
39. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
40. Id. at 8.
41. A recent study of 24,000 claims conducted by the Rand Corporation shows that

for every dollar received by a plaintiff in a product liability suit, $.41 is paid immediately to
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UNIFORM FEDERAL TORT STANDARDS
FROM COMMON LAw, To LEGISLATION, To FEDERAL LEGISLATION:

BACK To THE BASICS

Sometimes it is useful to go back to basics. For those of us who
have followed the issue for the past ten years, we can sometimes miss
the forest for the trees. We forget that product liability law today is
formed almost exclusively by courts on a day-to-day basis. 4 2 Unfortunately, the courts have gone a myriad of ways in formulating product
liability rules. The decisions are as diverse as the personalities of the
people who occupy the bench. 43 With fifty-one sets of ever-changing
rules and thousands of courts, it is no wonder that the law is muddled.
While the common law worked well for many years in our country, it
does not do so in the product liability area anymore. It only worked well
when there was a "common morality." Decisions tended to move slowly
and clung to the past. Today, as has been illustrated, there are very
different views among judges about what the tort system should accomplish. On the other hand, there is a strong economic dependency in our
insurance system on having some stability, and congruity of interpretation, in those rules. This dependency did not exist at common law.
Consequently, it is clear that product liability law can no longer be left
to the vagaries of the common law - it must be put into a legislative
framework.
IV.

WHY

Is

FEDERAL CURE NEEDED?

The states have not and cannot achieve uniformity of product liability law. After a careful study of the product liability problem from 19761978, a task force that one of the authors, Mr. Schwartz, chaired at the
United States Department of Commerce, drafted a model product liability law, known as the Uniform Product Liability Act ("UPLA"). It was
published on October 31, 1979, and offered to the states as a basis for
44
action.
Despite this model act and efforts to have states act in a harmonious
manner, the result produced even more differences. Many states enacted their "own" version of a product liability law. 4 5 Unlike the experience with the Uniform Commercial Code, there has been no harmony in
state legislation. Of equal importance is the fact that state statutes are
not comprehensive and fail to address key issues that arise in product
liability litigation. 46 For example, a key issue arising in product liability
the plaintiff's attorney. The defendant spends an additional $.58 in legal costs. Thus, for
every $.59 the plaintiff actually gets, lawyers get $.99. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Institute for Civil Justice, July

1983).
42.
43.
44.
45.
95,270.
46.

See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984).
Id.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
State product liability legislation is compiled at 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 90,112See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
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cases is the manufacturer's duty to provide warnings. 4 7 Must the manufacturer provide warnings directed to the product user or must the
warnings be given to a third party who will administer the product or
supervise its use, such as a physician or employer? This is an issue that
is not addressed in most state product liability statutes and, accordingly,
the answer is not always clear. This kind of lack of uniformity in the law
plagues the system. States are frustrated in this area because an average
of over seventy percent of all products are shipped outside their state of
origin. 4 8 Thus, an attempt by one state to resolve uncertainties in its
tort litigation system can not affect the overwhelming majority of cases
that are brought in other states against their home-based industries.
Opponents of federal product liability legislation sometimes point to
state tort reforms and say that they have not resulted in lower insurance
prices. With regard to product liability, that is exactly why state reforms
cannot solve the problem. Legislation in one particular state is not effective to help manufacturers and product sellers in that state because
their products are frequently used in a number of other states. Most
importantly, product liability insurance rates are set on a nationwide basis. 4 9

Thus, the insurer is required to take into account the laws of

states other than the one where a particular product is manufactured.
There is no question that product liability is a matter of interstate
commerce. In fact, on this basis in August of 1986, the National Governors Association voted to reverse its former position in opposition to
federal product liability legislation. 50 We need legislation, and that legislation must be federal.
V.

CONGRESS HAS CLEAR AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

To

ENACT

A

FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW

The commerce clause gives the federal government the right and
responsibility to regulate and promote interstate commerce. 5 1 The production, distribution and sale of products clearly takes place in and affects interstate commerce. A product may be manufactured in one state
and sold or distributed in another state, contain components or raw
materials acquired in different states, or compete with other products in
interstate commerce. Improper findings of liability and excessive
awards impose a significant burden on interstate commerce. In addition, product liability insurance rates, as previously indicated, 52 are set
on a national basis. In assessing an insured's potential liability, insurers
must take into account a new rule extending liability in any state, because the insured's product may be subject to a lawsuit in that state, or
47. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
48. See 1977 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMODITY TRANSPORTATION SURVEY, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TABLE I, pp. 1-77 (1981); see also S. REP. No.

422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
49. See 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979).
50. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 166, at A-2 (Aug. 27, 1986).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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other states may follow the new rule. Thus, in this respect, product liability rules in an individual state affect interstate commerce and provide a
53
justification for federal regulation.
In general, federal legislation falls within Congress' commerce
clause authority if there is any rational basis for the congressional determination that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. 54 The
current complex system of state common and statutory product liability
laws hampers trade among the states because products are subject to
varying and conflicting rules. Manufacturers who do business on an interstate basis have no clear statement of what their legal obligations are
or what legal standards still apply. This very problem exemplifies the
reason for the commerce clause: to permit a uniform approach to
resolving issues that burden the conduct of business and trade across
55
state lines.
In the past, the national interest in protecting interstate commerce
has prompted Congress to find a uniform federal solution to problems
involving interstate commercial activity. 56 Congress has authority under
the commerce clause to enact laws determining the liability of parties for
injuries arising out of commerce, and it has enacted a number of statutes
that preempt state tort law. 5 7 Such laws may create or abolish causes of
action, add, subtract, or modify defenses for liability, and limit or ex58
pand liability.
The fact that tort law traditionally has been a matter of state law
does not alter Congress' authority under the commerce clause to enact a
uniform product liability law. The argument that in local product liability laws the rules should be retained because the tort system traditionally
has been a feature of the common law has no constitutional basis. Congress has clear authority under the commerce clause to enact a federal
product liability law.
53. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("[E]ven activity that is purely
intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with
like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce.").
54. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (provisions of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (1982), did not violate commerce clause, especially where legislative history expressed the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards).
55. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8.1, at 261-62 (3rd ed.
1986).
56. See, e.g., United States Cotton Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1982), Grain
Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87, 111, 113, 241-73, 2209 and 16 U.S.C. §§ 490, 683
(1982), Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-51 lq (1982) (requiring compliance with
uniform national classifications); Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
and 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5315 (1982) (uniform safety standards for consumer products);
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982) (safety and labeling of drugs).
57. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-50 (1984) (imposing liability without regard to fault); Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2233, 2239 (1973 & Supp. 1983) (limiting liability for nuclear power plant accidents); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 5160 (1972) (governing the liability of interstate railway carriers to their employees and altering state court law on available defenses).
58. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984).
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FEDERAL LEGISLATION WILL ACHIEVE UNIFORM RULES OF

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Federal product liability legislation, Senate Bill 2760, reported to
the Floor by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1986,59 specifically
provides that such legislation would not create federal question jurisdic60
tion or jurisdiction based on an act of Congress regulating commerce.
In effect, the legislation leaves the resolution of product liability claims
to the state courts and federal courts that currently have jurisdiction
over such actions based upon diversity of citizenship. Some opponents
of the legislation have argued that uniformity will not be achieved under
a federal product liability act. 6 1 They contend that confusion and conflicting decisions will occur because state courts will have unbridled authority to interpret the act without regard to the decisions of federal
courts. This contention is unfounded both as a theoretical and practical
62
matter.
63
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
federal law overrides any conflicting provisions of state law. In inter64
preting federal law, state courts are guided by federal court decisions.
For example, in interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA), 6 5 state courts are bound to follow rulings of federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[m]anifestly the federal rights affording relief to injured railroad employees under a federally declared standard could be defeated if states were permitted to have
the final say as to what defenses could and could not be properly inter'6 6
posed to suits under the Act."
States have recognized their obligation to follow the decisions of
federal courts interpreting the FELA. 6 7 State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal district courts to entertain FELA cases, but in
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover in such cases,
'68
courts "look to the prevailing federal case law."
The importance of this rule as it applies to a federal product liability
59. See Product Liability Reform Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
60. Id. at § 104; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1982) (federal district court jurisdiction
over federal questions and acts of Congress regulating commerce, respectively).
61. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-75 (1984) (minority views of Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings).
62. There is a certain irony in the fact that some representatives of the organized bar
who argue this point also contend that the federal rules will make the law "rigid" and
"inflexible." One might conclude that these arguments are make-weights and that advocates of these viewpoints simply do not wish to end a system that has been lucrative for the
legal profession.
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
64. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45 (4th ed. 1983).
65. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
66. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
67. See, e.g., Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 102 N.E.2d 855, 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951);
Grosse v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 307 Ill.
App. 414, 423, 29 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (1940).
68. Moss v. Central of Georgia R.R., 135 Ga. App. 904, 905, 219 S.E.2d 593, 595
(1975), (The question of whether a worker, pursuing a claim under FELA, "is an independent contractor or employee is a problem of federal law.") cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907
(1976).
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act can be appreciated in light of the fact that over 100 opinions on the
topic of product liability are published by the federal circuit courts of
appeals each year. One can assume that similar federal appellate action
will occur under a federal product liability law. These opinions will supply substantial precedent and evidence for application in product liability actions brought in state courts, resulting in uniform interpretation of
the act at the state court level. Federal courts will interpret and apply
the federal product liability act in product liability actions brought in
federal district courts. In actions which arise under federal law, the district courts and the federal courts of appeal will not be bound by state
court decisions interpreting the federal product liability act. 69 State
courts will look to this body of federal decision, as they do in applying
other federal law, and will have substantial guidance in applying the act.
The obligation of state courts to follow federal decisions when applying federal law is the converse of the "Erie Doctrine" which requires
federal courts to follow the decisions of state courts when applying state
law. 70 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the view that "courts
of the States remain free to apply individualized local rules when called
upon to enforce . . . [that which is expressly preempted by federal
law.]" 7 1 Under the supremacy clause, state courts also will be obligated
to apply the federal court decisions interpreting the federal product liability act. Thereby, substantial uniformity in the rules of product liability will be achieved.
Furthermore, every court applying the federal product liability act
will begin from a common statutory text employing common, easily understood terms and familiar principles. Many potential ambiguities
could be readily resolved by reference to the comprehensive legislative
history of the act as has been the case under the Federal Rules of
72
Evidence.
The view that state courts will establish widely dissimilar interpretations of the federal product liability act also is contrary to experience
under other federal laws in which state courts have heard claims arising
69. See Bryant v. Civiletti, 663 F.2d 286, 293 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (In a habeas corpus
proceeding challenging consecutive life sentences, the federal court noted that it need not
adopt a lower state court opinion concerning parole. In fact, "[f]ederal courts are not
even bound by the decisions of a state supreme court setting aside a state's statute on
grounds that it violated the United States Constitution."); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F.
Supp. 1072, 1079 (D. Utah 1981) (nor is the federal district court "bound by the doctrine
of stare decisis to follow state court interpretations of federal law," in this case a Utah
Supreme Court decision), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd on
rehearing,773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).
70. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
72. Opponents made similar arguments about "confusions" prior to adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Federal Rules of Evidence H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 80, 82, 96 (1974) (statements of James S. Schaeffer and Joseph A. Moore for Association of Trial Lawyers of
America and statement of George A. Spiegelberg on behalf of American College of Trial
Lawyers and Ad Hoc Association of Trial Lawyers of America, respectively). As far as we
know, after a decade of operation, no one has seriously suggested repealing the statutory
rules and returning to "the common law."
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under those federal laws. For example, to the best of these authors'
knowledge, there is no evidence today that claims brought under
FELA 73 or under section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 194774 are treated much differently if they are brought in a state
court. These claims are treated similarly regardless of whether they are
brought in a state or federal court. Even if there is some diversity of
views regarding application of a federal product liability statute, a comprehensive federal law still will be an immense improvement over the
myriad of contradictory laws and standards that currently exists in the
different states. Federal product liability legislation will unquestionably
bring more stability than exists in the current system.
VII.

WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH FEDERAL PRODUCT
LIABILITY LEGISLATION?

There are several fundamental objectives that can be achieved in
any federal product liability legislation. The foremost goal is to remove
the unpredictability and uncertainty of the current system so as to make
it more efficient in terms of manufacturers understanding their legal obligations and the scope of their liability. 75 A second goal is to eliminate
the excessive legal costs resulting from the present system.
Unless underwriters can predict with some degree of certainty when
and how manufacturers and product sellers will be held liable, insurer
problems with the system are going to continue and fester. The rules
should specify when a defendant will be liable for his failure to safely
design a product and when he will be liable for his failure to warn.
Under tort law, the only rational basis for such rules is fault. If one
holds a manufacturer strictly or absolutely liable in the design or warning area, one creates an open-ended legal system that is unpredictable
and unaffordable. This is because a person can always design a better
product if he spends enough money. For example, one can make a car
that floats on water. One can always provide a new warning with hindsight as one's guide. A manufacturer should be liable when he has failed
to act in a reasonably prudent manner and either knew or should have
known about the risks. 76 Rules with respect to duty to warn are particularly important - guidance is needed. Rules can spell out quickly and
unequivocally who should be warned. For example, a pharmaceutical
company should be required to warn a physician about prescription
product risks. It may be questionable, however, whether the same pharmaceutical company should be required to give identical complex medi73. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
75. See

REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

TION, ON THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT,

S.

REP.

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTA-

No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5

(1986).
76. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 116 Mich. App. 466, 365 N.W.2d 176, 187
(1984) (cause for negligent design of forklift failed where jury found that "the manufacturer took reasonable care in light of any reasonably foreseeable use of the product which
might cause harm or injury").
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cal terminology to a patient. Today, the duty-to-warn area of law is
filled with uncertainty. Legislation can create rationality and
predictability.
2.

Abolish the Unfair Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability

One of the major causes of unpredictability in the product liability
system is the rule of "joint and several liability." Originally, this rule
applied when there were two or more persons, acting in concert, who
wrongfully pursued a common scheme or plan that was likely to result in
injury to another. 77 In effect, joint and several liability meant that the
persons who acted in concert were equally at fault and jointly responsible for the harm, and thus the injured person could recover damages
from any one of them. 78 Currently, courts in many states have expanded
this rule by applying it even when the defendants in the lawsuit acted
independently and were not equally at fault. 7 9 The result is that a defendant who is minimally responsible for causing a harm may be forced
to pay the entire amount of the injured person's damages. 80 An injured
person may choose to sue a particular defendant who is, for example,
only five percent at fault, merely because that defendant has the "deepest pocket." Meanwhile, the parties who are primarily responsible for
the harm - but frequently unable to pay - get off without paying
anything.
It is difficult enough for an insurer to predict the potential liability
of its own insured, but it is impossible to predict the liability for other
persons which may be assumed by its insured through the application of
joint and several liability.
Common sense says that it is simply unfair to make one person pay
for what another person did; nevertheless, that is exactly what the doctrine ofjoint and several liability does. Other than a basis for letting us
find a "deep pocket," how can we justify making Peter pay for the torts
of Paul? Courts today are able to and do apportion damages among
plaintiffs and defendants, and among defendants, when they are suing
each other. It is only logical and reasonable to limit the individual liability of a person to his own share of responsibility.
3.

Reduce Excessive Legal Costs

The uncertainties in tort law have helped generate tremendous and
unnecessary legal costs in product liability. Statistics clearly show that
77. See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed.

1986).
78.

Id.

79. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1986). It should be noted, however, that a growing number of states have abolished the doctrine of joint and several
liability through legislative action. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1983).

80. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (1985). For a
more detailed critique of the joint and several liability doctrine see Pressler & Schieffer,
Joint and Several Liability: A Case For Reform, supra pp. 651-84.
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victims are getting less than one-half of all the money spent on tort litigation, with the rest of the money going to attorneys' fees and the costs
of litigation. 8 ' But uncertainties in tort law are not the only factors
which contribute to unnecessary legal costs. There are also unreasonable and unneeded delays by some defendants' attorneys. There are frivolous and unwarranted claims brought by some plaintiffs' attorneys.
The federal product liability bill contains a provision that applies strict
sanctions against attorneys who bring frivolous claims or engage in unnecessary delay. 8 2 While this is a good start, the frivolous claims provision is unlikely to work if there are no rules or guidelines concerning
when a manufacturer or product seller is to be held liable. Attorneys
will be deterred from bringing frivolous claims and defenses only if they
have clear rules as to standards of liability. In addition, without clear
standards of liability, courts will have no guidelines to determine
whether sanctions should be imposed on an attorney bringing a particular case.
VIII.

THE ANTI-CONSUMER MYTH

It has been asserted that some very early versions of federal product
liability legislation, in effect, "tilted the law" toward defendants. 83 That
"tilt" has long since passed. The current legislation, in a number of
ways, expands liability of manufacturers. One example which would work
to the plaintiff's advantage is the statute of limitations - which begins
to run at the time a person knew or should have known about a harm
and its cause, 84 as contrasted with the8 5law of some states where a claim
arises as soon as a person is injured.
More importantly, rules that limit recovery are not automatically
"anti-consumer." If there are excessive costs in the system, consumers
are harmed by the corresponding increases in the price of products. Today, according to some surveys, product liability accounts for over
twenty percent of the price of a step ladder, 8 6 and approximately
$80,000 of the price of a general aviation airplane. 87 In the legislative
81. A recent study by the Rand Corporation shows that a successful plaintiff in a product liability lawsuit receives approximately 45% of the total annual cost of tort litigation,
with attorneys' fees, court costs and the value of the litigants' time consuming the rest.
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM YEARS 23 (1986).
82. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305 (1986).
83. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, on S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 128 (1982) (statement by
David I. Greenberg, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America).
84. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(a) (1986).
85. See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979) (statute of limitations
began to run at time of first legal injury, that is, when one was entitled to maintain an
action); Wojcik v. Almase, 451 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of limitations
began on date defective catheter broke off in plaintiff's body, not on date its presence was

discovered by x-ray); New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634
(1976) (statue of limitations in personal injury case began to run at time of injury, not time
of the negligent act).
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at VI-16.
87. See 132 CONG. REC. S13,016 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986) (statements of Senators
Nancy L. Kassebaum and Robert Dole).
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process in Washington, D.C., professional consumer groups are often
seen pitted against business groups, but that picture is not a true reflection of businesses and consumers in the United States of America. We
all have an interest in removing excessive costs from the tort system. A
recent Louis Harris poll showed that sixty-nine percent of consumers
believe the tort system has made it too easy for people to sue and win. 88
Consumers do not wish to pay inflated prices for products because some
people misuse products, drive while they are intoxicated, do not follow
instructions, or alter equipment, and then are hurt. It is ironic that professional consumer groups oppose reforms that would eliminate liability
of manufacturers when there has been an unreasonable or unforeseeable misuse of a product.
On another point, it does not make economic sense for the tort system to pay people who have already been paid by health accident insurance. The collateral source rule, however, precludes the introduction of
evidence before the jury showing that the plaintiff has already been compensated by collateral sources for the same harm. 89 This rule permits
double recovery and contributes to the excessive costs of the product
liability system.
Finally, the Louis Harris poll suggests that most consumers think
there should be some limit on liability at least with respect to
noneconomic costs (essentially, non-medical costs). 90 While the limit is
arbitrary, no matter what level is set, it is even more arbitrary to leave
noneconomic damages - damages that have no market value - totally
open-ended.
In sum, the idea that any tort reform legislation is automatically
anti-consumer is a myth. The current proposed federal legislation contains provisions that will benefit consumers, attempts to remove excessive costs from the product liability system - costs which eventually are
passed onto consumers in the increased price of products - and attempts to restore fairness to the system.
CONCLUSION

Two major product liability crises 9 1 have occurred in the past decade. Their impacts are not merely grist for academic musings-they are
very real. They put small businesses out of business. They blunt the
introduction of new and useful products. They compromise our efforts
88. See 132 CONG. REC. S7,604-5 (daily ed. June 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Robert
W. Kasten) (reporting contents of Harris Survey 1986, June 9, 1986).
89. See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1,465 P.2d 61, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (1970).
90. 132 CONG. REC. S7,605. The Harris poll disclosed that 65% of those persons
surveyed were in favor of a $150,000 limit on the amount that a person could collect for
any injury, provided, that if that person needed special medical treatment they could get it
free for the rest of their life no matter what the cost. Id. (emphasis added).
91. The two crises are the 1976-78 period which produced the FINAL REPORT, supra
note 2, and the present one which prompted the Product Liability Reform Act, supra note
59.
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to meet foreign competition, and they create unnecessary costs in the
price of products. In sum, they have adverse impacts on both consumers
and businesses.
The crises have had two basic forces that nudge them forward:
overly subjective insurance rate-making and unpredictable tort law.
Congress has partially addressed the insurance rate-making problem by
facilitating self-insurance for all product sellers and manufacturers. Fortunately, Congress has now taken an active interest in the second aspect
of the problem - unpredictable tort law. Although a bill progressed in
the 99th Congress farther than any bills have before, the time for further
study should be over. The plaintiffs' lobby has consistently opposed
federal product liability legislation both in concept and in substance.
While the organized plaintiff's bar attempts to couch its position in
terms of the interests of consumers, evidence such as the recent Louis
Harris poll shows that this plaintiffs' lobby does not accurately reflect
public opinion on this issue. 9 2 All interested groups should join together to assure that the federal legislation is fair and balanced. To
leave the system in common law chaos is simply to perpetuate unnecessary crises. The time to enact uniform federal product liability standards is now.

92. In fact, the survey showed that the public believes "that lawyers looking for big
contingency fees are responsible for what is seen as the flood of liability suits." 132 CONG.
REC. S7,605 (daily ed. June 16, 1986).

OUR PRODUCT LIABILITY SYSTEM: AN EFFICIENT
SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM
FRANK J. VANDALL*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a substantial volume of material has been written
contending that the American civil justice system is out of control, ' jury
awards have improperly reached astronomical proportions 2 and the
American penchant for tort litigation, particularly product liability tort
litigation, is on the verge of causing the ruination of the business and
manufacturing communities, if not the entire republic. 3 The writers of
these gloomy materials claim, in alarmist fashion, that product liability
and medical malpractice litigation has delivered the "insurance crisis."
This "crisis" is evidenced by the diminished availability of insurance in
certain areas and for certain activities, and by the dramatically increased
rates charged for insurance coverage. 4 It is asserted that these increased
rates have compelled physicians to leave the medical profession, forced
small businesses to close their doors, pushed major manufacturers into
bankruptcy and priced many types of insurance beyond the reach of
those who need it. 5 The most frequent and popular suggestion offered
by the alarmists as a cure for this dilemma is a call for far-reaching tort
reform, including comprehensive reformation in the product liability
6
area.
This article begins by suggesting that available data is woefully insufficient to support such catastrophic reform; hard facts are simply not
available to support the notion that a real problem exists in the product
liability insurance area. 7 It suggests that since most goods and services
* Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1964, Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Deborah
Mann, Joice Elam, James L. Hickey and Jane Tuttle.
1. See, e.g., Address by William M. McCormick, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, entitled The American Tort System: A Time to
Rebalance the Scales ofJustice (Jan. 7, 1986), repnnted in 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Feb.

15, 1986, at 267.
2. Id. at 268.
3.

See Molotsky, Drive to Limit Product Liability Grows as Consumer Groups Object, N.Y.

Times, Mar. 1, 1986, at 32, col. 1.
4. See Ross, Reforms, Profits Swallow Up Insurance Crisis, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1987, at 2,
col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Ross].
5. See generally S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report]. For a discussion on manufacturers' liability and bankruptcy, see Couric, The
A.H. Robins Saga, 72 A.B.A.J. 56 (1986).
6. See Rose and Abbott, Federal Liability Law Would Lessen Uncertainty, Legal Times,
July 9, 1984, at 15; Mayer, Change Urged In Product Liability Law; Product Liability Laws Overhaul Being Sought, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at D7; see also Reed and Watkins, Product
Liability Tort Reform: The Casefor FederalAction, 63 NEB. L. REv. 389 (1984).
7. See infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
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have increased in price over the last fifteen years, it should not be surprising that the price of insurance has also increased. The article's second section, an economic analysis of the alleged "crisis," suggests that
the free market - rather than government regulation or tort reform may be more helpful in lowering the price and increasing the availability
of insurance. 8 Section three examines our American system of tort recovery based upon strict liability. It explores the underlying rationale
for using a strict liability analysis in product liability actions and suggests
that abolition of this system could lead to the establishment of socialized
medicine as a means of compensating victims. The section advocates
manufacturer responsibility, not government largesse, as the appropriate means for compensating product liability victims. It concludes that
strict liability is less expensive than other alternatives. 9 The fourth section evaluates the inadequacies of several product liability reform proposals.' 0 The final section examines the benefits derived from "loss
shifting."'' It concludes that the American product liability system in its
current form is working well and provides a relatively inexpensive mechanism for resolving the complicated tensions which frequently arise
when a product liability tort is committed.
I.

CRISIS OR FICTION?

THE PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE PROBLEM

As with any public policy issue, proponents and opponents represent divergent interests and points of view. This phenomenon frequently results in confusion and makes understanding and resolution of
the issue in question more difficult. To some extent, this helps to describe the confusing and sometimes contradictory nature of the product
liability insurance problem. There is no question that during recent
years, impetus for reform in the product liability area has reached a fever pitch. 12 Manufacturers, suppliers and insurance companies argue
that the product liability insurance problem is in need of attention and
reform. 13 High insurance rates may force some manufacturers out of
business. 14 Claiming that a product liability insurance "crisis" exists,
8. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 6.
13. The American Insurance Association, which represents the interests of property/casualty insurance companies, found that by 1986 the number of federal product liability suits had increased by 750% since 1974. During the same period of time, the
average jury verdict in product liability cases had increased from under $400,000 to over
$1.8 million. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S.2760 Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 666 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]
(statement of Peter A. Lefkin, Counsel, Am. Ins. Ass'n). However, these allegations are
not new. SeeJohnson, Products Liability "Reform ":A Hazardto Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 677,
678 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson] (manufacturers faced with either paying dramatically increased fees for product liability insurance or going out of business due to the
product liability insurance "crisis").
14. The introduction to Senate Bill 2760, proposed in 1986, provides:
The inefficiency and unpredictability of the product liability system have been
linked to the increasing cost and unavailability of liability insurance. An increas-
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the move for legislative protection
the insurance industry has supported
5
of manufacturers' interests.'
As far back as 1977, the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, under the direction of the United States Department of Commerce,
studied a variety of problems in the product liability area. 16 The Task
Force attempted to define the product liability coverage problem and to
provide insight into possible legislative reforms that would ease the
plight of manufacturers faced with going out of business due to high
insurance rates. The study revealed that manufacturers of industrial
chemicals and certain consumer goods, such as pharmaceuticals, power
mowers, ladders and medical devices, are most severely affected by
heightened insurance costs. 17 The Task Force also examined the availability and affordability of insurance, both in small and large manufacturing firms, and found that some small businesses are forced to choose
between purchasing products liability insurance at very high premiums
or foregoing the protection of insurance entirely.' 8 The Task Force
concluded that the product liability insurance problem was not of "crisis" proportions. 19
The Task Force identified three primary causes for the rise in product liability insurance premiums: the insurance industry's rate-making
procedures, the tort-litigation system, and unsafe manufacturing practices employed by those seeking to be insured. 20 Several less substantial
causes also were identified, including consumer and worker awareness,
increases in the number and complexity of products, product misuse
and inflation. 2 1 Certainly all of these factors have impacted the cost of
product liability insurance premiums, but inflation is frequently overing number of companies, whether they make such products, are [sic] sporting
goods, textile manufacturing equipment, machine tools, medical devices or vaccines, cannot buy adequate insurance coverage. Some have had their insurance
cancelled or have experienced reduced coverage with increased deductibles at
higher prices. Others cannot obtain coverage at any price.
Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2.

15. Although the American Insurance Association supports product liability reform, it
found that Senate Bill 2760 was incomplete in developing solutions to the product liability
insurance problem. The Association has placed substantial blame on the legal system for
the current problems in the product liability area. See Hearings,supra note 13, at 666, 670.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT]. The Task Force also published a seven volume legal study that was prepared by independent contractors as part of
the study of product liability problems. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY (1977) [hereinafter TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY].
17. Schwartz, Proposed Remedies for the American Problem: U.S. Governmental Activity, 29
MERCER L. REV. 437, 440 (1978) (setting forth a summation of Task Force findings and
noting that the problem of increased cost of product liablity insurance is more severe for
smaller firms in all industries because, unlike a large manufacturer which produces goods
in large quantities, a small firm may not be able to pass on the cost of product liability
insurance in the price of its goods). Mr. Schwartz was chairman of the Interagency Task
Force on Product Liability.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20.

TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-20.

21.

Id. at 1-29 to 1-31.
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looked as a contributing factor, and is especially deserving of further
discussion.
Increased insurance rates are not so alarming when considered in
relation to inflationary trends evident in other industries and for other
types of goods and services. For example, in 1972, the price of a basic
Datsun 1200 was $2,051.22 By 1987, the price of a basic Nissan Sentra,
a successor to the Datsun 1200, was $6,199.23 This represented a 300%
price increase over fifteen years. Moreover, between 1967 and 1983, the
Consumer Price Index for all goods increased by almost 200%.24 And,
during that same sixteen year period, hospital room rates increased over
500%!25 It is not surprising that insurance rates have doubled or tripled over the years when the cost of virtually all other services and goods
have also doubled or tripled. When manufacturers, sellers and insurance companies argue for tort reform, they rarely mention the substantial impact inflation has had on this issue.
Another confusing area is that of insurance company profitability.
Although the insurance industry claims that the current tort system is
causing bankruptcy throughout the industry, recent earnings by the insurance industry are impressive and appear to be at an all-time high.
Figures complied by A. M. Best Company, an independent firm that follows the insurance industry, show that in 1985, property/casualty stock
prices rose fifty percent, twice the rate of increase for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. 26 In the first quarter of 1986, these stocks were up
an additional twenty-six percent. 2 7 According to the Insurance Services
Office, which advises insurance carriers on rate setting, operating profits
of insurance companies tripled during the first nine months of 1986,
compared to the same period in 1985.28 Earnings rose to $3.6 billion,
up from $1.2 billion in 1985.29 If a "crisis" within the insurance industry ever existed, current profitability reports would suggest that it now
has passed.
In attempting to assess the nature of the insurance problem, it be30
comes clear that few facts are available from the insurance companies.
Information is not generally available as to the amount of insurance
22.

Subcompact Cars, Datsun 2-door, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1972, at 224, 226.

23.
24.

Small Cars, Nisan (Datsun) Sentra 2-door, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1987, at 211, 213.
Health Care Costs and Their Effects on the Economy, 1984: Hearings Before the Joint Eco-

nomic Committee, Congress of the United States, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1984) (statement of
James Hacking, Assistant Legislative Counsel, American Association of Retired Persons).
25. "The tremendous growth in health care expenditures is expected to continue on
into the future. By 1990, total health spending is expected to reach some $758 billion,
more than double where it is today." Id.
Damage awards in personal injury suits also have increased over the last few years. A
portion of the increase is likely due to higher medical expenses.
26. Scherffius, The Insurance Crisis: Causes and Cures From a Plaintiffs Lawyers Perspective,

ATLANTA LAW. 15, 17 (Fall 1986) (quoting figures from A.M. Best Co.).
27. Id.
28. Ross, supra note 4.

29. Id.
30. Hearings, supra note 13, at 305 (statement of Robert L. Habush, President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
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sold, the income generated from premiums, the amount paid out in
claims and, most importantly, the amount made as profit. 3 1 This lack of
data from insurance companies makes it unclear whether an insurance
"crisis" truly exists. 32
II.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE "CRIsIS"

Assume that product liability insurance rates have increased dramatically, and that some manufacturers and sellers have been unable to
obtain insurance. As a result, they have been forced to go out of business. Many question what should be done about this situation.
The real question is - should anything be done? Economists would
submit that no action should be taken; instead, the influences of the
marketplace should be permitted to eventually provide an appropriate
remedy. 33 This type of economic analysis, as applied to manufacturers
and sellers unable to obtain insurance, might be more easily understood
by way of analogy to the gasoline shortage of the middle-to-late
34
seventies.
During that period, the price of gasoline went up dramatically.
People altered their driving habits by driving less and taking vacations
closer to home. 35 Automobile manufacturers - especially the Japanese
- responded with smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. 3 6 At the same time,
many oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United States,
England and Mexico, expanded their drilling for, and production of, oil
and gas.
The result has been that much more oil is currently available and
the price of oil has decreased. The natural influences of the marketplace
have worked, and the oil shortage "crisis" has been resolved.
Similarly, some economists might recommend that the product liability insurance crisis be handled the same way - by allowing the market
forces of supply and demand to establish the appropriate price for insurance. 37 If insurance prices continue to rise, new producers will inevitably enter the marketplace to sell insurance. In fact, this is already
occurring. In several states, cooperative groups of local physicians are
providing medical malpractice insurance for their members. 38 Indeed,
31.

Id.

32. In declaring unconstitutional a statute limiting awards in medical malpractice
suits, an Illinois judge found that there was no empirical data to support the claim that a
medical malpractice insurance crisis exists. 5 LAW. ALERT 10 (1986) (quoting from Bernier
v. Burris, No. 85 CH 6627 (Cook County Cir. Ct., II1., Dec. 19, 1985)).
33. See M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 13-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Friedman]; A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS I I (1983); R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 208, 485 (2d ed. 1977); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 368-70 (11 th

ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Samuelson].
34.

See, e.g., The Big Travel Mess, NEWSWEEK,June 18, 1979, at 22;A Global Deal on Prices,

TIMEJan. 14, 1974, at 15; The Painful Change to Thinking Small, TIME, Dec. 31, 1973, at 18.
35. Hitting the Road Again, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1982, at 55; The Holiday Jitters, NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1979, at 67.
36. Every major manufacturer now has at least one small, fuel-efficient model.
37. See Friedman, supra note 33.

38. James R. Posner, an insurance expert, reports:
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these co-ops are "reasonably successful." '3 9 With this heightened competition, insurance premiums invariably will become lower. Eventually,
40
the insurance price and availability "crisis" will have resolved itself.
Other questions have been raised about what should happen to
manufacturers and sellers that cannot obtain insurance. The economic
response lies in whether the companies are profitable or not. If they are
profitable, an insurance company will eventually offer them insurance,
most likely at high rates. If companies are not profitable, insurance will
be more difficult to obtain because premiums may be out of reach for
such marginally-operated companies. For companies that are not profitable because of high risks and large losses in product liability lawsuits,
increased insurance rates are the market's way of proclaiming their
products as too risky or dangerous.
Eventually in these high-risk situations, the issue focuses on
whether certain products are necessary to society despite their inordinate risks. Where these questions arise, and where private sector insurance coverage is not available, the government may be called upon to
decide whether to support companies that are struggling due to their
production of necessary, high-risk products. For example, in the midseventies when companies refused to produce swine flu vaccines because of liability fears - particularly caused by their inability to secure
adequate insurance - the federal government insulated the manufacturers from liability. 4 1 Similarly, the government has absorbed part of
Nearly forty malpractice insurance companies were formed between 1975 and
1982 with the sponsorship of state medical societies and other physician groups.
Eleven state hospital associations also formed insurance companies, either in the
United States or "offshore." In part, these companies were formed to replace
lost coverage in states where commercial companies had withdrawn entirely from
the market.... These companies have made primary insurance available to doctors and hospitals in nearly all parts of the country.
Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37,
39 (1986).
For a report on alternatives that may reduce the "malpractice crisis" faced by doctors,
see Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, 72 A.B.A. J. 38 (1986). For an examination of
the effect of high rates on other classes of insureds, see Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A.J. 48 (1986); Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, 72 A.B.A.J. 52 (1986);
Lynch, The Insurance Panic For Lawyers, 72 A.B.A. J. 42 (1986).
39. Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis of the '80s, 14 LEGAL ASPECTS oF MED. PRAC. 4, 5 (1986).
Although Dr. Hirsh found that physician-owned companies have been reasonably successful, he acknowledged that these companies also are facing an affordability crisis.
40. To enhance competition, the government should facilitate entry into the insurance market. Prices rise and fewer firms compete when market entry is artificially restricted by government regulation. See P. MAcAvoY, FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE
PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE (1977) (Professor MacAvoy argues that deregula-

tion of the insurance industry should be considered). For the traditional view, see M.
RHODES, 2A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 21.1 (1984) (states have the power to regulate the
insurance business).
41. Congress, to ensure that the swine flu program would proceed, enacted legislation in 1976 to resolve the problem. See Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (amended
1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (Supp. 1987)). The legislation provided that
the United States, not the manufacturers or other participants in the program, would be
liable for all injuries caused by the vaccine. The United States retained the right to obtain
indemnification against any manufacturer or other participant whose negligence caused
the claim. In effect, drug manufacturers were made ultimately liable for negligence, while
the burden of strict liability awards fell on the government. In addition, the United States
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the higher costs of "DPT" vaccines. 42 In sum, if the market is allowed
to respond to the forces of supply and demand, and the continued manufacture of some necessary products is thereby threatened, the government will likely follow with corrective measures.
III.

CONTRASTS IN COMPENSATION: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRICT
LIABILITY AND SOCIALIZED MEDICINE

To better understand the efficiency and value of our strict liability
system, one must first examine a different system. For example, England's approach to personal injury compensation is a substantial contrast to the approach taken in the United States. England has a "cradleto-grave" compensation system. 4 3 If a British citizen is seriously injured
by a defective product, the government's social insurance program automatically pays for the victim's medical expenses, drugs, prosthetic devices and a portion of his or her lost wages. 44 Compensation is the
government's responsibility. The drawback of the British system is its
great expense since the cost of this compensation is paid by an enormous tax on citizens and industry. 4 5 Consequently, citizens have limited
disposable income, resulting in a gross national product far below that
of the United States. 46 England's high taxes also prohibit industry from
47
making badly needed investments.
In comparison with England's welfare state, the strict liability sysfunded $230 million of liability insurance to protect the drug manufacturers against indemnity claims. P. KEETON, D. OWEN &J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY
356 (1980).
42. The Diphosphothiamine vaccine - commonly known as "DPT" vaccine is
given to children to protect them from diptheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus.
Lederle Laboratories announced in May of 1986 that, to combat rising liability insurance costs, it would nearly triple the price of its DPT vaccine to private physicians from
$4.29 to $11.40 per dose. Wash. Post,July 16, 1986, at 17. However, manufacturers have
made an approximate $80 million windfall profit from the price increases. The government pays for half, or up to $100 million, of the cost of the DPT vaccine sold annually.
Atlanta J. & Const., Aug. 24, 1986, at 6A.
43. See Gibson, Products Liability in the United States and England. The Differences and Ilhy,
3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 493 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gibson]; Plummer, Products Liability
in Britain, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Plummer]; see also Samuelson, supra note 33, at 816-17.
44. Interview with Professor A. L. Diamond, Director of the Institute for Advanced
Legal Studies, London, England (March 17, 1984); 1 ROYAL COMM'N ON Civ. LIAB. AND
COMPENSATION FOR PERS. INJ. 48 (1978). Neither Gibson nor Plummer attach much weight
to the impact of socialized medicine on the non-development of British product liability
law. Gibson states: "For some reason, English courts have not been as reluctant to create
new criminal offenses as they have been to expand civil remedies." Gibson, supra note 43,
at 518. Plummer entirely overlooks the role of "free" medical care:
Unless a person injured by a defective product can invoke the terms of the 1978
Consumer Safety Act, or is fortunate enough to be able to convince a court he
should have a civil cause of action for breach of a duty imposed by a statute which
does not specifically provide for such an action, he must rely on the contractual
remedies provided by the Sale of Goods Act of 1893 or be able to prove
negligence.
Plummer, supra note 43, at 68-69 (footnotes omitted).
45. See Samuelson, supra note 33, at 816-17.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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tern in the United States is relatively efficient and inexpensive. Nonetheless, many product liability reform proposals have been designed to
eliminate strict liability. 4 8 This is unfortunate because in some aspects
our existing strict liability system works as a free market substitute for
socialized medicine, supplanting the need for wholesale governmental
intervention in the compensation process. Our strict liability system
does not require a huge tax on citizens or industry to support it, since
only those found liable must pay. 4 9 The costs of legal representation
are also borne directly by the private sector. Through the "entrepreneurial-lawyer system," representation of injured parties is made
possible by the contingent fee. 50 When an injury occurs, an attorney is
consulted, and the attorney takes the case if he or she believes it is viable. If the attorney improperly evaluates the case, the attorney will recover nothing and, in fact, may lose thousands of dollars worth of time
invested over a substantial period.
If the United States were to abandon its present compensation system in favor of one patterned after England's socialized-medicine approach (and I am not suggesting this course be followed), there would
be little need for trials or for any strict liability analysis whatsoever. The
verdicts would be small. Few incentives for suit would exist, and most
damages would be compensated by the state. In contrast, our concept
of strict liability has developed over time to make it easier for consumers
to obtain compensation from manufacturers or sellers when injured by
their products. In so doing, the scales ofjustice have been slightly tilted
in favor of the consumer. 5 1
Accordingly, the private sector must bear the resulting costs. In
many cases, the burden will be on the manufacturer or seller to either
obtain insurance or raise the price of the product, thus spreading the
48. The most recent proposal was Senate Bill 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986),
which was considered by the Senate during the 1986 term. See Hearings, supra note 13.

The bill provided a return to a negligence standard for product liability actions. See also
H.R. 5471,99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), which also used a negligence standard for product
liability suits. However, "[a]fter withering on the legislative vine since June, product liability legislation has died on the 99th Congress." Starobin, Senate Product Liability Bill Killed
After Brief Filibuster, 44 CONG. Q. 2316 (1986).
49. However, others would argue that the cost of liability is borne by our entire society, through distribution of losses through insurance companies and in the increased cost

of products. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
50. For a thorough discussion of several advantages provided by the contingent fee
system, see Schmidt, Contingent Fee: Key to the Courthouse, 92 CASE & COM. 2-10 (Jan.- Feb.
1987).
51. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 534-38 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS]; D. NOEL &J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 286-89 (2d ed. 1981). A lead-

ing strict liability case is Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (see infra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text).
The . . . policy operating in [the evolution of strict liability] law is a clear recognition of the effect upon consumers of mass production and distribution of goods
and services aided by the mass media of advertising. The policy which the decisions exemplify can be stated as an attempt to tilt the balance more favorably
toward the single or individual consumer injured by a vast impersonal merchandising juggernaut.
Cowan. Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1086 (1965).
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loss, rather than the burden of the entire loss (often thousands of dollars) being placed on an innocent injured person. 5 2 It is also more desirable - and less expensive - from a societal view to have a product
liability system founded on strict liability rather than a compensation
system that is part of an enormously expensive welfare state as in
England.

53

IV.

A

CRITIQUE or REFORM GOALS AND PROPOSALS

The foremost goal of those who advocate product liability reform is
to shield manufacturers and sellers from liability. 54 The theory is that
product liability suits cause the price of products to increase, and this is
supposedly undesirable. However, when product liability litigation results in higher prices, one of the most valuable components of product
liability law is actually functioning in an appropriate manner. Such price
increases act as a deterrent, 5 5 as a beacon to consumers that a given
product is dangerous, defective or has serious drawbacks. Aware of a
potential hazard, consumers then discontinue purchasing these detrimental products. 5 6 Fewer consumers are injured; fewer suits are filed.
The system provides a meritorious economy. Manufacturers and sellers
seek to abrogate this valuable function when they advocate reform
legislation.
In addition, legislatively protecting manufacturers from the impact
of risk-taking is economically unwise. A natural component of business
activity involves the evaluation and taking of risks. Increases in the
prices of products - because of product liability losses and higher insurance rates - also act as signals to manufacturers that something may
be wrong with their products. These price signals should not be
57
blunted.
A second goal of reform is to eliminate strict liability and to return
to a negligence standard in product liability cases. 58 There are three
52. "The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
53. Samuelson, supra note 33, at 816-17.
54. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 2. Reforms, such as caps on damages, elimination of
strict liability, presumption of due care and statutes of repose, were developed to protect
the manufacturer from suit, provide the manufacturer with a strong defense and limit or
cut off the manufacturer's liability. The intent is to reduce the amount the seller spends
on damages.
55.

Deterrence is a major function of tort law. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS, supra note 51, at 25-26.
56. A. Polinsky & W. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and
Market Power (May 1982) (working paper available from Emory University Law & Economics Center).
57. Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Buhvark of Free Enterprise?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REX.
313, 322-23 (1978). But see Comment, Solving the ProductsLiabilitv Insurance Crisis:.A Study of
the Role of Economic Theory in the Legislative Reform Process, 31 MERCER L. REV. 755 (1980)(advocates adoption of statute limiting manufacturers' risk to solve product liability insurance
crisis).

58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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major flaws in this proposal. First, there are important differences between a cause of action founded on negligence, and one brought under
strict liability. 59 Second, the creation of a "new" cause of action will
generate confusion over what it means and what remains of former actions. This confusion will take years to clarify. During the clarification
period, valid claims will be lost due to attorney and judicial misunderstanding. Finally, the applicable standards and procedures comprising
our present product liability system have evolved over more than 100
6
years. 60 There is simply insufficient data for casting this system aside. '
Understanding the goals of those who advocate product liability reform helps to provide a partial insight into the dynamics of this issue.
To more fully comprehend the scope of reform's impact, however, one
must examine some of the proposals advocated.
A.

Drawbacks to the "Double-Burden" Approach

The "double-burden" proposal refers to the plaintiff's double burden of proof required in a strict liability action. One such approach
comes from a literal reading of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts6 2 which requires that a plaintiff prove that the product is
both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous.1 63 The Restatement
approach places a significantly increased burden of proof on the plaintiff
- contrary to the rationale underlying strict liability, which serves to
reduce the plaintiff's heavy burden of proof. In an ineffectual effort to
reduce the plaintiff's burden, the California Supreme Court, in Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp. ,64 ruled that a plaintiff in a product liability action must
prove that the product is "defective" and also the "proximate cause" of
the injury. 65 The Cronin approach, like the Restatement approach, re59. An important difference, then, between negligence and strict liability is, authors have suggested, that in negligence the key consideration for the courts is
the major policies involved, that is, whether the risk exceeds the benefit of the
activity. In practice, however, the courts avoid discussing the policy questions.
Therefore, a distinction between negligence and strict liability is that in strict liability the court is asked to face directly the question of whether the risk of the
activity exceeds the benefit. This express weighing of critical policies in products
liability cases is the central theme of Escola, Greenman, and Cronin. The proposed
similarity between negligence and strict liability has existed only because of the
commentators' molding of negligence into something it has never been: a frontal
consideration of important social policies.
Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Onio
ST. L.J. 61, 68-69 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Vandall].
60. For a historical analysis of strict liability in the product liability area, see Vandall,
supra note 59, at 62-65; Wade, Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP.
U.L. REV. 335 (1984); 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4500.
61. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
63. Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286,
296 (1966).
64. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (the plaintiff in Cronin
recovered damages under a strict liability theory after sustaining injuries caused by defective safety hasps sold by the defendant).
65. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Cases following the Cronin
approach include Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978) (Cronin approach applies to manufacturing defects and design defects); Hen-
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quires two fairly heavy burdens. A substantial flaw in Cronin is the "proximate cause" requirement:
The term "proximate cause" is unclear and superfluous. Findings of proximate cause and defect involve the same policy inquiries, and it is repetitious and misleading to ask whether the
defect was the proximate cause of the damage. The social policy question is asked once when the court weighs the various
factors to see whether the product is defective. It is confusing
to the court, the jury, and the attorneys to ask the same policy
66
question again, but under a different label, proximate cause.
Another "double-burden" approach was included under the proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act. 67 Under Section 104 of the
Act, the plaintiff must prove that the product is "unreasonably unsafe." ' 68 Clearly, the plaintiff would also have two burdens under this
proposal: to prove that the product is "unreasonable" and that it is "unsafe." In effect, the end result is that the plaintiff must prove negligence
twice. This will confuse the jury and perhaps lead to unintended
verdicts.
B.

Statutes of Repose

Numerous states have adopted statutes of repose as part of their
reform packages. Statutes of repose are sometimes confused with statutes of limitations, but the impact of a repose statute is different from a
statute of limitations. 6 9 Statutes of repose alter the torts system by providing a fixed period of time from the date of the original sale, usually
five to twelve years, in which a product liability suit must be brought. 70
As a result, a product liability suit may be barred by a statute of repose
before the injury even occurs.
Although statutes of repose will prevent some victims of injury from
an old defective product from suing for damages, 7 1 the majority of
plaintiffs involved in product liability litigation have not been injured by
derson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974)
(wrongful death action based on theory of strict liability for defective design of crane);
Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1979) (plaintiff
recovered under theory of strict liability for injuries caused by product lacking adequate
safety features).
66. Vandall, supra note 59, at 75.
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (proposed Oct. 31, 1979).
68. Model Uniform Prod. Liab. Act § 104 (1979).
69. A statute of limitations differs from a statute of repose; a statute of limitations
begins to run at the time of injury while a statute of repose begins to run at the date of sale. See
Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 673, 682
n.51 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Undermining Torts 'Policies];see also Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 143 (1980) (statutes of
repose will bring uniformity to the limitations area of product liability, reduce uncertainty
by placing a limit on manufacturers' liability and lower insurance costs for manufacturers).
As of February, 1986, at least eighteen states had passed statutes of repose: Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. 5 LAw. ALERT 7 (1986).
70. Undermining Torts' Policies, supra note 69, at 682-83.
71. Gingerich, The Interagency Task Force "Blueprint" for Reforming Product Liability Tort
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extremely old products. Ninety-seven percent of bodily injuries occur
within five years of purchase. 7 2 Consequently, a statute of repose will
have little effect on most claims. 7 3 However, there are several types of
victims on whom a statute of repose will have a devastating impact.
First, are those whose injuries are revealed years after the initial exposure, such as victims of "DES" ' 74 or asbestos. 75 Second, are persons
who are injured by long-lasting workplace machinery.
In battles over the constitutionality of product liability statutes of
repose, ten states have held that the statutes violate the "open courts"
provisions of their constitutions, 76 while four states have held they violate "equal protection."' 77 On the other side, four states have held their
statutes of repose were constitutional under their "open courts"
78
provisions.
C.

The "Statutory Compliance" Defense

A popular reform proposal calls for holding a product non-defec79
tive where the manufacturer has complied with existing statutes.
Compliance with governmental standards is one factor considered at
common law in determining whether a manufacturer has acted with due
care. 80 However, to provide - absolutely - that compliance with a
governmental standards statute would create a presumption that a product was not defective nor unreasonably unsafe would be an unfair defense to a product liability claim. The likely result will be that
manufacturers will prevail when they otherwise would have lost due to
Law in the United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 288 (1978) (citing Task Force Final

Report, supra note 16, at VII-25).
72.

TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at VII-16.

73. Johnson, supra note 13, at 690.
74.

Diethylstilbestrol -

commonly known as "DES" -

is a drug formally used for the

prevention of miscarriages. In 1971, the Federal Food and Drug Administration banned
the drug for such use because of evidence that the drug was ineffective in preventing miscarriages and was dangerous to unborn children. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 202-03 (1987).

75. Product liability claims arising from workers who were exposed to asbestos decades ago have only been filed in recent years as asbestosis victims have become ill. See

Preger, Asbestos-Related Disease (Book Review), 6 AM.J.L. & MED. 390, 391 (1980); Richard
& Meier, Lawyers Lead Hunt For New Groups of Asbestos Iictims, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
76. The ten states are Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Wyoming and Utah. 5 LAW. ALERT 6 (1986).
77. The four states are Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Id. at 7.
78. The four states are Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina and Oregon. Id.
79. For example, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act provided: "When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with
legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to
design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective .... " Model Uniform
Product Liability Act § 108(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,730 (proposed Oct. 31, 1979).
Widespread adoption of such a statute would influence both the availability of insur-

ance and the size of the premium. TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 16, at 130; see also
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER No. 9 (1976).
80. Johnson, supra note 13, at 687; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra
note 51, at 233.
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8
the plaintiff's failure to rebut the statutory presumption of due care. '
The defense of statutory compliance will discourage manufacturers
from developing safer products. To the contrary, the proposal provides
financial incentives for manufacturers to lobby for weaker regulations,
rather than to develop safer products.8 2 Opponents of the statutory
compliance defense argue that the current product liability system is one
in which decisions are made by institutions that are immune from political pressure, such as courts and juries.8 3 Other institutions, however,
are not immune. It is well known, for example, that manufacturers frequently influence administrative agencies to adopt less rigid safety standards.8 4 Because of this influence, manufacturers prefer to have
agencies - rather than courts - set applicable standards. 8 5 If the statutory compliance proposal is adopted, we will undoubtedly see weaker
guidelines resulting in more harmful products.

V.

THE EFFICIENCY OF "Loss SHIFTING"

"Loss shifting" refers to the theory whereby an injured party is
compensated by shifting the loss and financial liability from the injured
party to the seller, and indirectly from the seller to its customers and
insurers. 86 The cost of loss shifting is thereby shared by hundreds of
thousands, not by one victim, nor by one defendant. The seller may also
choose to redesign the product, engage in research or drop the product
87
from its line.
Historically, courts were slow to identify loss shifting. Judges struggled with the concepts of negligence, fraud, express warranty and im81. Compare Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348, 358
(1985) ("Compliance with a statutory standard is evidence of due care, but compliance
with the standard does not preclude finding of negligence for failure to take additional
precautions."), withJones v. Hittle Serv., 219 Kan. 627, 632, 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1976)
("Compliance is evidence of due care and that the conforming product is not defective,
and may be conclusive in the absence of a showing of special circumstances.").
82. Manufacturers have the power to influence the formation of government standards. Agencies often adopt regulations that are " rubber-stamped" versions of voluntary
standards already practiced by the industry. There will be no incentive to improve products since the existing practice is acceptable. Johnson, supra note 13, at 687-88.
83. Id. at 689.
84. According to the so-called interest group or economic theory of legislation,
market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve
private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers
to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups. The widespread acceptance of interest group theory has led to suspicion about much of
what Congress does, creating, in turn, a climate hospitable to judicial interference
with legislative outcomes.
Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986); see also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 271
(1985); Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82
YALE LJ. 871, 876 (1973); Forward to Green, Nader Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement: A
Summary, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1 (1970).

85. Johnson, supra note 13, at 689.
86. J. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAw 229 (1981); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW -BASIC TEXT

§ 3.1 (1971).
87. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962).
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plied warranty, but were sometimes seemingly frustrated because the
plaintiffs continually lost their cases. The watershed case in this area
was Escola v. Coca-Cola,8 8 wherein Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, relied on loss shifting to support his theory of absolute liability. In
Escola, he stated that the loss should rest on the manufacturer rather
than the injured consumer:
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It
of products
is to the public interest to discourage the marketing
89
having defects that are a menace to the public.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,9" Justice Traynor adopted a strict
liability theory similar to that previously suggested in Escola. Since
Greenman, courts have handed down a line of decisions with a unified
purpose: to protect the consumer. Recent decisions have emphasized
policies favoring injured parties: loss shifting, availability of insurance
and injury prevention. 9 1 This trend to shift the loss away from the injured party and onto the manufacturer culminated in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. ,92 a decision which held that once the plaintiff has successfully
proven a primafacie case, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer
who must demonstrate that the design benefits exceeded the costs of
avoiding the defect. 93 The expansive Barker decision was premised on
loss shifting and a desire to protect the consumer. It represents the efficient manner in which victims of defective products are compensated for
their injuries. It is a policy which deserves to be maintained.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Before any product liability reform is adopted, the relevant facts
must be uncovered and carefully examined. However, the search for
facts which would support the need for product liability reform is a snipe
hunt. We are told that industry is in trouble due to excessive product
litigation, yet we find that, in general, industry is flourishing. We are
told that insurance rates must increase or the insurers will be forced out
of business, but we see that in terms of profit, the insurance industry has
recently had gold-banner years. Also, few critical facts are available
from the insurance industry in regard to the amount of insurance sold,
the number of claims made, and the amount of claims paid. How can
legislatures intelligently pass reform measures when such crucial facts
are lacking? The answer appears to be that most product liability re88. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.

90. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
91. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Pike V.
Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
92. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
93. Id. at 432-33, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
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form proposals are a result of the lobbying pressures brought by manufacturers, the defense bar, and insurance companies. 9 4 Unfortunately,
the present reality is that product liability reform is based on political
pressure, not facts.
The goal of those who would "reform" our product liability system
is clear: to shift the cost of injuries back onto the shoulders of consumers and victims. In a country with socialized medicine, like England, this
would make sense because consumers would still be able to recover for
medical expenses and a portion of lost wages. In the United States,
however, it means that manufacturers and insurers would profit at the
expense of injured consumers. If the "reformers" are successful in
transforming their proposals into reality, injured parties will no longer
be fairly compensated. And such a change would represent a shameful
reversal of over 100 years of reasoned development in product liability
theory.

94. See Page and Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis:" Causes, Nostrums and
Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 387 (1984) (the tort system is not one of the forces pushing product liability insurance rates skyward).

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO

TORT REFORM:

EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
FRANK B. MORRISON, JR.*
AND JOHN M. MORRISON**

INTRODUCTION

During the past decade, state legislatures have enacted statutes circumscribing tort remedies in an apparent effort to curb rising insurance
costs.' The effect of some of the legislation has been to discriminate
against certain groups of injured persons and to grant special privileges
to select groups of tortfeasors. 2 Accordingly, a variety of equal protection challenges have been raised.
A growing number of state courts have relied on the language of
3
their state constitutions to decide these equal protection challenges.
This article examines, in particular, cases from Montana and other states
in which state constitutional language has been employed by courts reviewing equal protection attacks on "tort reform" legislation. The law
in this area is embryonic, but evolving.
*
Former Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, retired 1987; B.A., University of
Nebraska, 1959; LL.B., University of Denver, 1962.
**
Legislative Attorney, United States Senate; B.A., Whitman College, 1983; J.D.,
University of Denver, 1986.
1. Approximately 30 states have enacted statutory measures designed to contain jury
awards (and otherwise limit amounts and types of recoverable damages), as well as restrict
recognized theories of tort liability. Burke, ConstitutionalInitiative 30: What Constitutional
Rights Did Montanans Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance?, 48 MONT. L. REV. 53,
53 (1987) [hereinafter Initiative 30]; see also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F.Supp. 781, 785 n.2 (W.D.
Va. 1986) (citing cases in which statutory damage limitations were ruled both constitutional and unconstitutional).
2. See Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985) (holding unconstitutional, as a violation of equal protection, a statute that preserved municipal immunity from
tort suits brought by injured persons covered by workers' compensation act); Oien v. City
of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1986) (holding a statute unconstitutional that attempted to expand sovereign immunity to municipalities acting in a proprietary capacity,
thereby limiting causes of action for negligence).
3. State courts have increasingly relied on state constitutional language as the basis
for resolving constitutional questions. It has been suggested that states were forced to do
so when the Burger Court retreated from the expansion of individual constitutional protection brought about by the Warren Court. Galie and Galie, State Coustitutional Guarantees
and Supreme Court Review: justice Marshall's Proposalin Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REV. 273,
273 (1978). Justices Marshall and Brennan have strongly urged states to use their own
constitutions creatively and frequently to avoid Supreme Court review. See id. at 289 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State
Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
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STRICT SCRUTINY IN MONTANA AND ARIZONA

Montana
1. Legislative Attempt to Limit the Recovery of Noneconomic
Damages Held Unconstitutional

The Montana Supreme Court first upheld a constitutional challenge
to tort reform legislation in White v. State. 4 In White, the court held that a
statute prohibiting the recovery of noneconomic damages from governmental entities 5 violated the equal protection clause of the Montana
Constitution. 6 The plaintiff, Karla White, was attacked by an inmate
who had escaped from the state mental hospital five years earlier. White
alleged that the state negligently and recklessly allowed the inmate to
escape, and then made insufficient attempts to find him. As a result of
the attack, White contended that she received severe emotional injuries.
Because demonstrable economic losses were nominal, White filed the
action seeking noneconomic and punitive damages. The defendant, the
State of Montana, answered, contending that the government was statutorily immune from liability for both noneconomic and punitive damages. The trial court granted White's motion for summary judgment on
grounds that the pertinent parts of the State Tort Claims Act were
7
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Montana engaged equal protection analysis
in reviewing separately the statutory limitations on noneconomic and
punitive recovery. The court recognized that where fundamental rights
are implicated, the statute must be strictly scrutinized and a compelling
state interest must be shown in order to justify a discriminatory
scheme. 8 With respect to noneconomic damages, the court found a fundamental right in article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution,
which guarantees that all persons shall have a "speedy remedy... for
every injury of person, property, or character." 9 The majority in White
4. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
5. MONT.CODE ANN. § 2-9-104 (1977) (repealed 1983) provided:
(1) Neither the state, a county, municipality, taxing district, nor any other political subdivision of the state is liable in tort action for:
(a) noneconomic damages; or
(b) economic damages suffered as a result of an act or omission of an officer,
agent, or employee of that entity in excess of $300,000 for each claimant and $1
million dollars [sic] for each occurrence.
(2) The legislature or the governing body of a county, municipality, taxing district, or other political subdivision of the state may, in its sole discretion, authorize payments for noneconomic damages or economic damages in excess of the
sum authorized in subsection (1)(b) of this section, or both, upon petition of
plaintiff following a final judgment. No insurer is liable for such noneconomic
damages or excess economic damages unless such insurer specifically agrees by
written endorsement to provide coverage to the governmental agency involved in
amounts in excess of the limitation stated in this section or specifically agrees to
provide coverage for noneconomic damages, in which case the insurer may not
claim the benefits of the limitation specifically waived.
6. See infra text accompanying note 9.
7. White, at 363, 661 P.2d at 1273.
8. Id. at 368-70, 661 P.2d at 1274-75.
9. MONT.CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972) (originally MONT.CONST. art. III, § 6 (1889)).
Thirty-four states with "right-to-redress" clauses include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
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stated: "The language 'every injury' embraces all recognized compensable components of injury, including the right to be compensated for
physical pain and mental anguish and the loss of enjoyment of living." 10
The court concluded that when dealing with a fundamental right, in the
absence of a compelling state interest, strict scrutiny applies to make the
statute unconstitutional. I
Affirming the trial court with respect to noneconomic recovery, the
court addressed the State's compelling state interest argument. The
State contended that ensuring the availability of public funds to enable
state government to provide essential services was a sufficiently compelling state interest.1 2 In rejecting the State's argument, the court
concluded:
The government has a valid interest in protecting its treasury. However, payment of tort judgments is simply a cost of
doing business. There is no evidence in the record that the
payment of such claims would impair the State's ability to function as a governmental entity or create a financial crisis. In fact,
the State of Montana does have an interest in affording fair and
reasonable compensation to citizens victimized by the negligence of the State. Therefore, the strict scrutiny test mandated
by the implication of a fundamental right has not been satisfied
and the statute prohibiting recovery for noneconomic damage
3
is unconstitutional under the Montana State Constitution.'
Two weeks after White was handed down, the Montana legislature
went back to work. New legislation was passed, placing a $300,000
across-the-board limitation on all tort damages recovered against governmental entities. 14 This legislation was also challenged.
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. Note, The Right ofAccess to Civil Courts under State ConstitutionalLaw: An Impediment
to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Important Substantive and Procedural Rights?, 13 RUTGERS
L.J. 399, 399 (1982). A recent article calculates the number to be 36. See Marcotte, Federalism and the Rise of State Courts, 73 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (1987).
10. White, at 369, 661 P.2d at 1275 (affirming Corrigan v. Janney, 626 P.2d 838 (Mont.
1981)).
11. White, at 368, 661 P.2d at 1275.
12. Id. at 367, 661 P.2d at 1275.
13. Id. As to punitive damages, however, the court denied recovery under a "rational
basis" analysis stating: "[the] problem with assessing punitive damages against the government is that the deterrent effect is extremely remote and innocent taxpayers are, in
fact, the ones punished. Those taxpayers have little or no control over the actions of the
guilty tortfeasor." Id. at 369, 661 P.2d at 1276.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-107 (1985) (repealed 1986) provided:
Limitation on governmental liabilityfor damages in tort.
(1) Neither the state, a county, municipality, taxing district, nor any other political subdivision of the state is liable in tort action for damages suffered as a result
of an act or omission of an officer, agent, or employee of that entity in excess of
$300,000 for each claimant and $1 million for each occurrence.
(2) No insurer is liable for excess damages unless such insurer specifically agrees
by written endorsement to provide coverage to the governmental agency involved in amounts in excess of a limitation stated in this section, in which case the
insurer may not claim the benefits of the limitation specifically waived.
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An Equal Protection Challenge to the Statutory Limitation on
All Tort Damages

In Pfost v. State, 15 the $300,000 limitation on tort damages was attacked as a denial of equal protection. Pfost suffered catastrophic injuries and was rendered quadriplegic when his tractor-trailer slid on an icy
bridge, crashed through a guardrail and plunged over the edge. Pfost
alleged that the state and county had been negligent because they failed
to maintain the road, despite three recent accidents in the same location.
Pfost sought compensatory damages of $6.0 million. 16 The flat
$300,000 limitation on government liability barred Pfost from full reparation, although unlike the limitation reviewed in White, 17 no particular
type of damage was singled out for limitation.
In his constitutional challenge, Pfost relied on language from the
same clause which had protected Karla White three years earlier.' 8 In
addition to the requirement that a speedy remedy be afforded for every
injury, the Montana Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury
incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer
who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage
under Workman's Compensation Laws of this state ....19
The guarantee of full legal redress, however, appears in a sentence
relating to "employment" injuries. 20 The majority in Pfost sought to determine whether full legal redress was limited to that narrow context or
whether it was a fundamental right for equal protection purposes implied in the guarantee of a "speedy remedy" for "every injury." The
court focused on the first few words of the clause in question: "No person shall be deprived of this full and legal redress ....,,21 The word
"this" appeared to require an antecedent; the phrase "full legal redress"
seemed to refer to the preceding sentence and to assist in defining
"speedy remedy." Construing the two sentences together, the majority
held that the constitutional framers intended for "remedy" to include
"full legal redress." 22 Thus, the court determined that a fundamental
right to full legal redress was created. Continuing its equal protection
analysis, the court ruled that the state encroached upon this fundamental right in a discriminatory way by denying full compensation to catastrophically-injured

plaintiffs whose damages exceeded $300,000.23

Accordingly, the court noted that demonstration of a compelling state
15. 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985).
16. Id. at 496. Pfost also sought a declaratory judgment that the $300,000 tort damage limitation was unconstitutional. Id. at 497.
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19. Pfost, 713 P.2d at 503 (quoting MoNT.CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972) (originally MoNT.
CONST. art. III, § 6 (1889))).
20. See supra text accompanying note 19.
21. See supra text accompanying note 9.
22. Pfost, 713 P.2d at 503.
23. Pfost, 713 P.2d at 500 ("It discriminates in that any person who sustains damages
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interest was necessary in order to sustain the constitutional validity of
the statute. 24 Finding no such interest, the court ruled the statute
25
invalid.
3.

Nondiscriminatory Abolition of Tort Remedies

In White and Pfost, the Montana Supreme Court struck down statutes
which violated state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The
court did not, however, address the question of whether article II, § 16
would constitutionally invalidate a legislative attempt to abolish tort
remedies in a nondiscriminatory fashion. The majority opinions simply
held that certain statutes discriminated against particular classes of
claimants, that the discriminatory schemes affected fundamental constitutional rights to a "speedy remedy" for "every injury" and "full legal
redress," and that absent a compelling state interest, the statutes vio26
lated state equal protection guarantees.
Although no ruling has directly required a showing of compelling
state interest to justify nondiscriminatory tort reform legislation, 27 an
initiative movement, apparently based on the assumption that such legislation would not be upheld, formed in the wake of Pfost. 2 8 Constitu-

tional Initiative 30 proposed to eliminate "this full" from the "full legal
redress" clause and to provide that no language of article II, section 16
could be used in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation affecting
rights and remedies. 2 9 The initiative passed on November 4, 1986, but
of less than $300,000 in value will be fully redressed if the tortfeasor is the State, but any
person with catastrophic damages in excess of $300,000 will not have full redress.").
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. White v. State, 203 Mont. at 365, 661 P.2d at 1275 (1983); Pfost, 713 P.2d at 50506.
27. Historically, the Montana Supreme Court has afforded the "right to remedy"
clause minimal significance, construing it to mean only that courts must administer the
law, as provided for by the legislature. See Initiative30, supra note 1,at 57-58. In 1981, the
court abandoned the minimal significance interpretation and required that an adequate
substitute be provided if pre-existing rights or remedies were abolished. See Corrigan v.
Janney, 626 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1981). The decisions in White and Pfost went further and
included the implication of fundamental rights with the result that Montana's partial sovereign immunity statute was found invalid. See Initiative 30, supra note 1,at 79.
Montana courts have not subjected nondiscriminatory tort reform legislation to the
compelling state interest test. See Kelleher v. Big Sky of Montana, 642 F.Supp. 1128 (D.
Mont. 1986). In Kelleher, the court reviewed a constitutional challenge to a state statute
protecting ski areas from liability for injuries sustained by skiers. Id. at 1129. The court
distinguished White and Pfost by noting that these cases involved a discriminatory limitation
on the amount of recovery, as opposed to an elimination of liability altogether. Id. at
1130. The federal court used this distinction to justify the application of the rational basis
test, and upheld the statute by finding that a legitimate governmental objective was served
by promoting the ski industry in Montana. Id. at 1130-31.
28. In the spring of 1986, a special session of the Montana legislature was called,
during which several bills limiting governmental liability were considered and defeated.
See Initiative 30, supra note 1, at 80. A resolution was passed setting up a special joint
interim committee to study and to prepare legislation to address insurance problems, tort
reform and constitutional amendments, as well as general questions involving public and
private liability. Before the study was completed, interested private parties developed Initiative 30.
29. Initiative 30 was intended to modify MONT.CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972) (originally
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procedural defects in the adoption of the measure led opponents to
challenge it soon after its passage. 3 0 In State, ex. rel., Montana Citizens v.
Waltermire,3 1 opponents of Initiative 30 argued that the defects were so
egregious that the initiative should have no effect. Specifically, the
Voter Information Pamphlet, which was the sole published source of information concerning the Initiative, 3 2 showed "this full" to be underlined, indicating inclusion, rather than crossed out, indicating exclusion.
In effect, the voters ratified language diametrically opposed to the intent
of the framers of the initiative. The Montana Supreme Court agreed that
other procedural
the error was sufficiently material, considered 3with
3
problems, to justify nullification of the initiative.
The effect of Initiative 30 would have been to eliminate an array of
fundamental rights necessary to the strict scrutiny analyses employed in
White and Pfost. Because the initiative was defective and held invalid,
White and Pfost will continue to ensure that tort victims are protected
against legislative efforts to curtail fundamental rights, absent a showing
of compelling state interest.
B.

Arizona

The Supreme Court of Arizona has exercised the same strict scrutiny in reviewing a three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. In Kenyon v. Hammer,34 the mother of a stillborn child
brought an action for bodily injury and wrongful death allegedly resulting from a nurse's incorrect recording of the mother's Rh factor during
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1889)) as follows (new portions are italicized, deleted portions

are lined through):
Section 16. The administration ofjustice. (1) Courts ofjustice shall be open
to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property,
or character. Right andjustice shall be administeredwithout sale, denial, or delay.
(2) No person shall be deprived of this-full legal redress for injury incurred
in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer
provided coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this state. Right
(3) This section shall not be construedas a limitation upon the authority of the legislature
to enact statutes establishing, limiting, modifying, or abolishing remedies, claims for relief,
damages, or allocations of responsibilityfor damages in any civil proceeding; except that any
express dollar limits on compensatory damagesfor actual economic lossfor bodily injury must
be approved by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.
State, ex. rel., Montana Citizens v. Waltermire, 738 P.2d 1255, at 1257 (Mont. 1987).
30. Constitutional Initiative 30 was first challenged prior to the November election.
See Montana Citizens at 1255-56 (declining to exercise pre-election jurisdiction over the initiative). A lengthy, three-judge dissent was filed by justice Sheehy, author of the majority
opinion in the post-election hearing in which the initiative was nullified. Id. at 1268-72
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
31. 738 P.2d 1255 (Mont. 1987).
32. Id. at 1257-58. The adoption of Initiative 30 was further flawed by the failure of
the Secretary of State to publish the proposed amendment in accordance with art. 14, § 9
of the Montana Constitution. Only the Attorney General's summary was published, and
that was found incomplete. Id. at 1258-64.
33. Id. at 1264.
34. 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984).
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pregnancy. 3 5 While statutes of limitation in Arizona tort actions typically run from the date an action "accrues," or the point at which injuries become manifest, 36 the Arizona medical malpractice statute ran
37
from the date of injury, regardless of whether such injury was known.
The mother, whose claim for bodily injury would have been barred,
argued the statute discriminated against the class of tort claimants who
are victims of medical malpractice. 3 8 Victims of professional negligence
other than medical malpractice and victims of other torts generally, received more favorable treatment under Arizona's "discovery rule."' 39
After a brief survey of the traditional, three-tier approach to equal protection review, the Arizona Supreme Court looked to the state constitution for guidance regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny. 40 In
article 18, section 6, the Arizona Constitution provides: "The right of
action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the
4
amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." '
The court held that this clause created a fundamental right to bring
and pursue a medical malpractice action and that strict scrutiny should
therefore attach. 42 The statute, however, failed to withstand the scrutiny. In the final analysis, the court struck down the three-year statute of
limitation, and concluded that the State of Arizona "has neither a compelling nor legitimate interest in providing economic relief to one segment of society by depriving those who have been wronged of access to,
'43
and remedy by, the judicial system."
In Kenyon, the Arizona Supreme Court specifically noted that its decision was based "entirely on state constitutional grounds." ' 4 4 The remark is significant because the unique language of a state constitution
may provide a particularly suitable framework for equal protection review. Indeed, when state constitutional language is as clear and
mandatory as that in the Arizona Constitution, it affords a solid basis for
heightened scrutiny.
35. Id. at 963-64. As a result of this error, the plaintiff lost her baby and was required
to have a tubal ligation.
36. Id. at 968 n.6. This method of commencing the statute of limitations is known as
the "discovery rule." For numerous examples of the discovery rule's application in Arizona tort law, see id.
37. Id. at 967.
38. Id. at 968.
39. Id. at 968-69.
40.

Id. at 970-71; see e.g., Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier,

and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 525 (1980) (describing the three tiers applicable
to equal protection analysis).
41. ARIZ. CoNsT., art.18, § 6.
42. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 973 (in analyzing precedent from other states that recognize a
fundamental right in a similar context, the court cited the Montana Supreme Court's decision in White. Id.) See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.

43. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 976.
44. Id. at 963.
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OTHER STATES; OTHER TESTS

Louisiana

During the past few years, several other state courts have wrestled
with the equal protection aspects of "tort reform" legislation. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana confronted an equal protection challenge
to a statute limiting liability in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors.4 5 In Sibley, the
statute in question limited medical-malpractice judgments against state
affiliated health care providers to $500,000, exclusive of future medical
care. 4 6 Nineteen-year-old Jane Sibley was transferred to the psychiatric
ward of Louisiana State University's Medical Center, from a private hospital where she was being treated for depression. An inexperienced
team of health care providers at LSU changed her diagnosis from depression to psychosis and administered antipsychotic drugs. After
weeks of such treatment, Sibley developed an adverse reaction, culminating in cardio-pulmonary arrest and massive brain damage. As a result, she was consigned to a lifetime of institutional care and her
47
damages were recognized to be far in excess of the $500,000 mark.
Sibley's case was first heard by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
1985.48 In that hearing, Sibley raised the equal protection argument
and urged the application of strict scrutiny.4 9 The court ruled that such
strict scrutiny could be applied only to statutes which disadvantaged a
suspect class or infringed upon a fundamental right. 50 Because no pertinent fundamental right was specifically mentioned in the Louisiana
Constitution, the court applied the rational basis test and upheld the
51
challenged limitation.
On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court lamented the great
52
vacuum left between "compelling state interest" and "rational basis."1

45. 477 So.2d 1094 (La. 1985) ("Sibley H"), modifying Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,
462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985) ("Sibley I").
46.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39B (West 1987).

47. Sibley H1, 477 So.2d at 1098. In fact, Sibley's damages at the time of trial had
already surpassed $420,000. Id. In addition, she required, on a continuing basis: hospital
care; around-the-clock attendant care; physical, occupational, and speech therapy; psychological services; medical and rehabilitative coordinators; administrative services; and medical consultations. Experts estimated the annual cost of Sibley's treatment to be
approximately $222,000; over her lifetime, discounted to present value, her total medical
requirements were estimated at more than $9.0 million. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,
490 So.2d 307, 309-10 (La. App. 1986) ("Sibley III").
48. Sibley 1, 462 So.2d 149, reh'g granted, Sibley H, 477 So.2d 1094.
49. Sibley 1, 462 So.2d at 154.
50. Id. at 155. The court included a recitation of fundamental rights cases: Mayer v.
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to fairness in the criminal process); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right to privacy); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(right to fairness in procedures concerning governmental deprivations of life, liberty or
property); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote and participate in the electoral process); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of expression and association).
51. Sibley 1, 462 So.2d at 155-58.
52. Sibley II, 477 So.2d at 1105-07. Reviewing the historical underpinnings of accepted judicial review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
An important feature of the United States Supreme Court's current equal protec-
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Likewise, the court was unimpressed with the more recently developed
"intermediate" or "middle-level" scrutiny. 53 The court sided with those
critics who argue that the multi-tiered review has outlived its usefulness. 54 In particular, the majority said: "[The] rigidity [of the threelevel system] forces courts to begin the decision-making process by pigeon-holing a case in a particular category. Once assigned a category, the
the same type of treatment as all other
case theoretically must receive
55
cases of the same level."
The Louisiana court favored a more flexible approach based on a
balance between constitutionally protected rights and government interests. The "Declaration of Right to Individual Dignity," contained in the
Louisiana Constitution, delineates the rights deserving protection:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No
law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are
56
prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
The majority expressed its belief that there was no basis for discrimination "of any sort" on racial or religious grounds, but that discrimination with respect to the other rights may be permissible if not arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. 5 7 In an analysis similar to that employed by
the Montana Supreme Court in Pfost, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that victims whose damages exceed statutory limitations on liability constituted a class discriminated against on the basis of "physical
58
condition."
The court then referred to the record of proceedings of the 1974
tion analysis is an elaborate system ofjudicial review composed of three levels of
scrutiny, commonly referred to as strict, intermediate, and minimal scrutiny. This
system arose out of the constitutional crisis caused by the Court's clash with the
Roosevelt administration and its New Deal legislation. After the collision, the
Court's prestige plummeted, and the Court renounced much of its power by
adopting a posture of extreme deference to the other branches of government.
Governmental actions were presumed to be constitutional, forcing a challenging
party to prove the challenged action to be completely unrelated to any legitimate
governmental objective. However, to provide adequate protection for express
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, to protect implicit fundamental
rights, such as the right of privacy, or to protect against governmental action
based on an invidious suspect classification, such as race or ethnic origin, the
Court has retained a more exacting mode of judicial review that requires strict
scrutiny of such governmental conduct. Under strict scrutiny, government action
is not presumed to be constitutional, and will not be upheld by the Court unless
shown to be necessarily related to a compelling state interest.
Id. at 1105 (citingJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
524-25 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1000-02 (1978)).

53.
54.
provide
55.

Sibley II, 477 So.2d at 1105.
Id. at 1106-07. "The federal three-level system is in disarray and has failed to
a theoretically sound framework for constitutional adjudication." Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1106.

56. Id. at 1107 (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, § 3).

57. Sibley II, 477 So.2d at 1107, nn. 20 & 21.
58. Id. at 1108.
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Louisiana Constitutional Convention to find a new equal protection
standard for liability limitation legislation. 5 9 Using reasoning gleaned
from the committee which developed the "physical condition" clause,
the court concluded: "[t]he proposed article would require judicial examination when any such classification was challenged and would assign
to the State the burden of showing that the classification reasonably furthers a legitimate purpose." 60 Adopting this language as the new test for
constitutional validity of tort limitation statutes, the Louisiana Supreme
61
Court remanded the case for consistent proceedings.
B.

New Hampshire

A similar level of scrutiny was applied by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Carson v. Maurer.6 2 In Carson, the New Hampshire
court considered an equal protection challenge to the state's comprehensive medical injury statute. 6 3 The plaintiffs argued that the statute
improperly singled out victims of medical negligence (as distinguished
from other tort victims) because it restricted the means by which such
victims could sue and the damages they could recover for their injuries. 64 The court acknowledged that the statute created a discriminatory
65
classification.
In its equal protection analysis, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
moved directly to the "fair and substantial relation" test which it typically applied when reviewing economic and social legislation. 66 The
court described the test as one which asks "whether the challenged
classifications are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation." ' 67 Applying this intermediate standard, the
59. Id. at 1109.
60. Id. at 1108.
61. On remand, the court of appeals awarded damages in the amount of $2.0 million,
but found no direct liability on the part of the hospital board. Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the district court to determine the constitutionality of the $500,000 damages
limitation as it applied to the state hospital which the board governed. Sibley II1, 490 So.2d
307, 317. No determination was made, however, as certiorari was denied. Sibley v. Board
of Supervisors, 496 So.2d 325 (La. 1986).
The Louisiana judiciary has further refined its equal protection analysis with respect
to tort limitation statutes. See Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305 (La. 1986). In Crier, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a law which classifies individuals on a basis outside the
scope of the Declaration of Right to Individual Dignity, supra text accompanying note 54,
will be upheld unless a member of the disadvantaged class "shows that it does not suitably
further any appropriate state interest." Id. at 310. The statute upheld in Crier was a threeyear statute of limitations on medical-malpractice claims. See also Parker v. Cappel, 500
So.2d 771 (La. 1987) (applying an "appropriate state interest" test to uphold a statute
excluding sheriff's deputies from state workers' compensation coverage); Stuart v. City of
Morgan City, 504 So.2d 934 (La. App. 1987) (upholding a "recreational use" statute which
insulated public and private landowners from liability for injuries resulting from authorized, non-commercial use as reasonably furthering a legitimate state purpose).
62. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
63. N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C (1977 & Supp. 1979).
64. Carson, at 930, 424 A.2d at 830.
65. Id. at 931, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
66. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831 (citing Opinion of theJustices, 113 N.H. 205, 213, 304
A.2d 881, 887 (1973); State v. Moore, 91 N.H. 16, 21-22, 13 A.2d 143, 147-48 (1940)).
67. Carson, at 931, 424 A.2d 831.
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court ruled several provisions in the malpractice statute invalid. Rules
concerning background of medical experts and notice of intent to sue
were found not to substantially further the objectives of the statute. 6 8
Provisions which made the "discovery rule" unavailable, 6 9 imposed a
two-year statute of limitations with no tolling period for incompetents
and minors, 70 abolished the collateral source rule, and capped
noneconomic damages at $250,000,71 were found to be unreasonable
when the harm to the plaintiff was balanced against the public utility of
each provision.
The "fair and substantial relation" test applied by the New Hampshire Supreme Court was derived expressly from the court's interpretation of the New Hampshire Constitution, independent of middle-tier
analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court. 7 2 The New
Hampshire court's specific notation of this fact is evidence of the court's
faith in the independent state grounds relied upon for its decision.
III.

THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF
TORT VICTIMS

The foregoing cases underscore the relationship between state constitutional language and the degree of scrutiny exercised by appellate
courts when considering a discriminatory statute. That relationship
places constitutional analysis of "tort reform" legislation at the cutting
edge of the growing movement toward "independent state grounds."
The spirit of that movement was captured by the South Dakota Supreme
Court in its opinion in Daugaardv. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Association.73 In this case, rather than employing an equal protection analysis,
the South Dakota court applied the state constitution's "court access"
clause directly, to strike down a statute eliminating actions based on
negligent design of improvements to real property. 74 While equal protection was not the focus of the decision, the majority opinion eloquently stated the role of independent state courts in reviewing tort
limitations:
68. Id. at 934, 935, 424 A.2d at 832, 834.
69. Id. at 936, 424 A.2d at 833.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836-37.
72. Id. at 931, 424 A.2d at 831. See N. H. CONST. Pt. 1 arts. I & 12 which provide:
Article 1. [Equality of Men; Origin and Object of Government.] All men are born
equally free and independent: Therefore, all government, of right, originates
from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.
Article 12. [Protection and Taxation Reciprocal.] Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and
property; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such
protection, and to yield his personal service when necessary. But no part of a
man's property shall be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his
own consent, or that of the representative body of the people. Nor are the inhabitants of this state controllable by any other laws than those to which they, or
their representative body, have given their consent.
73. 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984).
74. Id. at 424-25.
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Our constitution... is [the] solid core upon which all our state
laws must be premised. Clearly and unequivocally, our constitution directs that the courts of this state shall be open to the
injured and oppressed. We are unable to view this constitutional mandate as a faint echo to be skirted or ignored. Our
constitution is free to provide greater protections for our citi75
zens than are required under the federal constitution.
Our
76
listen.
constitution has spoken, and it is our duty to
In those states where fundamental rights of tort victims are watered
down by constitutional amendments, 77 and in those states lacking clear
constitutional protections for such rights, courts may have to look further to find constitutional language which supports a level of scrutiny
above the rational basis test. Rights not specifically afforded by redress
or access provisions in state constitutions may receive heightened scrutiny under other constitutional provisions. For example, the Montana
State Constitution, article II, section 3, provides:
Inalienable rights. All persons are born free and have certain
inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety,
health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these
78
rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.
In Montana, citizens have a right to seek safety and health. The prophylactic effect of tort law furthers those objectives. In article II, section 4,
the Montana Constitution further provides:
Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise
of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, cul79
ture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.
Legislation which severely circumscribes the rights of handicapped
persons, including the catastrophically injured, may discriminate on the
basis of "social condition." Further, an argument can be made that forcing the seriously injured to become wards of the state through receiving
welfare - as opposed to an insurance settlement - violates the dignity
of the human being.
In most states, strict scrutiny will likely remain reserved for protec75. Id. at 425 (citing State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976)).
76. Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d at 425.
77. Overruling an unpopular judicial decision through the use of amendments to a
constitution is entirely possible. Most states already have procedures by which their constitutions may be amended. As these procedures are usually easily accomplished, state
constitutions are amended "at a furious rate." See Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1354 (1982); see also Williams, In the
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35

S.C.L. REV. 353, 382-83 (1984).
78. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1972) (originally MONT. CoNsT. art. III, § 3 (1889)).
79. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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tion of fundamental constitutional rights clearly and specifically affected
by a discriminatory statute. In such cases, equal protection represents a
great shield for the rights of tort claimants. Rational basis analysis, on
the other hand, can provide little protection for such rights. Scrutiny
which falls between these extremes may take any number of forms, depending on the language of the particular state's constitution. State
courts facing challenges to "tort reform" statutes should be encouraged
to arrive at some intermediate standard of review. By raising scrutiny
above the rational basis test, an appropriate balance may be struck between the rights of the claimant and the government interest to be
served in limiting tort liability.
CONCLUSION

As tort reform legislation proliferates and initiatives seek to weaken
state constitutional guarantees, courts will be flooded with litigants suggesting new constitutional approaches. Increasingly, courts will face the
challenge of defining an appropriately assertive judicial role that does
not excessively encroach upon the legislative prerogative. This challenge represents a unique opportunity for those who serve on appellate
courts and for those who aspire to be appellate judges. Excessive judicial activism can result in a clearjudicial supremacy not contemplated by
constitutional framers. Yet, without a strong judiciary, the republic itself stands exposed. Appellate courts should not succumb to legislative
overreaching no matter how vehement the public sentiment. Such submission will unduly compromise the judicial role and thereby threaten
those citizens whose rights the judiciary was designed to protect.

LEAKE V. CAIN." ABOLITION OF THE PUBLIC DUTY RULE AND
THE STATUS OF

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN
COLORADO

INTRODUCTION

As a result of concerns about excessive jury awards, the unavailability of liability insurance, and perceived increased litigiousness in Amencan society, a national debate has emerged regarding the restructuring
of tort liability.' Although this debate is in various stages in numerous
jurisdictions, issues of tort reform are already being addressed by state
courts and legislatures. Colorado is actively involved in trying to resolve
this debate and exemplifies the developing tort reform movement.

For example, Colorado has recently addressed the issue of tort reform in the area of governmental immunity. 2 In response to the "insurance crisis" and judicial decisions that have increased the government's

exposure to liability, the Colorado legislature amended the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act of 1972. 3 This recent legislation has enhanced the protection of government entities by broadening the scope

of sovereign immunity, 4 and expressly protecting public officials by codifying official immunity. 5

Additionally, the common law public duty

1. See generally the preceding articles in this Symposium supra pp. 613-732.
2. The doctrine of governmental immunity, as discussed in section II, involves other
more narrowly-defined doctrines which are often confused with one another and used interchangeably with "governmental immunity." These other doctrines, having both common law and statutory forms, are "sovereign immunity" (protects government entities
from tort liability, see, e.g., Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333
F.Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971)), and "official immunity" (protects government officials from
tort liability, see, e.g., Watson v. Barker, 428 F.Supp. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1977)). Distinguishable
from these two doctrines are the "public duty rule" (protects both government officials
and entities from tort liability if, when acting, the official or entity owed a general duty to
the public rather than a special duty to the injured party, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 131 (5th ed. 1984)), and the "discretionary-nondiscretionary" test (protects both government officials and entities from liability if acting in a discretionary capacity), both of
which are employed in determining if liability exists under either an official or sovereign
immunity analysis.
The confusion of these interrelated but separate doctrines, and the general approach
to them with the broad brush of "governmental immunity," has blurred the entire area of
governmental immunity. One of the objectives of the author is to more clearly define the
various aspects of governmental immunity, thereby helping to refine courts' and practitioners' analysis of governmental immunity or liability in Colorado.
3. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1986),
amended COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982) (effective July 1, 1982) which
amended the original version of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 130-11-1 et. seq. (1972) (effective July 1, 1972) [hereinafter "Immunity Act"].
4. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, one form of governmental immunity, is limited in its definition to the protection of government entities from liability. For further
discussion on this doctrine, see infra note 13.
5. The doctrine of official immunity, another distinct form of governmental immunity, is the protection of government officials from liability. For further discussion of this
doctrine, see infra note 14.
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test were maintained under
rule 6 and the discretionary-nondiscretionary
7
the Immunity Act.
At the same time that this legislation was enacted, the Colorado
Supreme Court charted a different course in the area of governmental
immunity. In Leake v. Cain,8 the court abolished the public duty rule, 9
thereby eliminating one form of governmental immunity. This decision
is the most recent in a line of opinions which serves to limit the scope of
governmental immunity. Leake is of particular interest since the legislature sought to broaden statutory immunity at the same time that the
court acted to abolish one facet of governmental immunity. These opposing legislative and judicial approaches to governmental immunity
give rise to some uncertainty as to the future effectiveness of governmental immunity under the newly-revised Immunity Act.
This article first will review governmental immunity and its various
forms prior to the Leake decision, including an examination of the historical struggle between the courts and the legislature regarding the proper
scope of governmental immunity. Next, the recent tort reform legislation relating to sovereign and official immunity will be examined. Finally, the significance of the Leake decision, in the context of the recent
statutory tort reform, will be discussed. The primary objectives in this
analysis are to provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the
law of governmental immunity and its development in Colorado, and to
suggest that the protections afforded by the Immunity Act should be
controlling in the future.' 0
6. The public duty rule is a form of governmental immunity that is designed to protect acting government officials and entities which owe a general duty to the public. If, on
the other hand, it is found that a special duty was owed to an injured party by the acting
official or entity, then the public duty rule offers no protection and liability attaches under
either an official or sovereign immunity analysis. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (Supp. 1986) (common law immunity expressly incorporated). However, these two doctrines only existed in the context ofofficial
immunity under the Immunity Act. Since sovereign immunity at common law had been
abolished by the supreme court prior to the enactment of the Immunity Act, see infra notes
18-20, the incorporation clause in the Immunity Act could not include the common law
forms of sovereign immunity. See infra note 46.
8. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.,
10. It is the author's position that the Immunity Act, as it now exists under COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986), is a well-written statute that strikes an
appropriate balance between the legislative prerogative of protecting the government and
its various representatives from liability when performing government acts, and the desirability of allowing an individual to recover for injury caused in certain situations. These
situations allow for recovery in a large number of areas, including where the government
entity or official performs in a willful or wanton manner. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106
(1982 & Supp. 1986). Specific situations in which governmental immunity does not apply
include: operation of a motor vehicle, operation of a public hospital or correction facility,
a dangerous road condition interfering with the movement of traffic, and a dangerous
condition of any public building or facility, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical,
power or swimming facility. See also COLO. REV. STAT § 24-10-118(l)(c) (Supp. 1986) (liability attaches for willful and wanton conduct). More importantly, the legislature has expressly stated the necessity for immunity from tort actions because of the ultimate fiscal
burden the taxpayers would otherwise be required to bear if there were unlimited liability.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986). For a declaration of the public policies
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I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Past Judicial Challenges to Governmental Immunity

The doctrine of governmental immunity, first adopted by American
jurists in the early national period,' I insulates governmental officials
and entities from liability.1 2 The protection of governmental immunity
has traditionally included both sovereign immunity' 3 and official immunity. 14 The governmental immunity doctrine was incorporated into the
common law of Colorado in 189315 and enjoyed judicial favor until
1971.16 In that year, the Colorado Supreme Court initiated an assault
upon the doctrine that continued up to and through the Leake decision.
1. Common Law Sovereign Immunity's Demise and Qualified
Statutory Reinstatement - Origins of the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act
Colorado's judicial assault upon governmental immunity was leveled specifically upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. At common
law, sovereign immunity protected government entities from tort liability. 1 7 In three cases heard during 1971, the Colorado Supreme Court
abolished sovereign immunity at the county,' 8 school district' 9 and
underlying the codification of governmental immunity, see infra note 27. This public policy, articulated by the legislature and reaffirmed in the recent tort reform, is clear legislative intent which must be given full recognition by the courts.
11. Osborn v. Bank of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The early
national period, 1789-1826, was characterized by a dynamic legal system that served to
solidify American society in such a way that separated it from its revolutionary beginnings.
See S. PRESSER &J.

ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY chs. 2,3. (1980).

Adoption of

the doctrine of governmental immunity in 1824 is a good example of this stabilization
movement.
12. See generally, Comment, An Analysis of South Dakota's Sovereign Immunity Law: Governmental v. Official Immunity, 28 S.D.L. REV. 317 (1983); see also Borchard, Governmental Liability
in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
13. The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the assertion of a cause of action
against a governmental entity unless the sovereign consents or waives immunity. Principe
Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971). Colorado courts have generally referred to this doctrine as "governmental" immunity. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Abeyta v. City of
Denver, 165 Colo. 58, 437 P.2d 67 (1968); see also COLO. REV. STAT § 24-10-103(5) (1982)
(definition of a public entity). For a comprehensive examination of sovereign immunity,
see Note, Chasse v. Banas: The Eroding Doctrineof Sovereign Immunity, 21 N.H.B.J. 324 (1980);
see also Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the South Dakota Plaintiff: A PracticalApproach, 26
S.D.L. REV. 300 (1981).
14. Under the doctrine of official immunity, governmental officials who act within the
scope of their authority, and who have taken an action requiring discretion, are insulated
from civil liability. Watson v. Barker, 428 F. Supp. 590, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(4) (Supp. 1986) which defines a public employee.
15. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893) (immunity at
the county level); see also In re Senate Bill No. 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 P. 1088 (1895) (immunity
at the state level).
16. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text for decisions in which the court abrogated sovereign immunity.
17. See supra notes 2 and 12.
18. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
19. Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 174 Colo. 110, 482 P.2d 966 (1971).
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state 20 levels. In doing this, the Colorado courts adopted the position
taken by a growing number of states 2 ' and commentators, 2 2 severely
criticizing sovereign immunity as an inequitable doctrine that had never
23
been a legitimate part of common law.
The Colorado legislature responded to this judicial assault 2 4 by
codifying sovereign immunity in the Immunity Act. 2 5 In rejecting the
analysis underlying the supreme court's decisions - that sovereign immunity had no rational foundation at its inception 26 - the legislature
justified sovereign immunity on the basis that it protected against excessive governmental liability and that it fettered the execution of the governing process. 2 7 This codification of sovereign immunity was,
20. Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971).
21. Numerous jurisdictions rejected sovereign immunity prior to the decision in Evans. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish
v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 Idaho
795, 473 P.2d 973 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969); Carroll v. Kittle,
203 Kan. 841,457 P.2d 21 (1969); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964);
Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);Johnson v. Municipal Univ. of
Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 82
Nev. 414, 419 P.2d 774 (1966); Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Dev.,
55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d
618 (1962). Each of these states has since reinstated sovereign immunity in some statutory
form.
22. See e.g., Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383 (1970); Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers. Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
23. These commentators contend that sovereign immunity, as expressed in the venerable maxim "the King can do no wrong," was originally intended to mean that the sovereign was not permitted to act wrongfully toward an individual, rather than the meaning
given in American law that the sovereign is not able to act wrongfully. Hall, Sovereign Immunity and Re-emergence of the Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction: A Setback in Idaho's Governmental Liability Law, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 197, at part II (1984); see also 1 F. PoLLOcK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 239 (2d ed.
1898); Borchard, supra note 12, at 4-9.
24. The court in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971), recognized the legislature's ability to statutorily reinstate sovereign immunity and
so made its decision prospective in effect.
25. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986). For an excellent
article examining the Immunity Act as a reaction to the supreme court's decisions abandoning sovereign immunity, see Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A Judicial Challenge and Legislative Response, 43 U. CoLo. L. REV. 449 (1972). For similar articles
examining judicial and legislative attitudes toward governmental immunity in other states,
see Hall, Sovereign Immunity and Re-emergence of the Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction: A Setback in Idaho's Governmental Liability Law, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 197 (1984); Comment, Defining
Governmental Function Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 9J. CONTEMP. L. 193 (1983);
Comment, Governmental Liability-Strict Liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act 3 NEW.
ENG. REV. 609 (1981); Comment, Torts-Governmental Immunity under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act, 11 N.M.L. REV. 475 (1981); Comment, Governmental Liability: A Review ofJudicial Decisions Applying the Kansas Tort Claims Act, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 499 (1985); Comment,
Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability in Michigan: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Doctrine
and Related Statutory andJudicial Exceptions, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1761 (1982).
26. Evans, 174 Colo. at 102, 482 P.2d at 970.
27. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986) provides:

Declaration of Policy. It is recognized by the general assembly that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are

often immune from suit for injury suffered by private persons, is, in some in-
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however, qualified. Sovereign immunity was not reinstated in all circumstances. 28 Although not subject to a direct tort action when a public
employee 29 inflicted injury, public entities3 0 are required by the Immunity Act to indemnify the employee. 3 1 Except in the circumstances provided by statute, public entities once again enjoyed absolute immunity
from direct tort actions.
2.

Subsequent Erosion of Statutory Sovereign Immunity

Judicial challenges to governmental immunity continued despite
sovereign immunity having taken statutory form. Specifically, sovereign
immunity remained vulnerable to judicial construction of the Immunity
stances, an inequitable doctrine. The general assembly also recognizes that the
supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity effective July 1,
1972, and that thereafter the doctrine shall be recognized only to such extent as
may be provided by statute. The general assembly also recognizes that the state
and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions and
that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of such essential public services and functions. The general assembly further
recognizes that the taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability and that limitations on the liability of public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal
burdens. It is also recognized that public employees, whether elected or appointed, should be provided with protection from unlimited liability so that such
public employees are not discouraged from providing the services or functions
required by the citizens or from exercising the powers authorized or required by
law. It is further recognized that the state, its political subdivisions, and the public employees of such public entities, by virtue of the services and functions provided, the powers exercised, and the consequences of unlimited liability to the
governmental process, should be liable for their actions and those of their agents
only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this
article. The general assembly also recognizes the desirability of including within
one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions
which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of
action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and that the distinction for liability purposes between governmental and proprietary functions should be
abolished.
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (l)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1986) provides the specific
instances in which sovereign immunity does not apply. They are as follows: 1) operation
of a motor vehicle; 2) operation of a hospital or correctional facility; 3) operation of a
public water, gas, sanitation, electrical or swimming facility; 4) a dangerous condition of
any road which interferes with the movement of traffic; and 5) a dangerous condition of
any public facility.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 240-10-103 (Supp. 1986) defines a public employee as "an
officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity, whether or not
compensated, elected, or appointed, but does not include an independent contractor or
any person who is sentenced to participate in any type of useful public service."
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(5) (1982) defines a public entity as the "state,
county, city and county, incorporated city or town, school district, special improvement
district, and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of
the state organized pursuant to law."
31. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-110(l)(a), (b)(i)-(II) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (public
entity required to pay defense costs, judgments, and settlements entered against an official
acting within the scope of employment); see also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 29-5-111 (1982) (public entity must indemnify a police officer found negligent when acting within the scope of
employment); Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo.392, 393, 532 P.2d 346, 347
(1975) (Immunity Act makes governmental entities indemnitors of their peace officers who
incur liability while employed).
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Act as exemplified in Stephen v. City and County of Denver3 2 and Wheeler v.
County of Eagle.3 3 In these decisions the Colorado Supreme Court
broadened the meaning of "dangerous road conditions," a statutory exception to sovereign immunity, 34 to include liability for damages that
resulted from negligent maintenance of a stop sign at intersecting
streets,3 5 and for injuries arising from the absence of a sidewalk along a
rural county road. 3 6 Other decisions effectively eroded statutory sovereign immunity by narrowly construing the notice requirement of the Immunity Act, 3 7 creating "assumed" duties3 8 owed by public entities in
addition to those under the Immunity Act, 39 and determining that governmental entities did not vicariously enjoy the common law immunity
40
afforded its officials.
3.

Common Law Official Immunity Remains Subject
to Judicial Challenge

From its inception in 1971 until 1985, 4 1 the Immunity Act did not
32. 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).
33. 666 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1983).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-103(1) to 106(l)(d) (Supp. 1986).
35. Stephen, 659 P.2d at 668.
36. Wheeler, 666 P.2d at 561.
37. In State of Colorado v. Young, 665 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Colo. 1983), the court held
that the 90-day notice requirement period under COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109(1) (1982)
(amended 1986 to require a 180-day notice) did not begin to run until the injured party
had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a claim. See also Nowakowski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709, 711 (Colo. 1983) (notice requirement is an affirmative
defense and not jurisdictional and, therefore, subject to waiver); Ebke v. Julesberg School
Dist., 37 Colo. App. 349, 550 P.2d 355 (1976), aft'd, 193 Colo. 40, 562 P.2d 419 (1977)
(notice not required if action brought under contract rather than tort).
38. Moreland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 725 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1985) (by adopting building code, public entity assumed a duty to enforce it); Gilbert v. City of Arvada,
694 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1984), af'd in part, revd in part,Jefferson County School Dist. v.
Gilbert, 725 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1986) (by providing school crossing guards at one time of day
a public entity is deemed to have assumed a duty to provide crossing guards at other times
of the day); Justus v. Jefferson County School Dist., 683 P.2d 805 (Colo. App. 1984), aff d
in part, rev'd in part, 725 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1986) (public entity, by promulgating school
handbook containing policy on bicycle riding by students, deemed to have assumed a duty
to enforce that policy).
39. For the situations in which sovereign immunity is inapplicable and a duty is statutorily owed by public entities, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(l)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp.
1986).
40. Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. App. 1984) ("[I]f every sovereign entity were to
be automatically immune from suit by virtue of vicarious enjoyment of the doctrine of
official immunity, the abrogation of sovereign immunity by our General Assembly and our
Supreme Court would be rendered meaningless."), revd in part, 724 P.2d 1289 (Colo.
1986) (court held that the public entity in the case was not liable, but on grounds of the
discretionary-nondiscretionary form of immunity; the court did not address the issue of
whether public entities vicariously enjoyed the immunity of their officials). The court also
held that sovereign immunity was waived under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104(1) (1982)
where liability insurance was purchased, irrespective of express immunity under COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (1982) (sovereign immunity not waived where injury incurred
from act by public official immune at common law).
41. For the original version of the Immunity Act, see 1971 CoLo. SEss. LAws 1204-18.
The Fifty-fifth General Assembly codified official immunity in a special session in 1985. See
infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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insulate individual public officials from tort liability. 4 2 In leaving public
officials subject to liability, the legislature also left public entities indirectly vulnerable. 4 3 Nonetheless, the legislature recognized that official
immunity under common law would continue to protect public officials
from individual liability 4 4 despite the fact that the Immunity Act did not
45
codify official immunity.

Official immunity at common law in Colorado, like sovereign immunity, 4 6 was qualified, however, and took one of two forms. 4 7 First, under
the "discretionary-nondiscretionary" form, a public official was immune
from liability when acting in a discretionary capacity 48 within the scope
of employment when his conduct was not willful, malicious or intended
to cause harm. 4 9 Second, official immunity existed under the "public
duty rule."' 50 Under this rule, a distinction was made between special
and general duties whereby an injured individual had no redress against
a public official owing a general duty to the public at large and not a
special duty to the specific injured party. 5 1 Since these two forms of
official immunity were derived from common law, they were subject to
the same persistent judicial challenge experienced by common law sov42. In Kristensen v. Jones, the court properly observed that:
[T]he Immunity Act is a legislative response to this court's abolition of the common law sovereign immunity doctrine, and was intended to define the bounds of
public entity liability in light of our decision. Since the common law doctrine did
not effect an individual employee's liability, it was not necessary that either this
court's abrogation of that doctrine or the General Assembly's enactment of the
Immunity Act deal with that liability, and neither our opinion nor the statute did
SO.

195 Colo. 125, 575 P.2d 854, 856 (1978) (citing Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187
Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975)).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. For recent cases in which qualified immunity did protect such officials, see
Strothman v. Gefreh, 603 F. Supp. 256 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.
1987) (administrative law judges immune in removal of the plaintiff, another administrative law judge, from his position); Alias Smith &Jones, Inc. v. Barnes, 695 P.2d 302 (Colo.
App. 1984) (Commissioner of Insurance immune in renewing interinsurance exchange's
certificate of authority).
45. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2) (1982 and Supp. 1986).
46. For the sake of clarification, it should be noted here that, although the public duty
rule was a doctrine of governmental immunity subsumed under the broader doctrines of
both sovereign and official immunity, after the abolition of common law sovereign immunity, the public duty rule only existed as a part of official immunity. For this reason, the
Leake decision itself was a challenge to common law and statutory official immunity, the
only forms of governmental immunity in which the public duty rule was still viable at the
time of Leake.
47. A third form, known as the "governmental-proprietary distinction," was expressly
abrogated by the legislature. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § section 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986).
48. See Alias Smith &Jones, 695 P.2d at 306 ("Discretionary acts are those which are of
ajudgmerntal, planning or policy nature; nondiscretionary acts are those that involve performance of a mandatory duty at the operational level.")
49. Compare Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (manager of city hospital exercised discretion when firing physician) with Winters v. City of
Commerce City, 648 P.2d 175 (Colo. App. 1982) (city not acting in discretionary capacity
in denying building permit).
50. The public duty rule is fully examined in the textual discussion at Section I,B.
51. See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984); Note, Municipal Tort
Liability and the Public Duty Rule. A Matter of Statutory Analysis, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 391
(1980).
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ereign immunity. This challenge was punctuated by the Leake court's
decision abolishing one form of the official immunity doctrine-the public duty rule.
B.

The Public Duty Rule - Focus of the Leake Challenge to Immunity

The public duty rule had its inception at common law in 1855,52
and has thereafter been used to determine the liability of both public
entities and officials. 5 3 The majority of courts 54 that have considered
the scope and application of the public duty rule have accepted it on the
grounds that it provides government entities with the necessary protection from liability to function efficiently. 5 5 In recent years, however, the
public duty rule has been denounced by commentators 56 and jurists 5 7 as
being inequitable. These critics contend that by owing a general duty to
the public at large, public entities and officials, in fact, owe no duty at all.
Some of the jurisdictions 5 8 which reject the public duty rule agree with
this criticism.

59

Others, however, reject the legal doctrine on the

52. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE
385 (4th ed. 1932); F. MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, 590 (1924).
53. For modem cases applying the public duty rule, see Shore v. Town of Stonington,
187 Conn. 174, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) and authority cited therein.
54. See Shore, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379; Warren v. District of Columbia, 444
A.2d I (D.C. App. 1981); Namauu v. Honolulu, 662 Hawaii 358, 614 P.2d 943 (1980);
Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 Il. App. 3d 611, 484 N.E.2d 909 (1985); City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. App. 1983); Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan.
113,643 P.2d 129 (1982); Hempel v. Livingston-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 641 S.W.2d
51 (Ky. App. 1982); Foshee v. City of Detroit, 80 Mich. App. 263, 263 N.W.2d 337 (1977);
Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981); Cox v. Department of Natural Resources,
699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. App. 1985); Frye v. Clark County, 87 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215
(1981); O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1983); Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 367 N.E.2d 51 (1976);
Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983); Barratt v.
Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (1985); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d
275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983); see also Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that Only General, Not Particular,Duty was Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R. 4TH 1194 (1985).
55. See, e.g., J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983);
accord Miller v. Ouray Electric Light & Power Co., 18 Colo. App. 131, 70 P. 447 (1902).
56. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAtV OF THE SEVENTIES § 25.07 (1976); Note,
State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 303 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Adams v. State of Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Stewart v.
Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Minn. 1981)
(Scott, J., dissenting).
58. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656
P.2d 597 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W. 2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d
1351 (La. 1980); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,
74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Adams, 555 P.2d at 241-42. The court called the public duty rule the
"duty to all, duty to no-one doctrine" and held that:
[A]n application of the public duty doctrine here would result in finding no duty
owed the plaintiffs or their decedents by the state, although they were foreseeable
victims and a private defendant would have owed such a duty.... Why should
the establishment of duty become more difficult when the state is the defendant... ? To allow the public duty doctine to disturb the equality would create
immunity when the legislature has not.
ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
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grounds that it creates confusion in the law. 60
The public duty rule was first adopted by Colorado in 1902 in Miller
v. Ouray Electric Light and Power Co.6 1 In that case, the court justified its
acceptance of the public duty rule after considering the government's
62
need to carry out its duties without the fear of impending liability.
The doctrine was later upheld in People v. Hoag63 and Richardson v.
Belknap.

64

The public duty rule enjoyed unqualified acceptance in Colorado
65
until 1972 when the supreme court, in Quintano v. IndustrialCommission,

was confronted with a statutory duty arguably owed to the plaintiff by a
public entity and its officer. 6 6 Instead of employing the public duty rule
in its analysis, the court expressly avoided it. In denying recovery, the
court held only that the legislature must explicitly provide for a private
action to impose tort liability. 6 7 This decision arguably left the public
duty rule with an uncertain status. That uncertainty was evidenced by

two decisions after Quintano which challenged the viability of the public
duty rule. 6 8
C.

Recent Tort Reform -

The Legislature Responds

In 1986, at the same time in which the viability of the public duty
rule was adjudicated in Leake, the Colorado legislature enacted tort reform legislation in the area of governmental immunity. 6 9 This legislation was in response to the court's prior decisions which had increased
the liability exposure of government and its officials.
1.

Official Immunity Codified while Leake was Adjudicated

Even after the Immunity Act was passed, public officials continued
60. See, e.g., Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599 ("We will no longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which
spells no recover, or if he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.").
61. 18 Colo. App. 137, 70 P. 447 (Colo. 1902) (county commissioners owed general
duty to inspect the county jail wiring system and therefore no recovery was allowed for the
death of an inmate who suffocated during fire at the jail).
62. Id. at 139, 70 P. at 449 ("for no sane man would assume the position [of count%
commissioner] with such potential liability attached").
63. 54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 400 (Colo. 1913) (county clerk owed general duty to make a
newspaper publication as required by law, hence, no recovery allowed).
64. 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335 (Colo. 1923) (county commissioner owes general duty to
maintain public highways; no individual right of action can exist).
65. 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 80-2-1 (1963) required the Industrial Commission to inspect
factories and workshops "for the purpose of protecting said employees or guests against
damages arising from imperfect or dangerous machinery."
67. Quintano, 178 Colo. at 135-36, 495 P.2d at 1139.
68. Compare Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44, 47, 554
P.2d 317, 320 (1976) (following public duty rule) with Martinez v. City of Lakewood, 655
P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982) (finding public duty rule a function of sovereign immunity
and therefore insupportable where the Immunity Act abrogated sovereign immunity).
69. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1986)
amended COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 et. seq. (1982) (effective July 1. 1982) which
amended CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 130-11 -1 et. seq. (1972) (effective July 1, 1972) (original
version of Immunity Act).
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to be exposed to liability for their actions despite the availability of qualified immunity at common law. 70 It also became increasingly difficult
for the government to obtain liability insurance. Consequently, both the
governor and the legislature recognized that the continued tort exposure of public officials required immediate attention. 7 ' In 1985, the
General Assembly convened in a special session to amend the Immunity
Act. 7 2 That special session produced legislation which conferred the
same immunities and limitations on liability of public officials as existed
73
for public entities under the original Immunity Act.
2.

Sovereign Immunity Reaffirmed

The Colorado General Assembly recently enacted comprehensive
tort reform legislation which also included amendments to the Immunity Act.7 4 These recent amendments came in response to the heightened "insurance crisis" in Colorado 7 5 which prompted the governor to
form a special task force. One purpose of the task force was to investigate the reasons for the unavailability of insurance. 76 Furthermore, this
tort reform was enacted to address those judicial decisions that weakened the effectiveness of statutory immunity and exacerbated the insurance crisis. For example, the legislation now clearly states that a
dangerous road condition is one that interferes physically with the movement of traffic, 7 7 that the adoption of a policy or regulation does not
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (physician's treatment
during plaintiff's pregnancy not protected under Colorado law by governmental immunity); Cooper v. Hollis, 42 Colo. App. 505, 600 P.2d 109 (1979) (officer's impoundment of
vehicle not automatically protected by official immunity).
71. Whereas, the difficulties encountered by public entities at all levels of government in obtaining insurance, combined with the ambiguous applicability of protections of the Governmental Immunity Act to officers and employees of public
entities, has heightened the concern of public officers and employees regarding
their personal liability for acts or omissions committed within the scope of their
employment.
1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1 (Supp. 1985).
72. 55th Gen. Assembly, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (1985).
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2) (Supp. 1986) provides:
A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury, whether
brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S., the common law, or
otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be
the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and which arises out
of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his
duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing
such injury was willful and wanton; except that no such immunity may be asserted
in an action for injuries resulting from the circumstances specified in section 2410-106(1).
74. H.R. 1196, 55th Gen. Assembly, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (1985) (effective July 1,
1986) and appearing in COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1986).
75. Newspaper articles chronicled the plight of local governments throughout the
state experiencing cancellation or nonrenewal of policies. See, e.g., Sanko, Skyrocketing Costs
Trigger Anger, Alarm, Rocky Mtn. News, Nov. 19, 1985, at BI, col.1.
76. The Colorado Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance included its
recommendations in THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, Liability
Insurance and the Law of Torts in Colorado (1986).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(d) (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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create an assumed duty of care owed by the government, 78 and that governmental entities do, in fact, vicariously enjoy the common law immu79
nities of their public officials.
II.
A.

LEAKE V CAIN -

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY CHALLENGED

Facts

On the evening of September 9, 1978, Ralph Crowe, age eighteen,
attended a party in Commerce City where he consumed enough alcohol
to become intoxicated under Colorado law. 80 Later that evening, when
five Commerce City police officers arrived to disperse the party, Crowe
became disruptive and was detained for a short time by the officers.
Crowe's younger brother, Eddie, age seventeen, offered to drive Ralph
home. Satisfied that Eddie carried a valid driver's license and appeared
to be sober, the police officers released Ralph to his younger brother
and the two youths left the party in a vehicle driven by Eddie. 8' Eddie
then drove to a convenience store where Ralph assumed the driving.
Crowe drove to a new location where the party was to resume. Upon his
arrival, he struck six persons on the street, killing Jeff Cain and Jay
82
Chase.
The victims' families filed a wrongful death action, naming as defendants Crowe and his father, the five individual police officers, and the
City of Commerce City.8 3 The trial court, employing the public duty
rule in its analysis, granted summary judgment on the grounds that the
doctrine of official immunity insulated the officers from liability because
they owed no special duty to the decedents. 8 4 The court of appeals reversed and based its decision on the discretionary-nondiscretionary test
for official immunity. In holding that the officers were not immune from
liability, the court of appeals found that the officers were not performing
a discretionary act when they decided to release Crowe to his brother. 85
78.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.5(l) (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 38-39 and ac-

companying text.
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(3) (Supp. 1986). See supra note 40 and accompanying text. For other areas where tort reform addressed decisions which eviscerated the
Immunity Act, see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109(1) (Supp. 1986) (notice period begins to
run after the discovery of the injury) in response to decisions such as State of Colorado v.
Young, 665 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983) and Nowakowski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709 (Colo.
1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104 (Supp. 1986) (repealed provision of CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 24-10-104 (1982) which provided that sovereign immunity was waived whenever
the government purchased liability insurance) in response to the holding in Mason v.
State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. App. 1984).
80. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 153-54 (Colo. 1986). CoLo. REV. STAT. § 42-41202(2)(c) (1984) provides the criteria whereby an individual is considered intoxicated.
81. Leake, 720 P.2d at 153-54.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Although as a public entity, Commerce City was itself immune from a direct action
under the Immunity Act, it could be named as a party since it was statutorily obligated to
indemnify the police officers pursuant to § 240-10-11 0(l)(a). Additionally, Commerce
City was liable for the defense and any judgment entered against the employees as police
officers under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 29-5-111(1) (1977).
84. Leake, 720 P.2d at 154.
85. Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Colo. App. 1984) (the "decision by a police
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Holding

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the police officers' argument
that they owed no duty to Jeff Cain and Jay Chase. In arriving at its
decision, the court concurred with the trial court's conclusion but rejected the public duty rule on which the trial court had based its decision. 86 Instead, the court employed the same test as the court of
appeals, the discretionary-nondiscretionary test. Unlike the court of appeals analysis, however, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed after
by police officers regarding custody and definding that decisions made
87
tention are discretionary.
1.

Abolition of the Public Duty Rule

Sensitive to the uncertain status of the public duty rule created by
its decision in Quintano, the first issue addressed by the supreme court in
Leake was whether the public duty rule was a viable doctrine of law in
Colorado. 88 The court concluded that it was not and, accordingly, the
rule was abolished.89
Despite its acceptance by a majority ofjurisdictions, the public duty
rule was abandoned in Leake for several reasons. First, the court pointed
out that there were "significant exceptions" to the public duty rule, even
in jurisdictions that follow the doctrine, which dilute the potency of the
rule as an effective legal doctrine. 90 Second, the court observed that the
public duty rule was widely criticized for confusing tort law by creating
the artificial distinctions of public and private duties, 9 1 and for being
inequitable. 9 2 Third, the court was not persuaded by arguments that
officer to release a disputatious, intoxicated person from custody, and to send that person
onto the roadway under the ostensible supervision of a younger brother as caretaker" is
not a discretionary act), rev'd, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (officers not liable under a conventional tort analysis).
86. Leake, 720 P.2d at 155.
87. d. at 164.
88. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rovira argued that it was unnecessary for the
court to address the viability of the public duty rule since the officers escaped liability
using conventional tort principles, and because neither the court of appeals nor the parties' briefs addressed the public duty rule. See Leake, 720 P.2d at 164-65. (Rovira, J., specially concurring). The majority defended its examination of the public duty rule on the
ground that judicial economy necessitated a resolution. Id. at 157-58, note 7.
89. Id. at 158-59.
90. Id. at 159. One of the "significant exceptions" articulated by the court is the "special relationship" exception, under which the public duty rule fails to insulate a public
official or entity when a special relationship existed with the injured party at the time the
injury occurred. See, e.g., Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (special relationship existed between electrical inspector and plaintiff). Another exception
cited by the court - the "statutory" exception - exposes a public official or entity to
liability if a statutory duty owed to the plaintiff is breached. See, e.g., Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (police officer owed and breached statutory
duty to arrest intoxicated driver).
91. Leake, 720 P.2d at 159-60.
92. Id. Authorities cited by the court which criticized the public duty rule included
Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100
both judges and commentators. See, e.g.,
Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 460 (1983) (Utter,J., concurring); Note, State Tort Liabilityfor
Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 303 (1977).
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the rule prevents excessive governmental liability or that abolition of the
rule will interfere with governmental operations. 93 Instead, the court
maintained that an injured party would still have to satisfy the requirements of foreseeability and proximate cause required by a traditional
tort analysis. 9 4 This burden of proof would allow officials to enjoy qualified immunity under the discretionary-nondiscretionary test.9 5 According to the court, therefore, the government's exposure would still be
limited and officials could continue to effectively perform their duties
without fear of imminent liability. 9 6 Finally, the court inferred that the

public duty rule was no longer supported by public policy. The court
observed that the tortfeasor's governmental status was the reason for
denying recovery under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had
been abrogated by the court in 1971.9 7 The Colorado legislature did
nothing to revive absolute sovereign immunity and, in fact, Colorado
statutory provisions dealing with governmental immunity provided that
public entities were to be treated the same as private parties. 9 8 Therefore, the public duty rule, which also denied recovery because of a
tortfeasor's status, was in conflict with the legislative pronouncements
and the judicial abolition of sovereign immunity. 9 9
2.

Conventional Tort Analysis-Special Relationship and
Statutory Duty

The second issue addressed by the court was whether a special relationship existed between the officers and either Crowe or the decedents,
thereby creating a duty on the part of the officers to prevent injury by
Crowe. 10 0 The court relied on Jackson v. Clements 101 in its analysis. In
Jackson the court held that a special relationship existed between police
officers and an intoxicated tortfeasor if there was an ongoing custodial
relationship between the officers and the intoxicated person. 10 2 Fur93. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 160 (citing Trimble v. City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (dicussing
the discretionary-nondiscretionary form of immunity)).
96. Id.
97. Id. Sovereign immunity was abolished by the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-107 (Supp. 1986) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this article, where sovereign immunity is not a bar under section 24-10-106, liability of the public entity shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were
a private person."
99. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
100.

Id. The court explicitly employed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)

which provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless:
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the
other a right to protection.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (duty of those in charge of person having

dangerous propensities).
101. 146 Cal. App.3d 983, 194 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1983).
102. Jackson, 146 Cal. App.3d at 985, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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thermore, a special relationship could be created where police officers
themselves either created the peril or induced detrimental reliance on
03
the part of the injured or deceased party.'
The court in Leake first reasoned that since the custodial relationship between the officers and Crowe ceased when Crowe was released to
his brother at the party, the officers were at that time discharged of the
duty of protection. 10 4 Next, the court distinguished the circumstances
underlying Leake from those in Irwin v. Town of Ware, 10 5 on which the
plaintiff relied, and held that no special relationship existed between the
officers and the decedents.' 0 6 In Irwin the police officers created the
peril when they elected not to arrest a person known to be operating a
vehicle while intoxicated and who subsequently injured others. The
foreseeability of injury by an intoxicated driver created a special relationship with the plaintiffs in Irwin. The court held, however, that since
the officers in the Leake case did not encounter an intoxicated person
while he was operating a vehicle, the deaths of the decedents were too far
removed from the officers' decision to release Crowe.10 7 The court concluded, therefore, that no duty existed under the "creation of peril" test
under the special relationship rule. 10 8
The final issue addressed by the court was whether a duty was owed
by the officers by virtue of the "emergency commitment" statute.' 0 9
The court recognized that in order for an actionable statutory duty to
exist it must be shown that the claimant was a member of the class of
persons that the statute was designated to protect, and that the injury
suffered was of the type that the statute was intended to prevent.' 10
The court held that the decedents' claim failed under the first part
of the statutory-duty analysis. Even though the statute arguably contemplated protection of the public against intoxicated persons, it did not
include persons injured by an intoxicated individual who had been released to a sober relative by police officers acting in a discretionary
capacity.'' 1
103. Id. at 986, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
104. Leake, 720 P.2d at 161.
105. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E. 2d 1292 (1984).
106. Leake, 720 P.2d at 161-62.
107. Id.
108. Unlike the Jackson court, the Colorado Supreme Court did not address the issues
of the creation of a special relationship by an assumption of duty of care, or detrimental
reliance on a promise that the police would protect them. Id. at 161, n.10.
109. The emergency commitment statute, codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-1-310(1)
(1982), provides in pertinent part: "When any person is intoxicated or incapacitated by
alcohol and clearly dangerous to the health and safety of himself and others, such persons
shall be taken into protective custody by law enforcement authority .. .acting with probable cause ... "
110. Leake, 720 P.2d at 162.
111.We recognize that a cursory reading of the emergency commitment statute
may suggest that the statute was intended to protect members of the public
against intoxicated persons who appear "clearly dangerous." However, in our
view, the General Assembly did not intend to create a claim for relief against
police officers who, in their discretion, release an intoxicated person into the
"custody" of an apparently sober and responsible relative.
Id. at 162-63.
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3.

PUBLIC DUTY RULE
Discretionary Acts

In addition to holding that the officers owed no duty under a conventional tort analysis, the court concluded that the officers were immune from liability under the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction
of official immunity. 1 2 The court held that the court of appeals incorrectly relied on Irwin in deciding that the officers acted in a nondiscretionary capacity.' 13 In Irwin the officers were required by statute to
arrest the intoxicated driver just as the officers in Leake would have been
had Crowe been operating a vehicle."l 4 In Leake, however, the officers
operated under the emergency commitment statute which required the
officers themselves to exercise discretion in determining whether an individual should be taken into custody.' 15 As a result, even though the
court followed the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction employed
by the court of appeals, it reversed the appellate court for incorrectly
applying it. 116
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Abandonment of the Public Duty Rule -

Defective Underpinnings

The court in Leake, in fashioning its reasons for abandonment of the
public duty rule, revealed a hostile attitude toward, and misunderstanding of, governmental immunity in Colorado.
1. Conventional Tort Analysis: A Thin Barrier to Liability
The Leake court offered a fragile argument in response to the concerns of excessive liability and unhampered execution of official acts expressed by proponents of the public duty rule,1 17 as well as by the
legislature through its promulgation of the Immunity Act. 1 8 The court
conveniently simplified tort law by reasoning that the negligence principles of foreseeability and proximate cause serve to negate these concerns. Since the time that Justice Cardozo issued his now-famous
opinion on foreseeability and proximate cause, 1 1 9 courts, including
those in Colorado,' 20 have struggled with the proper scope of these
principles. 12 1 Both doctrines have been widely criticized for escaping
112. Even though the officials were absolved from liability under conventional tort
analysis, the court addressed the issue of official immunity "because the court of appeals
erroneously narrowed the scope of official immunity afforded police officers." Id. at 163.
113. Id.
114. Under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (1984) an officer must arrest a person driving while intoxicated.
115. Leahe, 720 P.2d at 164.
116. Id. at 163-64.
117. Id. at 160.
118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 (Supp. 1986) for this legislative declaration.
119. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
120. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 51 at § 352.
121. For example, compare Burchinal v. Gregory, 41 Colo. App. 490, 586 P.2d 1012
(1978) (failure to supervise a guest on trampoline did not result in foreseeable injury) with
Hall v. Cheyenne Mtn. Museum and Zoological Soc'y., 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1972)
(walking in area where hay being pitched on windy day did result in foreseeable injury).
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22

definition. 1
By assuming that foreseeability and proximate cause sufficiently
guard against burdening the government and depleting its funds, the
court failed to recognize that the application of these principles often
provides little protection from liability. 123 Moreover, given the past restrictive application of governmental immunity by the Colorado
courts, 1 2 4 it is questionable whether either foreseeability or proximate
cause would effectively serve to limit the liability of public entities or
calm officials' fears of lawsuits.
In emphasizing the availability of these conventional prerequisites
to tort liability, the court glossed over the fact that its decision actually
lowers the threshold for official liability at common law by elimination of
the public duty rule. The thin liability barriers of foreseeability and
proximate cause serve as weak replacements for the public duty rule.
Consequently, the Leake decision increases the exposure of government
to tort liability under the Immunity Act due to the incorporation of common law immunity under the Act. 12 5 Although the court ultimately ab26
solved the officers in Leake of liability in a commendable tort analysis, 1
neither the ultimate result nor the discussion of the availability of conventional tort principles minimizes the importance of Leake as a continuation of the judicial limitation on governmental immunity.
2.

Analysis of Common Law Immunity Misplaced

The court's reliance on the public duty rule as a functional
equivalent to common law sovereign immunity 12 7 is misplaced.
Although it is correct that the public duty rule is a function of sovereign
immunity, it is inapplicable in an analysis of official immunity. The public
duty rule was a form of both sovereign and official immunity at common
law. 128 In the sole context of sovereign immunity, however, the public
duty rule has no remaining viability in jurisdictions that have abandoned
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, where sovereign immunity has
been abolished, it does not follow that the public duty rule also lacks
viability under the scope of official immunity.
Sovereign and official immunity are distinct forms of governmental
122. See, e.g., Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1971);
Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 238 (1951); Seavay, Cardozo and the Law of
Torts, 52 HARV. L.Q. 1127 (1939) (author pungently points out that proximate cause has
become "a stench in the nostrils of Law Review editors" due to its inconclusiveness).
123. See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at § 41:
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor,
despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is
there yet any general agreement as to the best approach.
124. See supra textual discussion at Section I(A).
125. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(4) (Supp. 1986); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 2410-106(2)-(3), 118(2) (Supp. 1986). Therefore, by removing the protection of the public
duty rule enjoyed by officials under common law, the decision weakens the Immunity Act.
126. See Leake, 720 P.2d at 160-63.
127. Id., at 159-60.
128. See supra Sections I(A, 3) and I(B) of this comment.
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immunity. 129 The court demonstrated its misunderstanding of this fundamental concept by relying on the abrogation of sovereign immunity
for the purpose of abolishing the public duty rule in the context of official
0
immunity. 13

B.

Governmental Immunity Act Misconstrued

The supreme court revealed the most significant analytical defect in
its decision when it cited section 24-10-107131 of the Immunity Act in
support of the proposition that the public duty rule, the equivalent of
sovereign immunity, should be abandoned since sovereign immunity
had not been legislatively revived.' 32 The position taken by the court
was, therefore, that the Immunity Act effectively waived sovereign
immunity.
In taking this position the court cited section 24-10-107 out of context. According to the court, this section "instructs courts to resolve the
plaintiff's claim without regard to the public status of the defendant."13 3
However, the court failed to recognize that this provision only applies
when sovereign immunity has been waived in the limited circumstances
enumerated in the Immunity Act.' 34 Except in those specific, enumerated circumstances, sovereign immunity is a complete bar to recovery'
under the Immunity Act. By citing only section 24-10-107, however, the
court creates the impression that under the Immunity Act, immunity is
the exception and liability the rule. 13 5 This is a misconstruction of the
Immunity Act and ignores the designed purpose of governmental pro36
tection from tort liability for which the Immunity Act was enacted.'
C.

Leake and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act

To an extent, the legislature has preempted the future application
of Leake since public officials are now statutorily insulated from liability,
irrespective of a common law liability analysis.' 3 7 However, where immunity has been waived, ' 3 8 and where common law principles of immu129. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.

130. The supreme court is not alone in confusing the separate principles involved
under a governmental immunity analysis. Lower courts have also articulated this same
flawed analysis as the court in Leake. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388 (Colo.
App. 1982).
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-107 (Supp. 1986).
132. See supra Section III, A of this comment.
133. Leake, 720 P.2d at 160.
134. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-104, 106(1)(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The circumstances in which public entity and official immunity are waived are numerous. See
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (Supp. 1986).

135. At least one other Colorado court has taken this erroneous approach to the Immunity Act. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982).
136. See supra Section 1, A, 1 of this comment. Curiously, the supreme court correctly
articulated the status of sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act in Kristensen v.
Jones, 195 Colo. 122, 124-25, 575 P.2d 854, 855-56 (1978).
137. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-118(2) (Supp. 1986).
138.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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nity remain to protect persons in government,' 3 9 the public duty rule no
longer offers protection to public officials acting within the course and
scope of their duties. 140 More importantly, Leake is significant because
the abolition of the public duty rule marks a further inroad into governmental immunity in Colorado. which in turn suggests that the judicial
persistence in exposing the government to tort liability will continue despite legislative action. This conclusion is supported by Colorado
courts' past decisions. 14 1 Therefore, even though the legislature has
now codified both sovereign and official immunity, the amended Immunity Act may provide less governmental protection than that contemplated by the legislature since the courts have demonstrated a
willingness to take the lead in providing a remedy to a party injured by
public officials or entities. Consequently, further reform may be
required.
Future limitations on governmental immunity by judicial construction of the Immunity Act are undesirable and contrary to the express
legislative intent. Each time the supreme court has acted to erode governmental immunity, the legislature has reacted by reinstating protection from tort liability. These persistent responses illustrate the
legislature's commitment to sovereign and official immunity. With the
recent reform, the representative branch of government has again made
it clear that public policy favors governmental immunity. This concept
should be recognized and the Immunity Act should be given its in14 2
tended protective effect.
CONCLUSION

In Leake, the Colorado Supreme Court drove another stake into the
heart of governmental immunity by abolishing the public duty rule and
increasing the exposure of government and its officials to tort liability.
Leake is the most recent decision on a continuum of cases that exemplifies courts' distaste for governmental immunity in both common law and
statutory forms. This judicial predisposition is contrary to the intent of
the legislature to insulate the government from tort liability. The 1986
amendments to the Immunity Act make it clear that the direction of tort
reform in Colorado regarding governmental immunity is toward limitation of exposure to liability and not expansion. Any future interpretation of governmental immunity should recognize this express legislative
intent. In this way the will of the people, as expressed through the democratic process, would not be thwarted.
Kevin M. Dufficy

139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(2)-(3), 118(2)-(4) (Supp. 1986).
140. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(4) (Supp. 1986); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2410-106(2)-(3), 118(2) (Supp. 1986).
141. See, e.g., supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
142. See Comment, The Need for State Immunity from Suit, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1321
(1984) (discussing the desirability of the recognition of statutory immunity by courts).

